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Abstract
Profiles are knowledge constructs that represent and identify a data subject. While not a new 
phenomenon, the use of profiling has exploded and its ubiquity is likely to increase, a s  a  result of 
the widespread adoption of monitoring technology. The literature on profile development tends to 
refer to the practice, the technique or the technology of profiling, separately. Little has been written 
on how the perspectives interact with each other and, ultimately, shape the emerging behaviour 
profile. In order to map out the elements that impact on behaviour profiling, this thesis uses 
organisational semiotics, enhanced with classification theory, for key constructs.
The study views profilers a s  agents who interpret and act on available information according to 
particular sets of technical, formal and informal factors and who, in the presence of incomplete or 
ambiguous stimuli, may fill in or distort information. Furthermore, the thesis exam ines how the 
position of the interpreter in the profiling process influences the result of the exercise. A case  study 
conducted in a British financial institution dem onstrates how technical system s and profilers acting 
in particular contexts influence each other in a dialectical process, whereby the characteristics of 
the data available impact the analysts’ ability to interpret an event and, at the sam e time, the 
analysts tend to look for in the data only what they consider conceivable.
The discussion centres on the influence of the type of stimuli available, the relational context and 
the actions of individual profilers in shaping the emerging meaning, in the context of financial crime 
detection. In addition, it considers the role of technical, formal and informal system s to overcome 
eventual variances in meaning.
The thesis extends the applicability of organisational semiotics with classification theory. Inspired by 
models of sequential encounters, the thesis provides a  methodological contribution by developing a 
tool for the analysis of sequential meaning making processes. A practical contribution em erges from 
mapping the impact of the profilers’ perceptions into the emerging profile, and by suggesting 
mechanisms for shaping those perceptions.
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1. Introduction
The thesis examines the process of development and use of profiling for the purpose of detection of 
one particular form of financial crime: money laundering. It investigates the topic by analysing the 
procedure at a UK financial institution, and adopting a subjectivist perspective on the phenomenon. 
The thesis draws on semiotics, enhanced with classification theory, to study how technology, 
employee and context interact with each other and impact on the emerging profile.
The term ‘profiling’ has particular u ses  and synonyms among specific communities. In North 
America, for instance, the term is sometimes associated with racial classification and som e authors 
(e.g., se e  Schauer 2003) consequently suggest the use of alternative terms such a s  ‘modelling’ or 
‘generalisations’ to refer to general applications. However, this thesis uses the term ‘profiling’ a s  the 
overall term describing the representation of data subjects’ behaviour, independently of the context 
or the purpose of the profiling initiative.
7.7 Problem domain and scope of research
The term profiling has its origins in the Latin word profilare, which m eans, literally, to draw a line 
forward1. The sam e dictionary also offers the following definitions of profiling: 'to draw or shape a 
profile of-, to produce a profile of. With profile further being defined as: ‘a  side view of an object or 
structure; a representation of an object or structure seen from the side; an outline o f an object; a 
biographical essay presenting the subject's most noteworthy characteristics and achievements; a 
formal summary or analysis of data, often in the form of a graph or table, representing distinctive 
features or characteristics’. In summary, profiling consists of developing a partial representation of 
an object, structure or person. Such representation consists of a  ‘set of correlated data that 
identifies and represents a data subject’ (Hildebrandt and Backhouse 2005).
The profiling process consists of studying patterns of behaviour of particular data subjects, and 
grouping such subjects according to exhibited behaviour. Such study of patterns requires capturing
1 Source: http://dictionarv.reference.com/search?Q=profilinq
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records of events and actions overtime and using these stored interactions to determine typical 
behaviour, as well a s  deviations from that behaviour (Lenzen 2004). In this sense, a  profile does not 
represent any particular person; rather, profiles represent an abstraction of observed patterns of 
behaviour. The abstraction does not necessarily contain all the details of the original behaviour. 
Furthermore, at high enough levels of abstraction, it becom es very difficult to identify any one 
particular example that corresponds to the profile, entirely.
The traditional method to classify data subjects based on records of behaviour relied on manual 
analysis and interpretation. Nowadays, however, the process is highly automated and dependent 
on computer technology, which is justified by the increase in size of the typical transactional 
database (Hardy 2004) and by a desire to keep costs under control (Canhoto and Backhouse
2004). In particular, data mining technology and techniques are routinely used to analyse the vast 
amounts of data available (Hosein 2005). Hildebrandt and Backhouse (2005) point out that profiling 
is also a practice and that, in that sense , profiling reflects a specific way of doing things within 
specific contexts and with specific purposes. In this sense, the profiling process is subjective and 
prone to be influenced by the circumstances surrounding, a s  well a s  the goal informing, profile 
development.
The thesis subscribes to the conceptualisation of profiles as abstract, subjective representations of 
behaviour. It investigates the process of profile development, examining the extent to which factors 
surrounding the development and use of profiles affect the outcome.
1.2 Relevance of the study
Organisations routinely capture and incorporate in a  database records of almost every aspect of 
daily life, from magazine subscriptions to financial transactions (EPIC 2004) and develop models -  
the behaviour profiles -  of who people are and what they do. Profiles are knowledge constructs that 
represent and identify a data subject, and enable private and public organisations to a s se s s  the 
risks and opportunities of that sam e data subject (Hildebrandt and Backhouse 2005). Subsequently, 
the profiles inform decision making in a variety of areas, including non-commercial applications
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such a s  crime prevention and detection. In circumstances where there is no universal empirical 
support for the profile -  because it is not possible to empirically verify the behaviour - the resulting 
decisions are made under conditions of ambiguity (Schauer 2003; Stein 2004; Durlauf 2005).
Som e authors defend that profiling has negative consequences for the persons being profiled 
(Custers 2004; Risse and Zeckhauser 2004; Stein 2004). For instance, data subjects may suffer 
discrimination a s  a  result of profiling (Schauer 2003; Durlauf 2005), or be wrongly allocated to 
categories that they do not belong to (Angell and Backhouse 2004). Additionally, there is potential 
for abuse of the system in the form of intensive surveillance and breach of one 's right to privacy 
(Etzioni 1999; Levi and Wall 2004; Hosein 2005).
Other authors are optimist, however, and regard profiling as  not only inevitable but even desirable 
(NSF 2003; Schauer 2003). According to profiling supporters, today’s  society is so complex that we 
need to make decisions and judgements very quickly, something that is possible, only, through the 
identification and understanding of underlying patterns in situations and behaviours (Gladwell
2005). Some authors go even further and suggest that profiling is a  critical factor in ensuring the 
long term viability of organisations (Inhoff 2004), because it allows organisations to optimise 
production (Hill, Menda et al. 1998), rationalise the use of limited resources (Feinberg, Krishna et al.
2002), increase sa les (Parsons, Zeisser et al. 1998; Peltier, Schibrowsky et al. 2002), prevent fraud 
(Brockett, Derrig et al. 2002), detect identity theft (Harris 2002) or even aid in the fight against 
terrorism (Swartz 2002).
The importance and frequency of profiling has exploded in the information society, regardless of the 
profound disagreem ent in the literature regarding the net benefit of the activity. While profiling is not 
a  new phenomenon -  fingerprinting has been practised for a long time - technologies such as  RFID, 
road pricing system s and mobile technology are likely to accelerate the extension of profiling to ever 
more areas of social life, and augment the m ass of information that m ust be coped with. Selection 
of the relevant bits of information, its meaning and how to act on it are som e of the big issues of the 
21st century (Hildebrandt and Backhouse 2005). Understanding the subjective nature of profiling 
and identifying the sources of bias is particularly important given that software tends to consolidate
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and hide away the ‘arguments, decisions, uncertainties and the processual nature of decision 
making' surrounding its development (Bowker and Star 1994). Additionally, a  clear understanding of 
the extent to which outcomes may be affected by the process would be of obvious interest to 
practitioners, in the sense that it could inform potential corrective m easures.
In summary, the process of development and use of profiling is a problem domain of central 
significance, bound up in the growing debate about the role of profiling in the information society. 
The thesis contributes to understanding this problem domain at both the conceptual and the 
practical levels, as  described in the final chapter.
1.3 Status of research on profiling
The literature on profile development, while abundant, tends to refer to the practice, the technology 
or the technique of profiling, separately, as discussed in chapter two. The literature focusing on 
profiling practice examines factors contributing to or hindering its adoption in particular industries. In 
the case of the banking industry, the empirical subject of this thesis, the literature points to an array 
of cultural and structural factors that may influence the adoption and deployment of profiling 
initiatives in an organisation. The literature on profiling technology considers the instruments used 
in the profiling process, including, but not limited to, information technology. The literature focusing 
on the technique addresses issues such as how to extract information from the database or select 
among different profiling algorithms. Some authors acknowledge that the analyst can interfere with 
the profiling exercise and highlight the need to identify the sources of, and minimise, that 
interference (e.g., (Chung and Gray 1999; Pazzani 2000; Kohavi, Rothleder et al. 2002)).
Little has been written on how the three elem ents -  technique, technology and practice - interact 
with each other and, even less, how they shape the emerging behaviour profile. In particular, calls 
have been made for research that provides a deep understanding of cognitive (e.g., (Gersh, Lewis 
e t al. 2006)) and contextual (e.g., (Lavrac, Motoda et al. 2004)) factors in profiling.
Page 15
The lack of an integrated view offers very limited prescriptive value regarding the content of profiles, 
or categories in general. The limited understanding of how definitions come to be construed, in turn, 
grants little scope for developing solutions for ineffective or undesirable profiles. Profiles are an 
overarching feature of the information society, and the consequences of acting on flawed profiles 
can have disastrous consequences for individuals and organisations. In order to understand the 
multi-faceted process of profile development, it is necessary to develop an integrated understanding 
of the various aspects of information processing. The present thesis addresses that challenge by 
applying an information system s’ lens to the study of profiling.
1.4 Information Systems and Profiling
Information system s are, according to Avgerou and Comford (1998), 'information and data handling 
activities in human organisations’ (page 1) and ‘essentially an organisational rather than a 
technological phenomenon’ (page 2). In other words, information processing extends beyond the 
sphere of technology. Moreover, a s  a discipline, information system s studies technology a s  part of a 
social system (Avgerou 2000). Information system s research lies at the intersection of people, 
organisations, and technology (Silver, Markus et al. 1995; Hevner, March et al. 2004), thus offering 
the so much needed integrated approach to the study of profiling.
Individuals construct and work with computers, communication networks and other artefacts within 
a particular organisational setting which, in turn, exists within a wider environmental context (Heeks 
2000). Similarly, profiling is an activity increasingly dependent on artefacts, which takes place in 
particular organisational settings and, a s  per the focus of this thesis, within the wider banking 
industry practice and regulatory requirements.
In the field of Information Systems, early conceptualisations of technology a s  sources of societal 
change have been replaced by a focus on the interplay between technology and human actions, 
within an institutional setting (Avgerou 2000). In particular, the study of the context has emerged as 
a major them e in the recent Information System s literature, accompanied by a theoretical em phasis 
on the social shaping or construction of technology (Lewis and Madon 2004). Two recent examples
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are Williams’s  (1999) study of the role of context in the implementation of information system s’ 
innovation, and Ciborra’s  (2002) description of the bricolage and improvisation surrounding the 
development and use of complex information system s in organisations. T hese and other studies, 
examining the role of context in shaping technology, tend to use detailed case  studies, depicting the 
ways in which organisations’ members shape the meaning and usage of information technology.
Based on the conceptualisation of information system s a s  social phenomena, and the interest in 
research on the interaction between technology and human actors, within particular organisational 
settings, the author of the present thesis suggests that the study of profiling is both relevant and 
timely in the field of Information Systems.
Information system s have been described as  being composed of three different but interrelated 
levels (Liebenau and Backhouse 1990; Liu 2000; Stamper, Liu e t al. 2000; Lewis and Madon 
2004).The informal level embodies the culture, system s of belief and politics that govern the 
perception, expectations, behaviour and values of the individual members of the system. The formal 
level refers to the attributes of the system that have been formalised and officially documented in 
rules, procedures, policies and other forms of bureaucracy. The technical level contains the 
hardware, software and data protocols, a s  well a s  elements of the design of the technology, such 
as  the layout and interface of the system. The technical system is em bedded in the formal system, 
which, in turn, resides in the relevant informal system. The three layers are mutually constitutive 
and interdependent.
Metaphorically, there is a  ‘Russian doll' effect where the informal is the outer shell containing the 
formal, and this contains the technical. Such a conceptualisation implies that the technical cannot 
be examined without first considering the outer layers in turn (Backhouse 2005; Halperin 2006). The 
decomposition of the information system into these three sub-system s enables the analyst to 
examine situations where groups acting in different informal environments react differently to the 
sam e formal or technical element. One example of such a situation has been described by Eckfeldt 
(2005) who indicates that consumer acceptance of RFID technology stem s not from the attributes of 
the technology itself, or from legal initiatives concerning privacy protection, but rather from
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consumer perceptions. Similarly, Kamp and colleagues (2007) note that compliance with European 
data protection legislation2 materialises in markedly different technical solutions across different 
industries, in particular retail and credit services. The conceptualisation of profiling information 
system s a s  layered structures assist the researcher in revealing how profiles become ‘frozen 
organisational discourse’ (Bowker and S tar 1994). This thesis analyses profiling over and above the 
technical aspects, devoting special consideration to the informal and formal contexts where the 
profiles emerge.
1.5 Goals and contributions -  Research questions
The present thesis is informed by the ‘Russian Doll’ conceptualisation of Information System s 
described in the previous section. The thesis com pares profiling to an act of communication 
occurring at three levels: 1) the technical level that captures and manipulates the data, 2) the formal 
level that regulates and administers the process and 3) the informal level of the analysts 
participating in the profiling process. Looking at profiling a s  a communication issue, facilitates the 
individual analysis of each element in the system, thus leading to an ‘incremental understanding 
within the system’ (Smith, Blackman et al. 2003).
The research focuses on the particular case  of detection of financial crime, a secretive and illegal 
activity whose profiling is profoundly marked by ambiguity and uncertainty. Financial intelligence - 
the systematic collection and analysis of data relating to financial transactions - makes extensive 
use of technology. Indeed, the use of automated monitoring system s is often seen a s  a powerful 
ally in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing (e.g., (McCue 2006)). As a  result, 
there is a  burgeoning industry providing sophisticated computer technology and complex 
mathematical models to mine financial data and single out unusual patterns of transactions. Yet, 
research in the field has been limited to either the technology, or the technique or the practice, and 
does not present the integrated approach advocated by Hildebrandt and Backhouse (2005). The 
current thesis, by adopting an information system s perspective, presents an holistic understanding 
of the phenomenon.
2 Namely, article 7 of the directive 95/46/EC
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The thesis examines how the effect of the technical, formal and informal levels of the organisation 
impact on profiling. Specifically, it is guided by the question ‘How do categories come to be 
construed and used in profiling, when only limited empirical support is available to support 
the emerging profile?. This question can be divided in two secondary questions, namely ‘How do 
classifications emerge7 and ‘What are the implications o f the technical, formal and informal 
elements for the emerging profile?. The relationship between the research questions is depicted 
in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 -  Research questions
How do classifcations em erge?
How do ca tegories com e to be  construed  and u se d  in profiling, when only 
limited empirical support is available to  support the em erging profile?
In order to study the profiling activity a s  a  communication process, the study draws on 
organisational semiotics, a well developed body of communication theory that has been used to 
analyse a wide range of artefacts and social practices (Pagel and W esterfelhaus 2005). However, 
while semiotics specifically acknowledges the role of. the agent in creating meaning, it does not 
address the agent’s cognitive process. Schauer (2003) described profiles a s  ‘generalisations in 
street clothes’, and conceived of profiling a s  an activity that draws on the use of categories, even 
when the attributes of the category do not accurately describe the subject - person or otherwise - 
being profiled. The concept of ‘category’ is a fundamental one in cognitive science. Namely, 
categories are mental constructs, rooted in people's experience and, as such, not uniform in their 
composition (Medin, Lynch et al. 1997; Medin, Lynch et al. 2000). In order to investigate the role of 
the user in profiling, the thesis expands organisational semiotics with insights from classification 
theory.
The primary objective of this research is to examine the effects of technology, employee and 
context in financial crime profiling. Furthermore, the thesis makes practical contributions to the 
problem domain, suggesting ways to detect sources of subjectivity. Moreover, the study contributes
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W hat are the implications of the technical, formal 
and informal elem ents for the em erging profile?
to methodology by developing a tool for the analysis of sequential meaning making processes and 
by proposing techniques to model individual perceptions.
1.6 Thesis structure
The thesis is organised in seven chapters. The present chapter set the research project in context, 
and defined the scope of the study and the research questions. Chapter two provides a broad 
perspective on the topics of relevance for this study, by reviewing the literature on the practice, 
technology and technique of profiling.
Building on the previous chapters, chapter three describes the theoretical framework that guides the 
research analysis. Two distinct theoretical approaches are used to understand the development 
and use of profiles: organisational semiotics and classification theory. The chapter includes a 
discussion of the contributions and limitations of the two theoretical approaches to the study of 
profiling. Chapter four presents the research methodology and design. It describes the approach to 
the research, details the selection of the case  study and introduces the data collection and data 
analysis techniques.
The empirical exercise forms chapter five. The chapter first presents the organisation under study, 
and then proceeds to present the contextual, personal and technical elements that form the 
information system of the case  study. Chapter six contains the analysis of the empirical data and 
highlights the key findings from the study. The chapter goes on to address, specifically, the thesis’s 
research question and sub-questions, and provides a new understanding of the profiling process. 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis, providing an overview of the research exercise and its 
contributions. Additionally, the final chapter discusses the limitations of the study and em phasises 
emerging options for research on the topic of profiling.
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2. Literature Review
The review presented in this chapter includes the three areas identified in Hildebrandt and 
Backhouse’s (2005) definition of profiling namely practice, technique and technology. The chapter 
presents the literature according to focus on particular topics, rather than whether it originated in 
one particular academic community or another. Having said that, it is noticeable that particular 
communities tend to research and write about specific topics. Section 2.1 examines literature on the 
practice of profiling in the banking system. Section 2.2 reviews literature on the profiling technology 
used for the detection of money laundering. Section 2.3 focuses on the technique that organisations 
employ to develop profiles of their users, data mining. Section 2.4 reflects on the insights obtained 
from the literature surveyed, as  well as its limitations in providing insight into the role of the context 
and the user in profiling, and sets the overall context of the thesis.
2.1 Profiling practice in the banking industry
This section examines som e of the existing works on profiling in the chosen industry, and outlines 
key emerging them es. It examines the practice from a comprehensive point of view, establishing a 
preliminary foundation in the topic.
The Financial Services Authority (FSA), the entity that regulates the financial services industry in
the UK and henceforth referred to as  the regulator, defines banks a s  firms with permission to carry
on regulated activities such as accepting deposits or other repayable funds from the public and
granting credit (FSA 2006). In particular, banks act a s  intermediaries between borrowers and
lenders (McDonald and Keasey 2002). Financial services, and in particular retail banks, touch the
life of m o st if not all, citizens in the western world:
‘As the chief means of managing the wages and investments of the population, [retail 
finance] affects directly or indirectly all of the population of '<developed '  countries’. (Leyshon 
and Thrift 1999)
2.1.1 Historical influences
The analysis of the literature suggests that there were two key historical drivers of the development 
of profiling: changes in the industry and changes in banking behaviour. The former focuses on the
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changes that the banking industry has been going through since the 1980s a s  a result of regulatory 
and economic factors, and leads to viewing profiling a s  a  necessity. The latter centres on the way 
that technology has influenced the way that payments are  processed and custom ers interact with 
the institutions, and treats profiling as an opportunity. The two angles are described next.
Regulatory and economic factors
Regulatory reform during the early to mid-1980s enabled firms from different parts of the financial
system to move into each other’s  markets (Brooks 1989; Molyneux 1990). The result w as a sharp
intensification of competition between the various institutions, leading to aggressive cost cutting and
promotion of new products:
‘The traditional values and mores based around sobriety, convention, long and faithful 
service, and skill in judicious lending were giving way to a new emphasis on marketing, 
selling, change, growth targets, performance-related pay, customer service and quality... 
The new priorities were cost-cutting and the aggressive selling of new products. ((Storey, 
Edwards et al. 1997), page 63)
The period of growth w as followed by recession in the 1990s, leading to the contraction of the 
branch networks of banks and building societies and a reduction in profit margins (Meadows and 
Dibb 1998). Specifically, Leyshon and Thrift (1999) report that between 1989 and 1995, the British 
financial industry registered a decrease of 19% in the number of bank and building society 
branches, a number that reached 25% for Barclays Bank. Additionally, the rise of the Internet and 
e-commerce from the mid-1990s onwards led to the development of Internet-based financial 
services, promising 'to efface space and place, and to bring about an anytime, anyplace, anywhere, 
24/7 economy for retail consumers' (French and Leyshon 2004). The growth of the Internet also 
enabled consumers to access information at little or no cost. Easy and inexpensive access to 
information, consequently, empowered the consumers and eroded the advantage formerly held by 
established intermediaries in the value chains of all kinds of businesses (Evans and Wurster 1997; 
Evans and Wurster 1999). Furthermore, it gave rise to new intermediaries (French and Leyshon
2004) - a  spurt of demutualisations and acquisitions followed, promoting a huge growth from within 
the UK banking industry (Datamonitor 2004). By the end of 2001, there were circa 108 million 
personal bank accounts in the UK, including 69 million current accounts and ensuring that there 
were considerably more current accounts than adults in the UK (Mintel 2003).
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The significant structural changes described meant that, for a firm to be profitable, it had to be
responsive to consumer needs (Knights, Sturdy et al. 1994). Profiling has long been advocated as
the way by which organisations identify and address such needs:
'Viewing a heterogeneous market as a number of smaller homogeneous markets (...) 
provides for greater maximisation of consumer or user satisfactions, tends to build a more 
secure market position and to lead to greater over-all stability (Smith 1956).
The reason why profiling increases effectiveness is that by placing customers in groups that are as 
similar as possible, the behaviour variation within the groups decreases and, therefore, the 
outcomes of the targeting efforts will increase (Lenzen 2004).
Behavioural factors
In addition to the structural factors mentioned in the previous section, the turn of the century has
seen a marked change in the way in which the banking industry processes payments. As illustrated
in figure 2.1, there is now a growing dependency on electronic transfers, such as direct debit or
standing orders, an expanding network of cash machines and a generalisation of payment of
workers’ wages directly into their bank accounts, at the expense of the traditional cheque (Mintel
2003). The ubiquitous use of money in electronic forms means that transactions are easily
registered and traceable (deGoede 2004):
‘Each movement and transaction... leaves a trail of electronic traces, which means that 
individuals cannot easily disappear’ (Levi and Wall 2004)
Figure 2.1 - Evolution of paym ent mode
Cheques and cash
-  Automated payments |
Source: adapted from Mintel (2003)
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The wide availability of data fomented a fundamental change in attitude towards customer data 
(Leyshon and Thrift 1999). Organisational strategists gained access  to a wealth of data with which 
to group consum ers into homogeneous groups regarding product preferences or exhibited buying 
behaviour (Lambin 2000; Kotler and Keller 2006). The profiles tell organisations whom the 
customers in each segm ent are, what they do and their motivations to buy from the organisation, an 
effort greatly aided by the increasing availability of technological solutions that enhanced the 
capacity of organisations to store and manipulate customer information (Wedel and Kamakura 
2000; Dibb 2001).
Comparison
In summary, adoption of profiling seem ed to be, first, a  response to the competitive pressures 
brought about by structural changes in the banking industry. Later, profiling w as seen a s  an 
opportunity created by the wide availability of data resulting from the changes in p rocesses and in 
banking behaviour. What these two influences have in common is the presence of an economic and 
administrative rationale.
2.1.2 Evolution of the content and type of profiling
The review also revealed that the content of the profiles in use has changed over the years. Initially, 
the data held in m ost corporations’ databases focused on data necessary for the transaction, and 
the customer w as fully aware of its collection. Nowadays, however, there is a  trend towards 
capturing a s  much data as possible (Dodge and Kitchin 2005), including personal information from 
various sources (Tavani 1999; Cary, Wen et al. 2003), in the belief that obtaining increased 
volumes of data will lead to better marketing opportunities (Nash 2001), improved security (Lyon 
2003) and a better understanding of customer behaviour (Elliot 2004).
Moreover, the data capture often goes unchallenged because it is often promoted a s  an inherent 
part of the service, a s  in the case of loyalty cards (Humby, Hunt et al. 2003), or because the default 
settings are defined in such way that customers have to consciously opt out of data capture (Dodge 
and Kitchin 2005). Additionally, those that attempt to avoid data capture often face penalties such 
a s  degradation of service, additional costs or even service denial (Bennett 2001; Dodge and Kitchin
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2005). There are even some instances of data capture where the customer is not aware that 
personal information is being compiled, a s  in the case of electronic monitoring of ac to n s or 
communications over the Internet (Cary, Wen et al. 2003).
Profiling seem s to be evolving from a transaction oriented, permission based practice, to an all- 
inclusive one, that happens by default. The organisation’s  efforts to collect, monitor and process 
vast amounts of information on individuals’ identities and actions is arguably in conflict (Seigneur 
and Jensen  2004) with the fundamental human right of those sam e individuals to ‘be left alone’ 
(Cooley 1888). Legal mechanisms such as the Data Protection Act of 1998 in the UK, attempt to 
regulate the procedures for collection and use of information regarding an individual’s identity and 
actions, but such legal tools are useful only a s  long a s  they are relevant and enforceable (McCarthy
2003). Technological mechanisms such as password and firewalls attempt to prevent unauthorised 
access to such information, but these safeguards are useless in the face of determined attackers 
(Langheinrich 2001; Langheinrich 2002).
While every society values privacy, the expressions of this privacy vary significantly across cultures
(Westin 1967), social groups (Raab and Bennett 1998; Perri6 2005) and situation (Brunk 2002;
Jiang, Hong et al. 2002; Kobsa and Schreck 2003; 2004; Seigneur and Jensen 2005). The issue of
privacy is extremely important for banks, as well. According to Donaghy (2002):
‘[In W estern society) monetary privacy is seen as a fundamental tenet... most financial 
institutions, businesses and their clients view money and privacy as being two sides of the 
same coin’.
There is an apparent conflict between, on the one hand, the business rationale of profiling as 
discussed in section 2.1.1 and, on the other hand, the beliefs of particular groups of customers a s  
well as the cultural traditions of the banking industry.
Another trend noticeable in the literature reviewed is the move from profiles that merely describe 
past behaviour, to attempts to predict future behaviour based on specific attributes. Examples of 
predictive profiling include the calculation of the propensity that a  particular person will consum e a 
given product, based  on the fact that he or she lives in a particular place (Dodge and Kitchin 2005). 
Predictive profiling is also used to determine whether or not to grant access to service, a s  in the
Page 25
case of credit scoring (Leyshon and Thrift 1999), or to estim ate which consum er segm ents will be 
the most profitable in the long term and, therefore, to determine which level of service to offer to 
each segm ent (Danna and GandyJr. 2002; Leyshon, Signoretta et al. 2006).
Trying to predict the future behaviours of custom ers is, to a  certain extent, speculative. As noted by 
Schauer (2003), Stein (2004) and Durlauf (2005), when it is not possible to empirically verify the 
behaviour being profiled, the resulting decisions are made under conditions of ambiguity. What the 
trend described in the literature reviewed in section 2.1.2 implies, therefore, is that the level of 
uncertainty surrounding the use of profiles is increasing.
2.1.3 The use of profiling
According to the literature reviewed, there are numerous applications of profiling. Organisations 
profile their customers in order to be able to predict future needs and assist in the development of 
new products (Germain 2000), decide which custom ers to target with initiatives such as  targeted 
advertising and price discrimination (Feinberg, Krishna et al. 2002), cross-sell to existing custom ers 
(Parsons, Zeisser et al. 1998; Peltier, Schibrowsky e t al. 2002), or prevent custom ers from leaving 
the company (Dibb and Meadows 2001). Profiling is also used in risk management, such a s  the 
assessm ent, via credit scoring techniques, of a customer’s  ability to repay a loan (Bofondi and Lotti
2006). In addition, profiling assists in fraud prevention or detection, a s  in the cases  of identity theft 
or the fraudulent use of credit cards (Harris 2002). In summary, the applications of profiling range 
from revenue maximisation to cost reduction.
An important question that em erges is whether the specific application for which a profile is used 
impacts on the emerging profile. Speed and Smith (1992), who conducted an extensive review of 
profiling in the financial services industry, found two distinct approaches: a  priori and ad-post 
strategies. The former requires the analyst to select a segmentation variable, typically age, social 
class and life cycle, and then allocate customers to each of the groupings, accordingly. The latter 
strategy consists of dividing the market based on how consum ers respond to a  number of variables.
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Speed and Smith argue that aspects of the market a s  well a s  the company’s position within it afFect 
the choice between the two approaches mentioned.
An interesting study by Kamp and colleagues (2007) examined to what extent two instances of 
profiling -  customer loyalty and credit scoring -  complied with European data protection legislation, 
in particular article 7 of the directive 95/46/EC. The study’s authors noted significant differences 
between the practices analysed, a s  summarised in table 2.1.
Table 2.1 - A nalysis of two p rofiling applications
C ustom er loyalty Credit sco ring
Data collected Extensive collection of 
personal data.
Extensive collection of product 
related, a s  well a s  personal, data.
Information given to the 
customer regarding 
extension of data collection
Systematic failures 
identified.
It is clear that personal data will 
be collected and examined.
Data mining techniques Association, classification 
and clustering.
Mostly classification. In some 
cases, also regression.
The study by Kamp and colleagues is valuable for the purpose of this thesis in the sense  that 
em phasises how the general practice of profiling discussed in section 2.1.1 may be operationalised 
differently in different contexts. The insights of Kamp et al. study are limited, however, because this 
is a  descriptive work and does not offer, or attempts to offer, an understanding of the differences 
observed.
In reference to Kamp et al.’s  study, Canhoto (2007) suggested that the differences highlighted in 
table 2.1 were not the result of random factors; rather they were a result of the different nature and 
goals of the two practices. Canhoto noted that customer loyalty programs aim to encourage or 
reward actions that are considered positive by the organisation. This type of practice is relatively 
recent, is exploratory and focused on the individual. By opposition, risk scoring programs aim to 
discourage particular types of behaviour. Such programs are based on long established profiles, 
are confirmatory and focused on classes. As a result, customer loyalty applications tend to be rather 
more intrusive than credit scoring ones, but the latter may be more discriminatory than the former 
and often result in denial of service. Canhoto’s  comments are, however, a  suggestion for an
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interpretation of Kamp et al’s  results, rather than a conclusion based on extensive analysis of 
numerous profiling practices. Therefore, Canhoto’s comments are hardly generalisable.
Particularly insightful for the purpose of this thesis is Meadows and Dibb’s  (1998) study of profiling 
practices a t seven major UK financial institutions. The authors identified four barriers to profiling in 
the banking industry, summarised in table 2.2. The first barrier is customer data requirements  and 
occurs because even though banks may be collecting a wealth of customer data, it is traditionally 
focused on account balances and transactions, offering limited customer information, only such as 
address and date of birth. Banks rarely collect, or systematically share, data that marketers tend to 
value, such a s  a customer’s  lifestyle, family or interests. Som e of the organisations interviewed by 
Meadows and Dibb were trying to fill in the gaps using personal interviews and questionnaires, but 
such exercises are slow and expensive. The second barrier identified by Meadows and Dibb is the 
strategic background to segmentation, that is, the fact that many banks have a ethos of public 
service and an egalitarian approach to the market, which is not supportive of an approach that 
differentiates between consumers. The third barrier mentioned in Meadows and Dibb’s  study is the 
fit between distribution channels and segmentation. The authors note that the implementation of 
segmentation affects a  wide range of staff types, linked with diverse functions such a s  marketing 
staff in the back office, customer dealing staff in branches and call centres, financial advisers, etc... 
and that have different expectations and needs. The fourth and last barrier is the organisational 
context surrounding segmentation, in particular the fact that banks have, traditionally, been product 
rather than customer oriented. The staff is usually organised into product team s, and are not 
necessarily aware of developments in another team, even though it may affect their own activities.
Table 2.2 -  B arriers to  segm entation  in th e  banking industry
Barrier Origin
Customer data requirements Banks rarely collect or systematically share with the 
marketing department the type of data that marketers tend to 
value.
Strategic background to 
segmentation
Ethos of public service and egalitarian approach to the 
market not always supportive of differentiated approach to 
servicing the customer.
Fit between distribution channels 
and segmentation
Differing expectations and needs of the various types of staff 
roles involved in serving the customer.
Organisational context 
surrounding segmentation
Banks have, traditionally, been product rather than custom er 
oriented and the various units tend to work in silos.
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The barriers identified by Meadows and Dibb, and summarised in table 2.2, suggest that the 
content of the profile is related to the nature of the business, in the sense  that different 
organisations may collect different types of data. Adoption of profiling may be affected by the 
organisation’s  ethos and the extent to which it requires the participation of staff in diverse functions. 
Finally, profiles drawing on information from more than one type of product are likely to be 
particularly difficult to develop. In other words, the implementation of profiling in a given organisation 
may be limited by hard and soft factors. Hard factors refer to the type of data available, w hereas 
soft factors include the cultural and operational characteristics of the organisations.
It is also important to note that the findings outlined in table 2.2 are, to a certain extent, surprising 
when contrasted with the literature described in section 2.1.1. The literature presented earlier 
depicted profiling a s  a profit-enhancing activity, highly desirable in a customer-oriented scenario. 
The study now presented, however, highlights som e points of conflict between, on the one hand, 
the concept of profiling and, on the other hand, its application.
In summary, a s  the focus of the literature surveyed moved from the general practice to the specific 
applications, nuances are noticeable. Apparent conflicts and contradictions emerge, a s  well a s  an 
indication that the profile’s  goal and context influences its operationalisations. The next section 
examines a specific area of customer profiling in the banking industry: the attempt to detect 
particular instances of financial crime.
2.1.4 Detection of financial crime
Financial institutions in the UK face a regulatory requirement to observe due diligence with respect
to their customers’ account activity, in order to aid in the prevention and in the detection of one
particular form of financial crime: money laundering (Johnston and Abbot 2005). The requirement
%
includes prosecutorial threats, a s  well as the possibility of corporate penalties (Levi and Gilmore 
2002).
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Money laundering refers to the processing of funds resulting from criminal activity, with the intent of 
disguising their illegal source (Treasury 2004). Since 2001, money laundering control has been 
extended to also include the processing of funds to finance criminal activity -  e.g., terrorism - 
regardless of whether those funds had had a legal origin or an illegal one. To reflect the fact that the 
money to fund criminal activities may have had a licit origin, some sources (e.g., (Cassella 2003)) 
refer to this activity a s  reverse money laundering.
Money laundering causes major economic and social disruption across borders. Whilst not a  new 
phenomenon, formal initiatives to detect and combat this criminal activity are relatively recent - the 
first international agreem ent making money laundering a criminal act w as the United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, also known a s  the 
Vienna Convention, signed in 1988. The international fight against money laundering gained further 
momentum in the wake of several high profile terrorist attacks worldwide, most notably, the attacks 
of Septem ber 11th 2001 in the USA. Figure 2.2 depicts the possible sources and applications of 
money laundering, and highlights the several stages of the process.
Figure 2.2 - Money laundering in a broader framework______________________________
Legitimate behaviour Criminal behaviour
Type of activity and 
source of profit Legal business concern
Illegal business concern
(e.g., drug Mafficking, corruption, tax evasion, insider trading, racketeering, 
gan toting. charities and other front companies, etc...)
Type of financial
transaction/
intermediary
______ __________
Legal transaction through 
bona fide institution
Money laundering through Money laundering through 
regulated institution informal financial or non­
regulated institution
Use of funds Legitimate consumption / 
investment / development
' ~~~~~~Crimi 1 
investment / development
Source: Adapted from Kaufmann (2002)
UK regulations mandate banks to participate in anti money laundering (AML) efforts (JMLSG 2006) 
even though they may not derive any direct business benefit from the exercise. There is a 
regulatory imperative to profile customers, which is a novel driver not considered in the literature 
reviewed in the previous sections. It is worth exploring how the nature of this driver might affect the 
profiling of money laundering.
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According to a survey of 281 financial institutions, AML is perceived a s  a very expensive exercise 
for the organisations and one that may even lead the organisation to lose its customers (Yeandle, 
Mainelli et al. 2005). Some retail banks’ interviewees in that sam e survey believed that the 
organisation might be able to derive customer knowledge from the effort, but not the type of insight 
that could be used to the advantage of the organisation. Detection of money laundering is, 
therefore, not only driven by a factor not previously considered in the literature surveyed, but it is 
also a practice informed by conflicting rationales.
There is, also, some scepticism among senior m anagers in retail banks regarding the effectiveness 
of the whole initiative to detect and prevent money laundering (KPMG 2004; Webb 2004). A survey 
of 30 London banks, consisting of interviews with the person in charge of money laundering 
detection at each institution -  the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) - found that 27% of 
MLROs had a positive attitude towards AML initiatives, 40% were neutral and 33% had a negative 
attitude (Webb 2004). In addition, 60% believed that the related regulations were ineffective in 
reducing money laundering and that the costs greatly exceeded any benefits. Interestingly, large 
retail banks tended to have more positive attitudes towards money laundering monitoring than 
medium and small ones, and than wholesale banks in general. Unfortunately, W ebb's paper does 
not offer any explanation for the difference in attitudes. W ebb’s  survey of 30 London banks also 
identified that where the MLRO is a senior manager, with direct access to the m anagem ent board, it 
is easier to obtain resources than otherwise, and recommendations are likely to be acted upon 
faster. In summary, there is a generalised climate of disbelief regarding the effectiveness of the use 
of profiling for financial crime detection which, according to Meadows and Dibb (1998), hinders the 
development and deployment of this particular profiling application.
Use of the application
One of the fundamental difficulties of monitoring financial crime in general, and money laundering in 
particular, is that there is virtually no convincing empirical evidence on the extent of money 
laundering that is actually occurring within the economy (Harvey 2005). By its very nature, money 
laundering occurs outside the normal range of economic statistics and remains unobservable. 
There are numerous studies discussing how large a phenomenon money laundering is. However,
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money laundering being an illegal activity, there are no official m easures of its size3. The UK’s  HM 
Customs and Excise estim ates that the annual proceeds of crime in the UK might be in the region of 
£25bn (NCIS 2003), which represents about 7% of the total value of deposits in the UK’s  personal 
accounts.
Given the volume of money involved, it is no surprise that many national governments and
international organisations have developed several initiatives to combat money laundering. AML
programmes are seen  as  essential in crime prevention, by visibly removing the financial reward for
those engaging in criminal activity:
‘Most organised crime is not worth anything to a criminai unless they can launder the 
money. A high percentage of criminal gangs have money laundering as a secondary 
activity  (ARA 2003).
The underlying assumption in national AML programmes is that effective counter money laundering 
regulation increases the costs to the launderer, therefore reducing his or her ability to carry out 
criminal activity. Furthermore, as a result of the reduced opportunity for laundering, the criminal 
should not be able to profit from the proceeds of his or her crime, eventually leading to a reduction 
in the underlying criminal activity (Harvey 2005).
AML initiatives have a role of detecting criminal activity either directly, by triggering a criminal 
investigation, or indirectly by contributing to an existing investigation -  e.g., by uncovering links 
between associates, by demonstrating the movement of money or goods, or by eliciting the modus 
operandi of a given criminal group. Given the role of the banks as  a point of entry of cash  in the 
financial system, and a major facilitator of movements of cash globally, it is not surprising that AML 
initiatives worldwide focused on ‘curtailing money laundering through the front doorJ (Zdanowicz
2004). The British Bankers’ Association campaign ‘Proving your identity - How money laundering 
prevention affects opening an account, for instance, highlights the role of retail banks in hindering 
criminals’ access to the financial system, by stepping up identity checks (BBA 2005). The leaflet 
states that:
3 The difficulty in measuring the size of money laundering activity is further compounded by the fact 
that different institutions tend to adopt different definitions of money laundering, thus hindering the 
comparison of estim ates produced by the different sources.
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‘A key defence against money laundering is to prevent accounts being opened in false 
identities (...) It is necessary to make checks on everyone’ (BBA 2005).
When financial institutions identify suspicious activity, they submit a  Suspicious Activity Report 
(SAR)4 to the Serious Organised Crime Agency5, the British financial intelligence unit (FIU). The FIU 
then decides whether or not to inform the relevant enforcement authorities who, in turn, may take 
further action (Backhouse, Canhoto et al. 2005). SARs are considered one of the key variables in 
the subsequent number of prosecutions for money laundering activity (Bell 2001), and an effective 
SAR regime should lead to an increase in the amount of criminal a sse ts  recovered through the use 
of such reports, a s  well a s  to an increase in convictions and other disruptions of criminal activity 
(Roule and Kinsell 2002; KPMG 2003).
What the literature mentioned in this section does not seem  to consider is that the role of banks in 
the fight against money laundering, ultimately, runs against the traditional strategic objectives of 
these institutions. Additionally, the traditional banking activities of accepting deposits, granting credit 
and intermediating between borrowers and lenders are very different in nature from the monitoring 
and quasi law enforcement actions required by the regulations mentioned. Adoption of profiling for 
the detection of money laundering is not only driven by a rationale different from the ones informing 
the adoption of other instances of profiling, but it is also bound to face-strategic and practical 
barriers.
Content of the profiles
Rules regarding what and how to monitor are, according to Angell and Demetis (2005), formulated 
by a three level hierarchy of organisations: transnational organisations such a s  the Financial 
Actions Task Force  (FATF), national organisations such a s  the regulators, and local organisations 
such as the banks themselves. Recommendations and requirements from the transnational level 
are passed onto the national level, where they are interpreted according to national priorities before
4 Also known a s  Suspicious Transactions Report
5 The Serious Organised Crime Agency is a law enforcement agency which assum ed functions on 1 
April 2006, taking over functions from the National Crime Squad and the National Criminal 
Intelligence Service, among others. Prior to April 2006, regulated institutions would submit their 
Suspicious Activity Reports to the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS).
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being delivered as procedural requirements to the local level. Organisations then formulate their 
own internal policies and strategies. Appendix 1 provides an overview of the main regulations and 
guidance issued at each of the three levels.
It is important to highlight that banks bear the responsibility for threshold vigilance, but have no say 
in public policy and regulations' development. Another important difference between the regulator 
and the banks is that the regulator covers a wide range of public interests, while the communication 
between banks and the public tends to be limited to their client relationship (Veyder 2003).
The variety of actors, with their own respective interests, issuing regulation and guidance on AML 
profiling is not the only hurdle in the development of profiles, however. The FSA puts forward two 
instruments for AML control: know your customer (KYC) and monitoring. KYC is described as 
‘obtaining and using information about a customer over and above the basic identification 
information’, w hereas monitoring is 'being alert to how a customer is using a firm’s products and 
services and therefore to signs of money laundering’ (FSA 2003). The requirement to detect 
suspicious activity dem ands from financial institutions knowledge of the normal and reasonable 
account activity of their customers so that they have a m eans of identifying transactions which fall 
outside of the regular pattern of activity (Basel 2001; IFAC 2004)., Yet, a s  the CEO of Searchspace, 
a leading provider of AML profiling solutions, noted:
‘Knowing someone through his or her behaviour is inherently bespoke, and interactions 
between a corporation (bank) and customer on this mass scale is new. ’ (Kingdon 2004)
There are numerous difficulties associated with the development of profiles of money laundering 
behaviour, a s  noted by the Office of Technology A ssessm ent of the US Congress (OTA) and 
summarised in table 2.3. Firstly, there is an extremely low incidence of money laundering compared 
to the overall volume of financial transactions. Secondly, there are no tested profiles of money 
laundering behaviour, because it is an extremely broad phenomenon whereas the institutions’ view 
is limited to its own business area. Referring specifically to the monitoring of wire transfers, the OTA 
report (1995) notes:
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‘Building traditional knowledge-based systems involves interviewing an expert about a 
relatively narrow problem area (e.g., diagnosing bacterial diseases) and constructing a 
computer based model of the reasoning process of that expert (...) Analysts and law 
enforcement agencies have little expertise analysing wire transfer on the scale envisioned 
by the proposals and until they do, it will be difficult or impossible to construct a traditional 
knowledge based system to analyse wire transfers automatically.’ (OTA 1995)
The third difficulty identified in the OTA report is that monitoring money laundering requires analysis 
of transaction patterns across time and space. Such analysis em phasises the importance of 
examining data from multiple locations and time periods, making localised screening very difficult 
and placing heavy requirements in terms of databases and analysis tools. Fourthly, there are many 
forms of laundering money. Any system attempting to identify money laundering needs to evaluate 
a limited set of transactions against multiple money laundering mechanisms. In addition, money 
launderers are believed to change their modes of operation frequently, quickly rendering obsolete 
any known methods. Fifthly, many transaction patterns associated with money laundering differ little 
or nothing from legitimate transactions. Lastly, money laundering monitoring may be done at 
different levels of analysis, ranging from the level of one particular transaction to the level of the
criminal network, and including the individual or account level and the business or organisational
level. Analysis that focuses at any one level, risks missing activity that is detectable a t the 
aggregate level. Yet, different institutions are best positioned to do analysis at different levels and 
may be unable to conduct a multiple level analysis altogether (OTA 1995).
Table 2.3 -  Difficulties in developing AML profiles______________________________________
o Low incidence of money laundering over total volume of transactions
o Lack of tested  profiles
o Temporal and spatial dimensions of the profiles
o Dynamic nature of criminal conduct
o Similarity between licit and illicit conduct
o Need for multiple level analysis____________________________________________________
The OTA report is admittedly over 10 years old. However, the situation does not seem  to have 
changed much, a t least as far a s  AML profiling in the UK is concerned. Gill and Taylor (2003) 
examined the profiling criteria used by numerous financial organisations in the UK concluding that 
there w as a generalised focus on cash transactions over and above specific thresholds. Besides 
that common factor, however, the criteria used to determine suspicion varied significantly, as 
illustrated in table 2.4. Some organisations monitored specific clients, locations or organisations.
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Others monitored departures from usual customer, account or product behaviour. Organisations 
tended to monitor a variety of features simultaneously, though there were also those that focused 
on one feature, only.
Table 2.4 -  Criteria u sed  to  identify potentially su sp ic io u s  tran sac tio n s
Criteria % using
in isolation with o thers
Over a particular sum 18.6 45.9
By certain clients 9.0 46.5
From certain locations 6.3 48.0
From offshore entities 5.4 42.9
Departing from past client behaviour 11.1 59.0
Departing from normal account, product or service behaviour 12.1 61.6
Source: Gill and Taylor (2003)
The variety of criteria presented in table 2.4 is symptomatic of the relative novelty of the profiling 
application to which it refers, a s  well as of the difficulties mentioned in the OTA report. A detailed 
analysis of the literature reveals several factors that contribute to the ambiguity in profiling financial 
crime. First, strictly speaking, money laundering does not correspond to any one particular 
behaviour (IFAC 2004; Yeandle, Mainelli et al. 2005). Indeed, it em anates from many types of 
predicate crime such a s  drug trafficking, illegal arms sales, prostitution, people trafficking, fraud and 
embezzlement, insider trading, bribery, corruption, tax evasion or siphoning off of aid funds 
(Johnson 2001; Treasury 2004). Since 2001, money laundering control has been extended to 
include the financing of terrorist activity. In practice, the money launderer tends to commit various 
forms of crime -  for instance, smuggling and tax evasion will occur simultaneously because the 
person who brings goods to a country without declaring them to customs is also unlikely to pay 
taxes on the profits of such activity (Canhoto and Backhouse 2005). Second, money laundering 
may involve a variety of actors, ranging from individual criminals that launder the money to highly 
sophisticated organised crime groups that have their own ‘financial director'. The extent of these 
networks is driven by a number of factors, such a s  the volume of money to be processed or the type 
of predicate crime committed (Bell 2002). Third, the form that money laundering takes is 
continuously evolving (Masciandaro and Filotto 2001). Launderers are constantly responding to 
regulatory initiatives by experimenting with novel strategies and instruments (Boorman and Ingves 
2001; Harvey 2005), such a s  moving money over the Internet, or using online casinos and e-
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banking (Lilley 2000; Philippsohn 2001; Angell and Demetis 2005). Fourth, the few elements of 
information available are held by different institutions that do not exchange information easily, owing 
to legal6, strategic7 and operational8 reasons (Backhouse, Canhoto et al. 2005). Without appropriate 
sharing of information, it is extremely difficult to verify the reliability and effectiveness of money 
laundering profiling.
In summary, there are various international, national and local organisations that publish regulation 
and guidance on AML monitoring. In that sense, banks are agents of other institutions. It is 
important to note, however, that the rules dictate what banks have to do, but not how to do it, 
resulting in a variety of criteria in use by these AML agents. In addition, the general guidance is 
difficult to translate into practice because of numerous technical difficulties linked with the nature of 
the phenomenon being profiled.
Emerging trend
Similarly to the general trend observed in section 2.1.2, the fight against financial crime is ever more
reliant on predictive profiling. This type of profiling is particularly valued in the field of crime
detection and prevention (Gersh, Lewis et al. 2006; McCue 2006):
‘Using predictive analytics, we can accurately model complex interactions, associations or 
relationships and the use these models to identify and characterise unknown relationships 
or make reliable predictions of future events. Employed in military strategy development 
and planning, data mining and predictive analytics can facilitate the attainment of dominant 
battle space awareness.’ (McCue 2005)
McCue’s  optimism, however, is contra balanced by other authors (e.g., (Kunreuther 2002)) who 
note that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to empirically verify the behaviour being modelled 
and predict the evolving money laundering schem e, or where and how the next terror attack will 
occur.
6 E.g., data protection obligations
7 E.g., in order not to compromise ongoing investigations
8 E.g., existence of limited human resources
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The em phasis in predictive profiling in crime detection assum ed particular relevance in the wake of
major terrorist attacks in the US, Madrid and elsewhere:
'(l)t actually represents a marked shift towards planned actuarial strategies that rely upon 
the analysis of secondary data obtained through the convergence of technologies and 
databases to surveil individuals and suspect groups who have previously been identified as 
a potential risk. It also symbolises a deepening and widening of the use of data mining 
away from (a) reacting to events by the surveillance of suspect individuals within suspect 
groups that have been identified by traditional forms of intelligence gathering, towards (b) 
the proactive surveillance of what effectively become suspect populations, using new 
technologies to identify ‘risky groups’ by their markedly different patterns of “suspect 
behaviour”. '  (Levi and Wall 2004)
AML is, in summary, both similar to and distinct from other profiling practices. As IFAC (2004) noted, 
in reference to AML terminology, 'with near ubiquity, these terms are strongly contextual and highly 
judgemental. Money laundering monitoring seem s to occur regardless of the (dis)belief in the goals 
of the activity, the lack of confidence on the effectiveness of the tools in use and the numerous 
technical difficulties encountered.
This section reviewed the practice of profiling in the banking industry, from its inception to emerging 
issues that are likely to shape the intensity and form of profiling in the industry. The next section 
focuses on the technology used in profiling.
2.2 Profiling technology
Profiling technology refers to the instruments used in the profiling process. In order to illustrate the
concept, Hildebrandt and Backhouse (2005) use the example of fingerprinting:
'[Fingerprinting] is a technology, involving hardware (ink and cards and/or electronic 
imaging devices). Fingerprinting is a good example because it has been practiced for a long 
time before the computer took over; thereby demonstrating that profiling is not new. ’
The collection and processing of data is an activity increasingly reliant on technology, both because
advances in information technology have made it increasingly ubiquitous in organisations, and
because there is a growing demand for evidence-based information to support decision making in
organisations (Sund 2003):
‘The growing pervasiveness of identification codes and informational systems that match, 
trace, monitor and regulate populations (...) coalesce as a metatrend, that of the creation of 
a machine readable world. ’ (Dodge and Kitchin 2005)
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The increasing availability of computer system s and software applications, the generalised adoption 
of Internet and, in certain fields, the compulsory record keeping mandated by government 
regulation mean that data is being produced and w arehoused at unprecedented rates. Additionally, 
there is an emerging trend to view information a s  a  product in itself, with high market value. 
Companies that collect valuable data are in a position to becom e an information broker by reselling, 
a s  reports, the data collected (Berry and Linoff 1997). As a result, the number of records or objects 
in a typical database has increased exponentially, a s  has the number of fields or attributes 
describing each object (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro et al. 1996; Hand 1998; Bruha 2000). The 
consequence is that the size of the typical database increased dramatically, with som e sectors 
registering an increase of 9,999 times in the 5 years between 1999 and 2004 (Hardy 2004). 
Consequently, numerous companies emerged offering software to profile customers and/or 
databases of particular segm ents of the population. Examples of commercial organisations whose 
revenue stream s come from providing technologies and data products to corporations and 
governmental bodies include Acxiom, ChoicePoint, Claritas, Equifax, Experian and Lexis-Nexis, 
among many others (EPIC 2004).
Alongside the supporters of the increasing use of computer platforms to profile behaviour, there are 
those who alert to risks such a s  threats to privacy (e.g., (Jennings and Fena 2000; Lyon 2003)) or 
security problems (EPIC 2004), among others. This thesis does not wish to adopt a  position 
regarding the benefits and disadvantages of technology. Rather, it entirely espouses the view that 
‘Technology in itself is neither good nor bad, but its effects are never neutraf (Hildebrandt and 
Backhouse 2005) and, therefore, investigates how and to what extent technology impacts on 
profiling outcomes.
2.2.1 Technology in AML profiling
The FSA has been reluctant to state that banks must buy AML software, but it often implies that 
staff cannot manually check against blacklists and monitor transactions for suspicious activity 
(Maguire 2005). In practice, the detection of suspicious activity is a complex and resource-intensive 
task, accomplished by a range of manual and technology based  methods.
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In a KPMG survey, 90% of the respondents based in W estem-Europe stated that they rely on staff 
vigilance, among other methods, to identify potential money laundering (KPMG 2004). Gill and 
Taylor (2003) reported, additionally, that over 80% of UK banks with 1,000 or more staff have 
adopted automated transaction monitoring system s. However, that percentage is much smaller for 
banks below the 1,000 staff threshold as, according to the sam e survey, less than 20% use 
software to monitor transactions.
The specific solutions adopted by each bank vary widely, and may include vendor solutions, 
employment of in-house data miners to develop ad-hoc queries or the adoption of models 
developed by the relevant FIU (RSM 2002; Canhoto and Backhouse 2004; KPMG 2004). Of those 
financial organisations that use automated solutions to monitor money laundering, it is estimated 
that only a minority use bespoke software, w hereas the rest are roughly equally divided between 
those using adapted and unadapted standard software (Gill and Taylor 2003).
2.2.2 Attitudes towards AML technology
Gill & Taylor (2003) reported that around three quarters of the organisations that the authors 
surveyed considered that too much reliance is placed on technology to monitor money laundering. 
This attitude w as similar among those that use  money laundering system s and those that did not 
adopt automated solutions, therefore suggesting that there is not only scepticism about what the 
technology can contribute but also dissatisfaction among those that did adopt technological 
solutions.
In a report investigating the use of technology for the automated detection of money laundering, the
OTA of the US Congress gloomily concluded that:
‘Automated computer screening of transactions for money laundering is virtually impossible' 
(OTA 1995)
The OTA report advanced several reasons, summarised in table 2.5, that make detection of money 
laundering, via automated monitoring, difficult. OTA's analysis focused on the case  of wire
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transfers, but the findings are easily transferable to other financial transactions, in general. The OTA 
noted that the banking system handles massive volumes of transactions, daily, therefore generating 
large volumes of data to be analysed. Yet, the potential for information contained in each of these 
transactions is very low. Some institutions use exclusions to reduce the volume of data to be 
analysed, but that decision carries the risk that money launderers could attempt to use  the non­
monitored transactions to launder their funds. Another factor concerns the difficulties and the risks 
associated with the transmission, processing and storage of large volumes of custom er data. 
Difficulties originate, for instance, in capacity constraints or system s’ integration. Risks arise from 
possible security leaks of the stored records. A third factor relates to incomplete or faulty data. 
Organisations do not need to collect, for commercial purposes, information that is necessary for 
AML detection. In situations where the data is collected, it is not always reliable owing to processing 
errors or even deliberately wrong information provided by the customer, who wishes to confound 
analysis. Furthermore, information regarding the individual and business nam es and addresses is 
usually entered in free form text, resulting in numerous variations in format or misspellings. The 
fourth factor mentioned by OTA is that transactions vary greatly in their characteristics, which 
produces a wide variability of data formats and data types. The fifth factor is that detection of money 
laundering requires the comparison of behaviours of different individuals and com panies to general 
profiles of behaviour for types of individuals and companies, for instance in the relevant socio 
economic group or type of business activity. Yet, monitoring institutions have fragmentary records of 
their customer only. The sixth and final factor refers to the difficulty in obtaining confirmed models of 
money laundering for data analysis9. The long list of hindering factors, led OTA to conclude that:
‘Analysing the relatively small amount of data in each [transaction] presents a  surprising
array of problems.’ (OTA 1995)
9 The difficulty arises because years often elapse between the transaction occurs and the eventual 
law enforcement investigation leads to prosecutions and, therefore, specific information about the 
type of transactions used. Additionally, there is the argument that law enforcement agencies may 
be able to catch only the incompetent money launderer, whose behaviour is not representative of 
sophisticated schem es. Finally, law enforcement agencies do not identify or prosecute all money 
laundering activity and, therefore, any reference models that eventually em erge will always be 
limited in scope.
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Table 2.5 -  Issues in automated transaction monitoring_________________________________
o Large volume of data to be analysed
o Difficulties and risks associated with data transmission, processing and storage
o Incomplete or faulty data
o Heterogeneous data formats and types 
o Fragmentary records
o Difficulty in obtaining confirmed cases of ML for data analysis__________________________
OTA’s view is mirrored in the following statem ent by the CEO of Searchspace, the provider of a
leading AML monitoring software (RSM 2002):
‘More sophisticated analysis has used intelligent systems to enhance manual investigations 
(...) Data mining techniques are more useful when an investigation is already under way, 
because they are suited to agencies that pursue criminal investigations. They are less 
useful for industries attempting to prevent the abuse in the first place.' (Kingdon 2004)
It is also difficult to understand which, if any, of the various automated products available has a 
technically superior approach. Despite the power and sophistication of the various AML 
technologies in the market, none has yet proved to be irrefutably better than the others at identifying 
launderers (RSM 2002).
Similarly, choosing a  technological solution based on economic factors is fraught because 
calculating the return on investment of an AML system is particularly difficult. Harvey (2005) 
suggests that the costs of AML should be sought in the investments that institutions are forced to 
make in physical and human capital. However, firms experience considerable difficulty in identifying 
these costs (Yeandle, Mainelli et al. 2005), not least because changes in regulations require 
changes in their systems, and those changes are both unpredictable and outside the control of the 
organisation. Additionally, AML also impacts the bank’s  relations with its customers, incurring 
possible loss of business, as  well as additional m anagem ent costs of products such a s  loans and 
deposits (Masciandaro and Filotto 2001). As far a s  the benefits of AML are concerned, there may 
be som e gains from being better able to place a financial or credit product, a s  a  result of the 
additional information collected on the client (Masciandaro and Filotto 2001), but the main value 
factor seem s to be that certain downsides are avoided, namely fines and reputation dam age 
(Harvey 2005). Kitano (2005) goes further and suggests that the high adoption rate of such system s 
w as partly driven by the series of fines imposed by the financial regulator on several UK financial 
institutions that breached AML requirements. The total amount of fines between 2002 and mid 2005
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exceeded £6 million, with the highest single fine applied in 2003, exceeding £2 million (FSA 2003; 
Kitano 2005).
In summary, the method to profile money laundering behaviour in the UK is heavily reliant on staff, 
and not necessarily making use of bespoke or specially adapted software. There is a  trend towards 
increasing use of information technology to detect money laundering, despite generalised 
scepticism regarding the suitability of technology to monitor this particular type of behaviour and the 
difficult in assessing the technical value or the net benefits of alternative autom ated monitoring 
systems.
2.3 The profiling technique
Organisations develop profiles using data mining systems, which comb through data collected from 
various online and off-line customer touch points (Mattison 2000; Danna and GandyJr. 2002; 
Hosein 2005), and extract useful patterns or models from the data (Hand, Manila et al. 2001). The 
purpose of the data mining exercise may be to explain or to monitor behaviour. In the former, the 
objective is to produce an overall summary of a set of data to identify and describe the main 
features of the shape of the distribution, w hereas in the later, the objective is to identify departures 
from the norm and detect unusual patterns of behaviour (Jackson 2002). As testified by Buck
(2001):
'The retail and financial industries have been among the first to embrace data mining 
technologies, first with the analysis of data in large corporate warehouses, and more 
recently in the analysis of online web-based activities’
Organisations traditionally justify investment in data mining solutions by the phenomenal expansion
of the data space (Anand, Bell et al. 1996) and the resulting sharp increase in the size of the typical
database (Hardy 2004):
'There is no alternative to heavy reliance on computer programs set to discover patterns for 
themselves with relatively little human intervention' (Hand 1998).
Lavrac et al. (2004), however, contest this argument, and note:
'The data mining community takes as its starting point that we are deluged with data, and 
the fundamental problem is dealing with the overwhelming quantity of observations. While
Page 43
this may be true for some business applications, for (others) this is the exception rather 
than the rule.’
Whether data miners have to deal with overwhelming quantities of observations or not, the fact is 
that data mining is now common in numerous commercial applications such a s  loan requests 
screening (Langley and Simon 1995), corporate bankruptcy prediction (Kyung Sung, Chang e ta l .  
1999) or machinery control (Evans and Fisher 2002), a s  well a s  scientific applications in the fields of 
astronomy, biology and many others (Langley 2000). Money laundering is no exception. AML 
system s process the financial transactions using data mining techniques that employs both 
statistical modelling tools and also artificial intelligence tools to flag non-obvious relationships 
between pieces of data in large input data sets, or to look for unusual patterns of behaviour, such 
a s  sudden cash movements in a previously dormant account (Brenneman and DeLotto, 2001, 
Complinet, 2005, RSM, 2002).
Policing and intelligence agencies worldwide adopt the sam e data-warehousing techniques 
generally associated with commercial business activities (Jensen 2005; McCue 2005; McCue 
2006):
‘Many of the [tools to detect crime] already exist The business community has exploited 
data mining and predictive analytics for several years. The same tools and techniques that 
are used to determined credit risk, discover fraud, and identify which consumers are likely 
to switch cell-phone providers also can be exploited in the fight against terrorism’ (McCue
2005).
Despite the generalised adoption of data mining in profiling, including AML, the field is not without 
controversies, a s  described next.
2.3.1 Central debates
The traditional technique to process data and classify data subjects relied on manual analysis and
interpretation, a s  explained by Hand (1998):
‘What we are describing here is nothing but exploratory data analysis, an activity which has 
been earned out since data were first analysed (...) But there is a difference (...) the sheer 
size of the data sets now available (...) containing many millions or even billions of records 
(...) Special storage and manipulation techniques are required to handle data collections of 
this size’.
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In order to start a data mining project, the organisation needs to have some kind of data storage 
with query facilities in place. Furthermore, ideally, the organisation should already have 
experimented extensively with more traditional query and reporting tools, and adopted data mining 
solutions only after concluding that the traditional solutions do not work or are too labour intensive 
(Lavrac, Motoda et al. 2004).
The em ergence of data mining requires a specific method of data inquiry:
‘Traditionally the task of identifying and utilising information hidden in data has been 
achieved through some form of traditional statistical methods. Typically, this involves a user 
formulating a guess about a possible relationship in the data and evaluating this hypothesis 
via a statistical test. This is a largely time-intensive, user driven (...) approach to data 
analysis. With data mining, the interrogation of the data is done by the data mining 
algorithm rather than by the user. Data mining is a self organising, data influenced (...) 
approach to data analysis. Simply put, what data mining does is sort through masses of 
data to uncover patterns and relationships, then build models to predict behaviour’ (Chan 
and Lewis 2002).
Chan and Lewis’s  description suggests that the use of data mining tends to minimise -  or, even, 
eliminate - the influence that analysts have in the process of data collection and analysis. This view 
is echoed by other researchers who define data mining a s  an exercise that ‘strives to discover new  
knowledge from data, effectively letting the data speak for itself  (Williams 2006). The data driven 
view of data mining is, in turn, supported by numerous success stories such as the deployment of a 
system at Bell Atlantic to allocate technicians to solve telephone problems and that, arguably, 
saved the organisation more than $10 million per year due to the accuracy of its allocation 
decisions (Danyluk, Provost et al. 2002), or the system implementation at American Express to 
screen loan applications and that could predict loan default in 70% of the cases, w hereas human 
experts could only do so in 50% of the cases (Langley and Simon 1995).
As a result, the data mining community has invested considerable research effort on issues of 
learning how to classify data and of finding natural clusters of data (Olafsson 2006), or issues of 
processing and visualising enormous data sets (Abbiw-Jackson, Golden et al. 2006; Yang and 
Olafsson 2006; Zhang, Liu et al. 2006). The list of topics discussed in the leading conference in the 
field (table 2.6) offers a  similar perspective.
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Table 2.6 -  Main top ics d isc u sse d  at KDD co n feren ces
KDD-89™ KDD 2006"
Topics Expert database systems 
Scientific discovery 
Fuzzy rules
Using domain knowledge 
Learning from relational 
(structured) data 
Dealing with text and 
other complex data 
Discovery tools 
Better presentation 
methods 
Integrated system s 
Privacy
Applications of data mining 
Data and result visualisation 
Data warehousing
Data mining for community generation, social network 
analysis and graph-structured data 
Foundations of data mining 
Interactive and online data mining 
KDD framework and process 
Mining data stream s 
Mining high-dimensional data 
Mining sensor data 
Mining text and semi-structured data 
Mining multi-media data 
Novel data mining algorithms 
Privacy and data mining 
Robust and scalable statistical methods 
Pre-processing and post-processing for data mining 
Security issues
Spatial and temporal data mining
On the contrary, there are sources that posit that, even though the data mining process is largely 
quantitative and automated, it is still mainly influenced by factors other than the technical platform. 
In particular, Chang et al. (2003), in a study of adoption of data mining solutions among Taiwanese 
financial services organisations, found that adoption was influenced by a mixture of organisational 
and personal factors. Namely, adoption of data mining was positively related to the size of the host 
organisation and the emphasis that it put on data availability. Additionally, the authors found a direct 
relationship between adoption of data mining and individual decision making styles, with adoption 
highest among organisations where the relevant decision m akers relied primarily on data, rather 
than personal experience, for decision making. Hwang and colleagues (2004) also investigated 
organisational factors influencing the adoption of data warehouse technology and, indirectly data 
mining, and concluded that adoption was positively influenced by the size of the bank, internal 
needs and competitive pressure, as well as person-related characteristics such a s  support from top 
management and existence of a technology champion.
Additionally, Lavrac et al. (2004) point that project managem ent skills are one of the most important 
factors in guaranteeing the success of a data mining initiative:
10 First edition; Source: (Piatetsky-Shapiro, 2000)
11 Most recent edition; Source: http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigkdd/kdd2006/workshops.html
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‘A well defined process is of importance to achieving successful data mining results, 
particularly if the number of participants involved in carrying out the data mining tasks is 
large, involving teams of individuals with different expertise, skills, habits and cultural 
backgrounds.’
The analyst can also influence the process itself. Tim Mason, the director of one of the most famous 
applications of profiling in the UK -  Tesco's Clubcard -  is quoted a s  saying that, far from being a 
straightforward and objective process, the mining of customer data requires the use of ‘intuition and 
creativity as well as statistical know-how, and you have to hope you have identified the right things 
to test  (Humby, Hunt et al. 2003).
Finally, personal characteristics influence which patterns in the data are deem ed useful or 
interesting (Agrawal, Imielinski et al. 1993; Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro et al. 1996; Pazzani, Mani e t 
al. 2001) and, in this away, the perceived success of the whole data mining initiative.
The present thesis adopts the ontological view that data mining, and hence profiling, is indeed 
affected by the individual agents participating in the process. Therefore, the researcher needs to 
understand and model the user’s  influence on the process, with a view to developing m eans to 
either leverage on or minimise that influence. The next section reviews the data mining literature in 
an effort to uncover whether and how analysts influence what the data ‘tells’ them.
2.3.2 The data mining process
The processing of data includes several steps ranging from definition of a goal for the data mining 
exercise to the evaluation of its effectiveness. Different data mining authors have proposed a 
varying number of stages in this process, as illustrated in table 2.7.
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Table 2.7 -  A lternative view s on the  data  mining p ro cess
(Fayyad, P iatetsky-Shapiro 
e t al. 1996; C hung and  Gray 
1999)
(Berry and Linoff 
1997) (P eacock  1998)
(Chapm an, Clinton et 
al. 2000)
1) Learning the application 
domain
1) Identifying the 
business problem
1) Understanding the 
project objectives
2) Creating a target dataset 2) Transforming data 1) Data Funnelling
2) Data collection and 
preliminary analysis
3) Cleaning and preparing the 
dataset
2) Data pre­
processing 3) Data preparation
3) Exploratory data 
analysis
4) Transforming the data 4) Data recoding and transformation
5) Choosing the algorithm’s 
function 5) Querying the data 4) Data modelling
6) Choosing the data mining 
algorithm
6) Development of 
models
7) Querying the data
8) Interpreting the data 
outputs 7) Model validation
5) Evaluation of the 
model
8) Model scoring 
10) Recalibration of 
the model
9) Using the discovered 
knowledge
3) Acting on the 
information
9) Reporting the 
results
6) Deployment of the 
results
4) Measuring the 
results of the 
exercise
A well-known model of data mining, and the one that is emerging a s  the standard model for 
practitioners (Jackson 2002; Lavrac, Motoda et al. 2004) is CRISP-DM, which stands for CRoss 
Industry Standard Process for Data Mining. The CRISP-DM model emerged from a consortium of 
four industrial partners, under the auspices of the European Commission. According to this 
standard, data mining is conceived of a s  a cycle, as illustrated in figure 2.3, consisting of the 
following six steps (Chapman, Clinton et al. 2000; CRISP-DM 2006): 1) Understanding the project 
objectives and requirements from a business perspective, and then converting this knowledge into 
a data mining problem definition, and a preliminary plan designed to achieve the objectives, 2) data 
collection and preliminary analysis in order to form hypotheses for hidden information, 3) data 
preparation, covering all activities to construct the final dataset from the initial raw data, 4) data 
modelling, 5) evaluation of the model developed in stage 4, in order to determined whether som e 
important business issue that has not been sufficiently considered and 6) deployment of the results, 
which can be a s  simple as generating a report or a s  complex a s  implementing a repeatable data
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mining process. The sequence of the CRISP DM phases is not strict, and the analyst is encouraged 
to move back and forth between different phases. The outer circle in the figure symbolises the cyclic 
nature of data mining itself, in the sense that the lessons learned during the process can trigger 
new, often more focused business questions (CRISP-DM 2006).
Figure 2 .3 -C R IS P  DM
?_
‘Depending on the scale and scope of the project, multiple individuals may assume each of 
the various roles. For example, a large project would likely need several data mining 
analysts and data mining engineers'
The divisions of tasks noted above, as well a s  others found in the literature, will more or less 
distinguish between those users that will have solely, or mostly, understanding of the business 
context where the data mining exercise takes place, and those users that will m aster the technical 
skills, with little or no understanding of the business domain. When seen in this light, the user is one 
of the enablers of the process, and the key challenge is to either select or provide the right mixture 
of skills (Cranford 1998).
2.3.4 The user: focus on the process interaction
A second group of readings addresses, specifically, the interaction between the technical
component of the system and the user. For instance, adoption and acceptance of data mining
technology, like other technical innovations, is thought to be influenced by specific attributes of the
user such a s  previous experience, involvement and training (Guimaraes, Igbaria et al. 1992), or
decision making style (Chang, Chang et al. 2003). However, discussion of interaction, at this level,
is mostly focused on explaining why some organisations use data mining or n o t rather than on
discussing the effects of the user on the process, itself. Anand et al. (1995), however, focusing
specifically on data'manipulation note that:
‘The ideal situation (...) would be where the discovery process is not biased by the user in 
any way as this would lead to a pure form of discovery (...) A more realistic discovery tool 
has within it a role for the human.’
The role of domain knowledge
One way in which the user may influence the process is via his or her domain knowledge. Domain 
knowledge consists of information about the data that is already available either through som e other 
discovery process or from the domain expert, such as attributes of interest, relationships between 
attributes or environment based constraints (Anand, Bell et al. 1995). Such knowledge impacts on 
the questions being asked from the exercise (Kohavi, Rothleder et al. 2002), the first step on the 
CRISP-DM model previously described. In a supermarket located in a busy office area, the analyst 
may seek to answ er the question ‘What Items sell together7  in order to stock shelves accordingly
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(RetailWeek 2003). However, another analyst with knowledge that the majority of purchases, in this 
particular supermarket, are form lunchtime customers who buy sandwiches may, instead, 
investigate 'What items self with sandwiches?’ (RetailWeek 2003). The two questions focus on 
completely different business problems. The first question focuses on correlations between 
products, w hereas the second question focuses on customers’ basket analysis, and the two do not 
necessarily produce the sam e result.
Domain knowledge may also influence stage two, when the analyst moves on to an assessm ent of
the existing knowledge and data, as  well a s  an  appraisal of the data that needs to be collected. A
common problem at this stage is that the inputs which the domain expert considers important are
not represented in the raw input data, in a way that the data mining tools can recognise or use
directly (Apte, Liu et al. 2002; Danna and GandyJr. 2002), such a s  when there are too many
attributes, i.e. too much detail:
'Where very large amounts of data, with correspondingly large numbers of attributes, are 
available, the scale of the problem may limit the success of [the exercise] due to the vast 
number of inter-related variables' (Scotney and McClean 2003).
The data analyst then needs to make several decisions such a s  regarding which proxies to use, or
how to narrow the analysis to those attributes that are particularly informative:
‘For example, if age and income are the most predictive attributes, one of these may not be 
selected in the final model because age is highly related to income - as age increases, so 
does income. Much of the information collected within age and income independently 
overlaps, and this overlap creates error.’ (Lenzen 2004)
In stage three, the analyst performs such functions as cleansing the datasets obtained in stage two 
from existing 'noise', such as random events that have no perceivable causality (Bruha 2000). The 
analyst also needs to 'translate' between data collected from different sources and which are often 
held in different databases, sometimes incompatible with each other (Scotney and McClean 2003), 
and errors are likely to occur (Danna and GandyJr. 2002). In fact, even when the architectures are 
compatible, it is possible that the data encoding is inconsistent over time, or that there are missing 
data fields such a s  questions that were not answered in a questionnaire, or attributes not applicable 
to a given object (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro e t al. 1996; Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro et al. 1996),
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and translation is still needed. In summary, there is much potential for the analyst to interfere with 
the data mining process, even before the actual querying of the data begins.
The potential for interference continues in stage four, when the analyst chooses between various 
modelling techniques to apply, and calibrates the model’s  parameters. A key component of this 
s tage is the choice of the algorithm to search the data, which is influenced by the type of data 
available, the preference criterion and the type of model chosen (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro et al. 
1996). The model informing the process, in turn, reflects the function to be performed, a s  well a s  the 
representational form chosen, as illustrated in figure 2.4. For instance, a classification model 
em erges after examining the features of a newly presented object and assigning it to one of a 
predefined set of classes. This task has a discrete outcome, and the analyst expects to be able to 
assign any record into one or another of the predefined classes. An estimation model is similar to 
classification, except that it deals with continuous variables. Further, the resulting records may be 
ranked in order. A prediction model, also referred to in the data mining literature a s  ‘regression’ 
(e.g., (Chan and Lewis 2002)), also has similarities to the classification and estimation models, 
except for the fact that it refers to the future w hereas the other to refer to past events. A clustering 
model, also referred to a s  ‘segmentation’, assigns an object to a class. These c lasses are 
determined from the data by finding natural groupings of data items, but it is up to the analyst to 
determine what meaning to attach to the clusters resulting from the grouping exercise. A 
summarisation model, also known a s  ‘description’, provides a compact description for a subset of 
the data in a way that increases the understanding of the processes that produced the data in the 
first place. Finally, an affinity grouping model, also known a s  ‘dependency analysis’, ‘link analysis’ 
and ‘sequence analysis', generates rules from the data that describe significant relations between 
fields in the database, which can either occur together or in a sequence.
Page 52
Figure 2.4 -  Factors influencing the choice of algorithm
Algorithm
M odelD ata P re fe re n c e  criterion
Function
• C lassification
• E stim ation
• Predic tion
• C lustering
• S um m arisa tion
• Affinity grouping
R ep re sen ta tio n a l form
• S tan d a rd  s ta tis tic s
• M arket b a sk e t an a ly sis
• M em ory-based  re a so n in g  (a lso  know n a s  e x a m p le -b a se d  m o d e ls )
• G enetic  algorithm s
• C luste r detection
• Link ana ly sis
• D ecision tre e s  and  rules
• N on-linear m ode ls  (e .g . neural ne tw orks)
Additionally, models may be represented in many forms. The choice of model representation is, in 
fact, very important because it determines both the robustness of the model and its interpretability. 
Popular model representations are standard statistics, market basket analysis, memory-based 
reasoning (also known a s  exam ple-based models), genetic algorithms, cluster detection, link 
analysis, decision trees and rules, and non-linear models (e.g. neural networks) (Kyung Sung, 
Chang et al. 1999; Danna and GandyJr. 2002). The choice of model representation and the specific 
param eters of the model are partially influenced by the function to be performed (table 2.8). For 
instance, complex models such a decision trees are particularly useful for finding structure in high­
dimensional problems, such as classification or prediction and, typically, several techniques cam be 
applied to the sam e data mining problem (Jackson 2002).
Table 2.8 -  Correspondence between representational forms and functions
Function
Clustering Classification Prediction Affinity grouping •  » •
Fo
rm
Cluster detection
Neural networks ■/ ✓
Memory-based
reasoning
Decision trees V ' ✓
However, the choice is also influenced by domain knowledge. In particular, what tends to happen, 
according to Fayyad et al. (1996), is that while researchers develop and advocate rather complex
models, practitioners often use simple models that provide ease  of interpretability while 
guaranteeing a reasonable robustness.
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'[The data mining analyst] interacts with a domain expert. (...) We use feedback on whether 
the domain expert finds the solution acceptable to adjust the data's format (such as by 
adding or deleting variables) or the learning algorithm’s parameters (such as the 
significance level of the over fitting avoidance method) until we find an acceptable solution. 
(...) We must adjust the available parameters with indirect control over these criteria until 
we satisfy the domain expert’ (Pazzani 2000)
Stage five refers to the assessm ent of the degree to which the model m eets the business 
objectives, where success is defined a s  a function of the findings (Jackson 2002). This is a  key 
stage as, ultimately:
‘The success of data mining depends on the (...) ability of data miners to distinguish 
meaningful correlations from misleading patterns in the data’ (Cary, Wen e t al. 2003)
A major problem at this stage is the gap between the volume of rules generated in the previous
step, and the capacity to inspect manually these rules in order to gain insight from the data mining
exercise, in which case it is necessary to prioritise which patterns to analyse (Liu, Hu et al. 2000). A
number of studies present m easures of ‘interestingness’ of the patterns identified (e.g.,
(Silberschatz and Tuzhilin 1996)). These m easures can be classified a s  objective when they
depend solely on the structure of the pattern and the underlying data used in the data mining effort,
and are classified a s  subjective when they also depend on the users examining the data mining
output. Geng and Hamilton (2006), put forward, following a survey of m easures of interestingness,
the following two subjective m easures:
‘Novelty: A pattern is novel to a person if he or she did not know it before and is not able to 
infer it from other known patterns (...)
Surprisingness: A pattern is surprising (or unexpected) if it contradicts a person’s existing 
knowledge or expectations (or if it) is an exception to a more general patterns which has 
already been discovered.’
The survey goes on to present complex methods and formulae identified in the literature to 
measure the subjective interestingness of a  data mining project’s  findings.
Another important issue in stage five is that the analyst has to judge whether the outcomes are 
possible, internally consistent, and plausible. These results will typically raise further questions, 
sometimes in conflict with previously believed knowledge therefore leading to the generation of new 
hypotheses and the start of a new data mining cycle.
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The final stage of the CRISP-DM model, stage 6, is where the output of the exercise is acted upon,
for instance when sales managers reflect on the effect of particular sales policies in custom er
retention, or product m anagers derive insights from the effect of past marketing cam paigns and
incorporate them in further marketing efforts (Berry and Linoff 1997). Acceptance of the mined
output is strongly influenced by domain knowledge:
'Domain knowledge influences what kind of experiments we will perform, what phenomenon 
we will observe, what kind of data will we gather, or what data base or repository we will 
query. The data we obtain in this way is analysed and results are interpreted to test our 
working hypothesis, potentially discovering new findings and verifying their consistency with 
the existing body of knowledge, which is updated accordingly.’ (Zupan, Holmes et al. 2006)
Zupan et al.’s  claim regarding updates on previous knowledge is, however, contradicted by findings 
from research on medical data mining, which found that where insights obtained from a mining 
exercise go against previously existing domain knowledge, users tend not to accept the results 
(Pazzani 2000; Pazzani, Mani et al. 2001; Kohavi, Rothleder et al. 2002; Maojo 2004).
The effect of domain knowledge on the exercise, according to the data mining literature, is 
summarised in table 2.9.
Table 2.9 -  The effect of dom ain know ledge on the data  mining p ro cess
. - Effect S ource
Choice of question (Kohavi, Rothleder et al. 2002)
Choice of input (Apte, Liu et al. 2002; Danna and GandyJr. 2002; Lenzen 2004)
Data transformation (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro e ta l. 1996; Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro 
et al. 1996; Bruha 2000)
Choice of model (Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro et al. 1996; Pazzani 2000)
Evaluation of the output (Geng and Hamilton 2006)
Implementation of findings (Pazzani 2000; Pazzani, Mani et al. 2001; Kohavi, Rothleder e t al. 
2002; Maojo 2004; Zupan, Holmes et al. 2006)
The role of personal bias
A second way in which the user influences the data mining exercise is via personal bias, which
includes such factors a s  the users’ preference for certain attributes, or the level of uncertainty that
he or she is prepared to accepted for the rules discovered (Anand, Bell et al. 1995). Personal bias
may affect stage one of the data mining exercise, a s  noted by Humby et al. (2003):
‘The best data analysts are not like most people. They are mathematicians, of course, but 
they are also creative thinkers. When they look at a seemingly insurmountable problem
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they are at their happiest. They think: if we can’t answer that question, how can we redefine 
the question so that we can answer it? There is always a solution’ (page 143).
Furthermore, Berry and Linoff (1997) note that the choice of particular data mining technique, in 
stage two of CRISP-DM, is determined partly by the preferences of the data mining analyst (page 
423).
Analysts’ intuition seem s to play a critical role in determining whether or not a rule is novel, useful or
even understandable (Pazzani 2000), a  method that lacks substance (Gaines 1996). Furthermore,
the lack of formal, definitive criteria is very troubling in the case  of counterintuitive rules, such a s  the
one reported by Pazzani (2000):
‘In screening for Alzheimer’s disease, we found the following counterintuitive rule: “if the 
years of education of the patient is greater than 5 and the patient does not know the date 
and the patient does not know the name of a nearby street, then the patient is normal.” We 
would usually associate the behaviours in the precondition with an impairment of memory, 
yet the conclusion was that of normal memory. My experience has been that finding 
counterintuitive results is not unusual in practice’.
Finally, it has been shown that familiarity of the user with a particular representation system is a key 
factor in determining a  model’s acceptability (Pazzani 2000; Pazzani, Mani et al. 2001). Moreover, 
analysts tend to use rather informal judgment to determine whether an unexpected finding should 
be considered sufficiently convincing for rejecting previous knowledge (Lindsay 1997). In the words 
of Fisher (1959):
‘No scientific worker has a fixed level of significance at which from year to year, and in all 
circumstances, he rejects hypotheses; he rather gives his mind to each particular case in 
the light of his evidence and his ideas. ’ (page 42)
The effect of personal bias on the data mining, according to the data mining literature, is 
summarised in table 2.10.
Table 2.10 -  The effect o f personal b ias on the  data  m ining p ro cess
Effect Source
Choice of question (Humby, Hunt e t al. 2003)
Choice of model (Berry and Linoff 1997)
Evaluation of the output (Pazzani 2000)
Implementation of findings (Fisher 1959; Lindsay 1997; Pazzani 2000; Pazzani, Mani e t al. 
2001)
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Departure point
Table 2.11 outlines the sources of user influence on the data mining process, and the specific 
effects that such users may have, based on the literature reviewed in this section. Some branches 
of the data mining community defend that users do influence the data mining process. However, 
most effort has been in the role of domain knowledge and even there the subject is treated a s  a 
marginal issue. This is so  much important a s  data mining is an iterative process, with frequent 
feedback loops in which information feeds back and influences prior steps in the process (Chung 
and Gray 1999) and, therefore, the opportunities for users to influence the process are multiplied.
Table 2.11 -  Sum m ary of so u rc e s  and  effects of u se r  influence on data  mining
Effect Domain know ledge P ersonal b ias
Choice of question X X
Choice of input X
Data transformation X
Choice of model X X
Evaluation of the output X X
Implementation of findings X X
Figure 2.5 illustrates how the analyst may interfere in the data mining process. The column on the 
left outlines the various stages of a data mining exercise. The column in the centre provides 
examples of actions that the analyst may take, at each stage, and that impact on previous stages -  
for instance, in the final stage, the analyst examines the outcome of the data analysis. If the analyst 
is satisfied with the outcome, a particular action may be taken, for instance making an offer to a 
customer or reporting a suspected criminal to a law enforcement agency. If the analyst is 
dissatisfied with the outcome, he or she may move back to the previous stage in the process, and 
refine the query by changing a particular threshold, for instance. Finally, the column to the right 
provides examples of decisions that the analyst makes a t each stage, and which impact on the 
result of that stage. For instance, in order to search through the data, the analyst needs to choose a 
model. Fayyad et al. (1996) noted that while researchers develop and advocate rather complex 
models, practitioners often use simple models that provide ease  of interpretability. Such decision 
has a big impact on the data analysis stage because it determines both the robustness of the model 
and its interpretability.
Page 57
Figure 2.5 -  Iterative and interactive nature of data mining
Interpret outcome
Problem specification
Data analysis
Processing
Data selection
choice o f model
e.g.: analysts choice o f proxies
e.g.: further data
e.g.: fine tune
e.g.: capacity to analyse all 
rules
e.g.: business user imparts 
domain
e.g.: analysts criteria for 
attribute
e.g.: choose subset o f original 
problem domain
e.g.: select alternative 
source
Stages Iteration Interaction
The data mining literature is not prepared, however, to explain how that happens or to suggest
mechanisms to correct, or leverage on, such influence. As a  result, the sam e literature has limited
prescriptive and corrective value for subjectivity in data mining. This is because the disciplines
traditionally informing data mining research are not prepared to answer issues concerning the
human mind (Siau 2004):
‘It’s time for [data mining] to draw on cognitive psychology in addition to databases, 
statistics, and artificial intelligence. By taking the human cognitive process into account, we 
might be able to increase the usefulness of [data mining] systems.’ (Pazzani 2000)
Other authors called for the integration of data mining and sen se  making (Gersh, Lewis et al. 2006), 
a s  well a s  knowledge of the specific characteristics of the context where the data mining 
applications are deployed (Lavrac, Motoda et al. 2004). At the end of the day, a s  noted by Jackson
(2002):
'Data mining helps organisations focus on the most important information available in their 
existing databases. But data mining is only a tool; it does not eliminate the need to know 
the business, to understand the data, or to understand the analytical methods involved.’
The current study departs from existing work on data mining in that it focuses on the conditions 
surrounding the data mining project, including the user.
2.4 Overview of the profiling literature surveyed
The first section of this chapter looked at profiling as a practice. Hildebrandt and Backhouse (2005) 
define practice a s  a  specific way of doing things, within specific contexts and with a specific
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purpose. Accordingly, section 2.1 reviewed the existing literature of profiling in the specific context 
of the banking industry, and for the specific purpose of money laundering. The literature reviewed 
em phasised that the banking industry has gone through significant structural and behavioural 
changes and that, a s  a result, the industry entered a  quantitative revolution (Leyshon and Thrift
1999), with increased focus on customer profiling, driven by an economic and administrative 
rationale. The content of the profiles in use has changed over the years, progressing from a 
transaction oriented, permission based practice to an all-inclusive one, that happens by default. 
Such trend is in conflict with the beliefs of particular groups of custom ers a s  well a s  the cultural 
traditions of the banking industry. In addition, the recent em phasis on predictive profiling may be 
accompanied by an increase in the level of uncertainty surrounding the use of profiles.
Section 2.1 also surveyed the numerous applications of profiling in the banking industry, ranging 
from revenue maximisation to cost reduction and, subsequently, explored the questions of whether 
the specific application for which a profile is used impacts on the emerging profile. Preliminary 
evidence is that the implementation of profiling in a given organisation may, indeed, be limited by 
structural and organisational factors, and that the use of profiles in practice is not as easy  and 
unanimously supported a s  some of the literature would suggest.
The discussion of the literature focusing on profiling for the purpose of money laundering detection 
unearthed a different type of rationale for adoption of profiling: the regulatory imperative. The role of 
banks in AML, ultimately, runs against the traditional strategic objectives of these institutions, and 
the supporting monitoring activities are very different in nature from the traditional ones associated 
with banking. The existing rules mandating banks to monitor their custom ers are rather vague and 
result in the use of a wide variety of criteria. In addition, the general guidance is difficult to translate 
into practice because of numerous technical difficulties linked with the nature of the phenomenon 
being profiled.
Section 2.2 focused on the technology used in profiling, namely AML monitoring. The current 
method of profiling money laundering behaviour in the UK is heavily reliant on staff. Information 
technology is more and more used, however, despite generalised scepticism regarding the
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suitability of technology to monitor this particular type of behaviour and the difficult in assessing the 
technical value or the net benefits of alternative automated monitoring systems.
Section 2.3 addressed the profiling technique, that is the method of building descriptive or predictive 
models of customer behaviour. The review of the literature identified a division between those 
researchers that describe profiling a s  an entirely objective process, where the data speaks for itself, 
and those who defend that it is a subjective process. Section 2.3 presented the data mining 
literature’s  view on the role of the user in the process. The field may be roughly divided between 
those that mention the user a s  part of the process but do not specifically address the possible 
interaction between user and the data mining exercise, on the one hand, and those that focus on 
that interaction, on the other hand. The latter group has demonstrated, convincingly, that users may 
influence the profiling technique via domain knowledge and personal bias, and that the effects may 
be felt a t the level of the choice of questions, input and model, a s  well a s  at the level of data 
transformation, evaluation of the output and the implementation of the findings. Even though the 
subjective nature of the profiling technique has been acknowledged by som e researchers, the data 
mining literature does not offer understanding regarding how such influence happens, and is unable 
to suggest mechanisms to correct, or leverage on, such influence.
The ample literature surveyed in this chapter provides a rich description of the practice, the 
technology and the technique of profiling. It points strongly to the conclusion that the emerging 
profile is, indeed, affected by the factors surrounding its development and offers som e good starting 
points for this thesis, regarding specific factors to consider. The literature is, however, limited in the 
insight that it can offer, for two reasons. The first reason is that the literature is rather 
compartmentalised. By not treating profiling a s  the integrated phenomenon described by 
Hildebrandt and Backhouse (2005), it offers limited understanding of the overlaps and interactions 
between each of the three aspects of profiling: the practice, the technology and the technique. The 
second reason is that the literature tends to be descriptive or normative, rather than explicatory, 
therefore offering limited insight beyond the specific application or the case  to which particular 
papers refer.
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The present thesis responds to the call for a deep understanding of cognitive (Gersh, Lewis et al. 
2006) and contextual (Lavrac, Motoda et al. 2004) factors in profiling, using a research lens that 
treats profiling a s  a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon. It draws on theories of meaning and 
classification, a s  described in chapter 3.
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3. Theoretical framework
The current chapter describes the two theories informing the research project, and presents the 
research framework that guides the interpretation of the empirical findings. The thesis investigates 
the development of behavioural profiles -  focusing on the representation of behaviours by 
employees in an organisation and addressing questions such a s  what the representation consists 
of, how it gets shaped and why. As such, it needs a theoretical framework that treats the information 
system s’ capabilities and the organisation’s  requirements a s  an integral unit (Liu, Sun e t al. 2002). 
The study needs a framework that bridges the gap between the highly flexible, nuanced and 
contextualised nature of human activity and the rigid and brittle nature of technical system s 
(Ackerman 2000; Eatock, Paul et al. 2002).
The semiotic study of information in organisations may be located, exactly, at the junction between 
technical and social:
‘Organisational semiotics can meet the needs of the 'hard’ sciences for formality and 
precision without which IT  systems cannot be designed. At the same time, it accommodates 
the concepts and categories essential for solving ‘soft’ problems in the organisational 
domain... (it) can link the mechanical to the social, combining as far as possible the 
strengths of both’ ((Stamper 2004), page xiii).
Organisational semiotics constitutes the primary theoretical lens of this study. An overview of this 
theory, its relevance for the study a s  well a s  its limitations is provided in section 3.1. Additionally, 
because organisational behaviour should also be studied at the level of the individual member of 
the organisation (Heusden and Jorna 2001), the study draws on classification as  the secondary 
theory. Classification theory helps researchers understand how individual employees ‘understand 
the world, act upon it and react to it  (Edwards 1991). Section 3.2 describes classification theory 
and its application to the research. Section 3.3 com pares and contrasts the two theories. It presents 
a  theoretical framework where the two theories complement each other, and offers a holistic 
understanding of the technical and social factors that shape profiling. Section 3.3 also d iscusses the 
limitations of the theoretical framework proposed.
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3.1. Primary theoretical lens: organisational semiotics
Semiotics is concerned with the study of signs12 and emerged a s  a response to complex issues of
meaning and representation (Gottdiener, Boklund-Lagopoulou et al. 2003). Semiotics assum es a
relational view of the world (Basunti 2004), where:
‘The true nature of things may be said to lie not in things themselves, but in the 
relationships that we construct, and then perceive, between them’ ((Hawkes 1977), page 
17).
Barley (1983) noted that, in the field of organisation studies, semiotics is ultimately the study of how 
communication is possible. Organisational semiotics is the study of organisations’ treatment and 
use of information, using the concepts and methods of semiotics (Liu 2000; Liebenau and 
Harindranath 2002). The next section outlines the philosophical underpinnings of semiotics. 
Appendix 2 provides a brief overview of the various branches of semiotics for the interested reader.
3.1.1 Philosophical origins
From the organisational semiotics perspective, an organisation is essentially an information system 
where information is created, stored and processed for communication and coordination, and for 
achieving the organisational objectives (Liu, Sun et al. 2002). The information system is composed 
of various interrelated sub-systems or layers (Walsham 1993; Stamper 1996; Liu 2000; Stamper, 
Liu et al. 2000; Walsham 2001; Lewis and Madon 2004), which are mutually constitutive and 
interdependent (Backhouse 2005; Halperin 2006), a s  illustrated in figure 3.1.
The informal layer of the information system includes culture, system s of belief and politics that 
govern the perception, expectations, behaviour and values of the individual mem bers of the system. 
The formal layer contains attributes of the system that have been formalised and officially 
documented in rules, procedures, policies and other forms of bureaucracy. The technical layer 
holds the hardware, software and data protocols, a s  well a s  elem ents of the technology design, 
such a s  the layout and interface of the system. Information is processed and communicated at each 
and any of the three layers.
12 The concept of ‘sign’ is explained in section 3.1.2.
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Figure 3.1 - The Technical-Formal-lnformal model of information systems
Informal
Formal
Technical
Source: Adapted from Stamper, Liu et al. (2000)
Semioticians studying organisations adopt a  social subjectivist stance, where the agent plays a key
role (Liu 2000), and meaning is understood a s  behaviour, a s  per table 3.1.:
‘This philosophical position states that, for all practical purposes, nothing exists without a 
perceiving agent nor without the agent engaging in actions. That is to say, each thing 
depends for its existence upon the existence of its antecedents. Words and expressions we 
use are names for invariant patterns in flux of actions and events which the agents 
experience.’ ((Stamper, Liu e t al. 2000), page 24)
Table 3.1 -  Subjectivist view of key Information S ystem s co n cep ts
C oncept View
Reality Created subjectively and socially with subtle differences between groups 
of agents
Data A m eans of indicating intentions and coordinating actions
Truth A temporary consensus reached a s  a basis for coordinated action
Meaning A relationship between a sign and som e pattern of action established a s  a 
norm within a group
Information System A semiological system, mainly informal but supplemented by formalised 
m essages
Role of the analyst To assist the users to articulate their problems, discover their information 
requirements and evolve a systemic solution
Source: Stam per (1993)
In order to understand the em ergence of meaning in a  particular organisational context, the 
researcher needs to study two aspects: the vehicle of meaning and the process of meaning. The 
two are discussed next
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3.1.2 The vehicle of meaning: Sign
Eco (1976) defines this key semiotic concept a s  ‘everything that, on the grounds of a previously 
established social convention, can be taken as something standing for something else’. Eco’s 
definition highlights, then, that there are three components of a sign: that which stands for 
something, that which is being signified and the convention. Peirce (1931-58), used the term13 
representamen  to designate the material form of the sign which may embody any meaning, the term 
object to indicate that for which the representam en stands for, and the term interpretant to identify 
the convention linking the representam en and the object together. The interpretant is one particular 
interpretation of the representam en, and is embodied in the person involved in reading or 
interpreting the sign, and to whom the signification makes sen se  (Liu 2000). For instance, the 
representam en 'red rose’ stands for the object ‘labour party’, in the interpretant concerning the 
symbology of UK’s political parties.
Peirce em phasised that the sign exists in the intrinsic nature of the triadic correlation as a whole: ‘A 
sign mediates between the interpretant... and its object (Peirce 1977). The sign is, therefore, a 
relation between three correlates (Nake 2002). The relation is not fixed and may differ depending 
on the context or time. For instance, the representamen red rose, in addition to standing for the 
object labour party, may also stand for love in Greek mythology, or for martyrdom in Christian 
iconography. Moreover, the red rose only becam e the logo of UK’s labour party in the mid 1990s, 
and before that date this particular interpretant was activated by a different representamen.
The way in which the representam en stands for the object is a  representation. Linguistic and colour 
conventions are examples of representation14. The interpreter’s  mental process connecting the 
interpretant and the representam en is an interpretation. Lastly, the successful link between 
interpretant and the actual object of the sign is a matching relation (Barr, Biddle et al. 2003).
13 Peirce w as not particularly consistent in the terminology used which, according to Hervey (1982), 
reflects Peirce’s search for new term s that would express his view appropriately.
14 For instance, black represents mourning in som e cultures, w hereas other cultures favour the 
colour white in such occasions.
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Signs are constantly created and consumed within a social and organisational context (Liu 2003). 
The meaning of the sign can not be fully grasped without the explanation of its components and of 
the outcome of the mediation (Hervey 1982). Meaning is subjective and, a s  a  result, representation 
by signs is rarely absolute (Desouza and Hensgen 2005). Moreover, a sign is a  stimulus that is 
capable of evoking responses from the interpreter (Morris 1938/1970; Heusden and Jom a 2001), 
further emphasising the role of the interpreter in the existence of meaning (Liebenau and 
Harindranath 2002).
Signs may stand for objects at varying levels of abstractedness. The most concrete level is an 
iconic sign, which represents the object by similarity. Next is the index, which represents by 
instruction or cause and effect link. At the highest level of abstraction, a symbol represents by 
convention (Liu 2000; Gudwin 2004). The role of social conventions in interpreting the sign is the 
more important, the higher the level of abstractedness. In order to fully grasp the meaning of a  sign, 
and be able to use it in communication, it is necessary to know and abide by the social conventions 
amongst the users of the sign (Fiske 1990).
The signification of signs cannot all be established in the sam e way, however. Stam per (1973) 
distinguishes between the mode and the intention. The mode distinguishes between signs that 
designate som e object of action - denotative signs -  and signs that refer to emotions associated 
with an idea or action -  affective signs. The intention distinguishes between signs that describe 
states of affairs -  descriptive signs -  and signs that set down courses of action -  prescriptive signs. 
In summary, it is possible to classify signs in one of four categories (table 3.2) that have different 
signification and, accordingly, are justified in very different ways.
Table 3.2 -  Classification  of s ig n s  accord ing  to  how they  signify
Denotative Affective
Descriptive Signs that refer to factual information 
E.g., Facts
Signs that convey value judgem ents 
E.g., Expressions of feelings
Prescrip tive Signs that state what must be done 
E.g., Instructions
Signs about the consequences of 
doing something 
E.g., Promise of reward
Stamper (1973) also notes that:
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‘Whereas our denotative use of language generally admits the substitution of one word for 
another without any change of “meaning” in the sense of what is referred to, it is very much 
more difficult to change one word for another without changing the emotive force of what is 
being said and therefore changing the “affective” meaning’ (page 64)
The conclusion is, therefore, that affective signification is more conducive to ambiguity and 
misunderstandings than denotative one.
3.1.3 The process of meaning making: Semiosis
Semiosis, the second key concept in semiotics, is the process through which a knowing subject 
attributes meaning to a sign (Morris 1938/1970). Semiosis leads to the building of knowledge. Liu 
(2000) identifies the following characteristics of semiosis: 1) it is universal, in the sense  that it 
explains the creation and use of any type of sign processing activity; 2) it is capable of identifying 
anything present according to a specific norm, and it can make anything not present identifiable and 
3) it is subject-dependent in the sense that it depends on the point of view of the interpreter and on 
the knowledge available.
Semiosis may occur at several levels. Stam per (1996; 2001), building on the work of Moms, 
proposed six levels of semiosis, that he refers to a s  the ‘semiotic ladder*15. Each level represents a 
different way of understanding signs (Stamper 1973), a s  illustrated in table 3.3, and described next. 
Stam per (1973) notes that the study of meaning does not have to include all six levels. Instead, the 
se ts  of properties of each level can be studied independently from other levels. Appendix 3 
contains descriptions and examples of each of the three levels, for the interested reader.
The first three levels of the semiotic ladder -  that is, the physical, empiric and syntactic levels - are 
mainly concerned with the technical platform and formal aspects of signs, w hereas the other three 
levels focus on the human handling of information and the cultural environment of meaning 
(Liebenau and Backhouse 1990; Stamper, Liu et al. 2000; Liebenau and Harindranath 2002).
15 Morris identified three levels of semiosis: pragmatics, sem antics and syntactics. In his early work 
(1973), Stamper added a fourth level: empirics. The four levels formed a bridge between the social 
and technical aspects of communication (Liebenau and Backhouse, 1990). It w as only in work 
published from the late 1990s onwards that the social and the technical levels appear a s  steps to 
be studied per se, rather than a s  an input or an output of the meaning making process.
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Table 3.3 -  The six levels of the semiotic ladder
Level Units investigated Phenomena observed
Physical - Sign tokens: physical objects and events
- Categories of tokens -  e.g., spoken ones
- The physical properties of sign-tokens 
(e.g., weight, duration, position)
Empiric - Stream s of sign-tokens
- Apparatus capable of displaying varieties 
of states (channels, storages)
- Statistical properties of sign-tokens
- Combinatorial properties of sign- 
tokens
Syntactic - Forms of sign-types
- Well-formed formulas
- Formal transformations
- Structure of sign-types and their 
permitted manipulations
Semantic - Sign-types in sign roles
- Perceivable things
- The labels we give to perceivable things
- Relationships of denotation and 
signification
- How and by whom things are related 
(e.g., ontological dependency)
Pragmatic - Acts performed by agents using unique 
sign tokens to influence other agents
- Signs incorporating expressions of 
intention
- Success or failure of the sign acts
- Relations among agents and other 
conditions making sign acts effective
- Relationships among the acts
Social - Attitudes and norms held by individuals
- Sign events that change the attitudes 
and norms
- Regularities of behaviour of the 
individuals
- Rules that signify norms
Source: Adapted from Stam per (2002)
The analysis of information at the physical, empirical and syntactical levels is primarily focused on 
issues of efficiency - that is, the effect of uncertainty caused by the noise and distortion inherent to 
the channel being used, in the certainty of the m essage. Efficiency is critical for assessing whether 
the m essage has reached its destination. The analysis at the semantic, pragmatic and social levels 
addresses issues of effectiveness of the m essage, namely whether the receiver understands both 
the m essage and the sender’s  intentions, and the social purposes are met (Liu 2000). The 
distinction between the first and the last three levels of the semiotic ladder has led Backhouse and 
Cheng (2000) to describe the physical, empirical and syntactic levels as the ontological aspects of 
meaning, w hereas the semantic, pragmatic and social levels constitute the epistemic ones.
A central contribution of organisational semiotics to the understanding of meaning making in 
organisations is that it identified factors in the environment that affect semiosis and, hence, 
meaning. While Peirce’s semiotics acknowledged the role of context in the em ergence of meaning, 
it w as the work of Stam per and others that allowed the formalisation of how and why that happens. 
In particular, organisational semioticians proposed two key constructs: affordance and norm, 
explained next.
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Affordance
The semiotic affordance is an extension of the theory of affordances developed in direct perception
psychology [e.g., (Gibson 1979; Michaels and Carello 1981)]. Gibson (1979), talking about physical
properties of the environment, defined affordances in the following way:
‘The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or 
furnishes, either for good or ill. (...) Properties... would be physical properties of a surface if 
they were measured with the scales and standard units used in physics. As an affordance 
of support for a species of animal, however, they have to be measured relative to the 
animal. They are unique for that animar. (page 125)
Gibson’s  definition of affordance points to a relationship between the objective properties of the 
environment and the user’s  subjective utilisation of such environment. In other words, an affordance 
is a  pattern of behaviour made possible by some combined structure of organism and its 
environment For example, a user and a web browser together afford surfing the web (DeMoor 
2002).
Norman (1999), expanding on Gibson’s work, argued for the distinction between the physical 
characteristics of an object, which he terms real affordance, and the characteristics in the 
appearance of a device that give clues to its proper use, to which he named perceived affordance. 
While both characteristics are important, Norman argued, they have very different attributes and 
purposes. Real affordances help users with their physical actions, and do not have to be visible, 
known or even desirable. Perceived affordances guide users in their interaction with the objects, 
that is such affordances answer the question ‘How do you know what to do?’. Hartson (2003) 
observed that perceived affordances depend greatly on cultural conventions.
Organisational semiotics extends the theory of affordances from the natural to the social world, in
order to study social behaviour:
'The society acting as environment makes many patterns of behaviour possible.’ ((Liu
2000), page 62)
In the context of a  commercial organisation, for instance, employees are afforded different actions 
depending on their job functions. An employee in the call centre is afforded the reception of
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custom ers’ calls, w hereas an employee in the sales department is afforded the processing of orders 
(Simoni and Baranaukas 2004).
Liebenau an Backhouse (1990) em phasise that the realisation of affordances is contingent on its 
elements:
'We can not realise the eating of a pizza without the contingent elements: a pizza and a 
person’ (page 47)
It is sometimes the case  that an affordance is ontologically dependent on the existence of another. 
Where dependency occurs, the dependent affordance becom es available only when the antecedent 
affordance is available, a s  well (Bonacin, Baranaukas et al. 2004). For instance, the affordance 
'reply to m essage’ depends on the affordance 'receive m essage’. If the addressee of the initial 
m essage did not receive it for som e reason, he or she is not able to realise the dependent 
affordance.
Norms
Norms have functions of directing, coordinating and controlling collective action (Liu, Sun et al.
2001) and they correspond, at the social level, to the idea of an affordance at the individual agent 
level (Wright 1963; DeMoor 2002), in the sense  that they provide the socially acceptable repertoire 
of behaviour. Norms comprise the common experience shared by all the people who work together 
in a particular organisation (Liebenau and Backhouse 1990). For example, the Hippocratic ideals, 
the health service concern with affordable medicine, political principles of equitability and practices 
of communication between medical hierarchies all guide the actions of members of a hospital 
(Liebenau and Harindranath 2002).
Various taxonomies of norms exist, reflecting different study focuses. For instance, norms may be 
classified according to their formality, their form, the attitudes that they inspire or the tasks that they 
regulate. The classification of norms according to each of these criteria is summarised in table 3.4, 
and further described in Appendix 4.
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Table 3.4 -  C lassification of norm s
Criterion Taxonom y
Formality Informal norms 
Formal norms 
Technical norms
Form Explicit norms 
Implicit norms
Attitudes Perceptual norms 
Evaluative norms 
Cognitive norms 
Behavioural norms
Regulated task Substantive norms 
Communication norms 
Control norms
For the purpose of studying meaning, it is more important to understand how norms condition 
behaviour, rather than become tangled in distinguishing between different types of norms. Norms 
are cultural phenomena, applicable to specific circumstances (Hechter and Opp 2001). Employees 
of a  given organisation, for instance, share a common culture and will tend to se e  the world in a 
similar way, exhibiting common views and assumptions (Liebenau and Backhouse 1990). Members 
of an organisation, or an organisation’s division, have a  generalised disposition to the world which 
generates a propositional attitude that may, but not necessarily will, affect the person’s  behaviour:
‘A norm is like a field of force that makes members of the community tend to behave or
think in a certain way*. (Stamper, Liu et al. 2000)
It is also important to note that members of an organisation ofterr have multiple group memberships. 
Each organisational component -  for instance, production or distribution or accounting -  brings with 
it a different set of norms (Liu, Sun et al. 2001; Liebenau and Harindranath 2002). Where the 
influence of these groups differs in form, direction, or magnitude, the corresponding norms will have 
conflicting influences on the group’s members (Greenberger, Miceli et al. 1987).
Consciously or not, people interpret signs according to norms (Liebenau and Backhouse 1990), and 
may sometimes wittingly deviate from normative behaviour (Liu 2000). Violation of norms, however, 
makes one vulnerable to sanctioning (Hechter and Opp 2001).
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3.1.4 Relevance for the study of profiling
Organisational semiotics made major contributions to the understanding of meaning in 
organisations, which may be summarised in the eight propositions presented in table 3.5. This 
section reflects on how organisational semiotics may contribute to the understanding of the 
em ergence of particular profiles of money laundering behaviour.
Table 3.5 -  Summary of key propositions
# D escription
1 Meaning is a relationship between a sign and som e pattern of action. Furthermore, the 
vehicle of meaning, the sign, and the process, the semiosis, both determine meaning.
2 Signs have varying levels of abstractedness, and social conventions play an increasing role 
in interpreting signs at high levels of abstractedness.
3 Signs signify via mode and intention. Mode distinguishes between denotative and affective 
signs. Intention distinguishes between descriptive and prescriptive signs.
4 Semiosis is universal, capable of identifying anything present and make anything not 
present identifiable, and subject-dependent.
5 Semiosis may occur at various levels, each representing a different way of understanding 
signs.
6 Semiosis is affected by two factors in the organisational environment: affordances and 
norms. W hereas the affordances refer to the meanings m ade possible by particular 
elements in the environment, the norms refer to the meanings m ade possible by the rules of 
the relevant social group.
7 The realisation of affordances is contingent on its elements.
8 Each organisational component brings with it a  different set of norms. Where the influence 
of different groups differs in form, direction, or magnitude, the corresponding norms will 
have conflicting influences on the group’s members.
Organisational semiotics focuses on complex issues of meaning and representation in 
organisations, considering both human activity and technical system s (Ackerman 2000; Eatock, 
Paul et al. 2002). Profiles are, inherently, representations of particular instances of behaviour, and 
profiling consists of deriving meaning from certain observations (Schauer 2003). R esearchers from 
varied fields of study, from those studying particular applications to those developing profiling 
techniques, recognise that the meaning of a particular se t of observations is subjective in the sense 
that it is likely to be impacted on by various social and technical factors surrounding the use and 
development of profiles. Organisational semiotics holds promise for deepening understanding of the 
processes by which profiling agents construe meaning.
According to the subjectivist stance adopted by organisational semiotics, described in section 3.1.1, 
meaning is relational, depends on the existence of a perceiving agent and is materialised in the
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agent’s  actions. Similarly, in order to study profiling a s  a  meaning making process, the researcher 
ought to focus on the agents and their actions, rather than on the behaviour being profiled.
The conceptualisation of a sign, the vehicle of meaning, described in section 3.1.2 is also extremely 
relevant for this thesis. The triadic view of signs distinguishes between that which signifies, that 
which is signified and the convention for which the signification makes sense. The present thesis 
proposes a similar view of profiles. The thesis proposes to treat profiles a s  signs, also composed of 
three elements. A particular observable pattern of behaviour becom es the representam en, i.e., that 
which signifies. Suspicious money laundering behaviour is the object to which the profile refers. 
Additionally, the particular convention establishing that a  particular pattern of behaviour stands for 
money laundering activity becom es the interpretant. The interpreter that embodies the interpretant 
is, in the case of AML profiling, the profiling agent who observes patterns of behaviour and deem s 
them suspicious, or not. Moreover, profiles are indexes, that is, they signal by m eans of cause and 
effect links. Signs have, therefore, moderate level of abstractedness, where social convention plays 
a relatively significant role in meaning. In order to fully grasp the meaning of profiles, the researcher 
needs to identify and articulate the social conventions amongst the relevant interpreters (Fiske
1990). Lastly, profiles may be either denotative or affective, and descriptive or prescriptive, and, 
therefore, be less or more ambiguous.
Lastly, the notion of the process of meaning, a s  presented by organisational semioticians, and 
presented in section 3.1.3, is extremely relevant for this thesis, a s  well. The first concept presented 
w as that of the semiotic ladder, consisting of different ways of understanding signs (Stamper 1973), 
ranging from a focus on types of signs, to the attitudes and norms among the perceiving agents. 
While the semiotic study of signs and organisations can focus on any subset of the semiotic ladder, 
the present thesis will endeavour to include all of the six levels. This effort is because, a s  mentioned 
at the end of chapter 2, the strength of this thesis in comparison with existing literature on the topic 
of profiling is that it treats profiles a s  complex, multi-faceted phenomena. Furthermore, the thesis 
actively seeks to develop a framework that integrates the various components of the phenomenon, 
rather than focusing on particular angles. The second concept presented was that of affordances, 
denoting the many patterns of behaviour m ade possible by properties of the context where semiosis
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takes place (Liu 2000), and which realisation is contingent on its elements. The implication for the 
researcher studying profiling is that this instance of meaning making is, too, conditioned by 
properties of the context where it occurs. One of the tasks of the researcher will be to identify those 
elements, as well a s  the meanings that such elem ents enable. The third and final concept referred 
to in section 3.1.3 w as the norm. Norms guide the actions of the members of a  group, and are likely 
to differ for different groups. The variance of norms may lead to ambiguity, or even conflict, in 
meaning. It w as also noted that, even though norms guide behaviour, ultimately agents may opt to 
deviate from particular norms and accept the eventual consequences. In order to fully understand 
how profiles em erge, the researcher has to unearth the norms guiding behaviour of the relevant 
interpreters, a s  well a s  to identify possible conflicts between norms and circumstances where the 
agents ignore norms.
In summary, it m akes sense to treat profiles a s  signs and profiling a s  meaning processes. 
Organisational semiotics enables the researcher to treat profiling in an integrated manner, thus 
contributing to the fulfilment of the objectives of this thesis. Like any other theory, however, 
organisational semiotics is a way of both seeing and not seeing (Walsham 1993), with its own 
limitations. The next section examines the shortfalls of organisational semiotics in accounting for 
certain aspects of meaning in organisations.
3.1.5 Critique of organisational semiotics
Although organisational semiotics makes a real contribution to Information System s on issues of 
meaning, it has som e significant drawbacks. In recent years, several authors (e.g., (Andersen 
2004)) have noted that the body of work developed by Stamper and his followers fails to account for 
major aspects of meaning. Organisational semiotics is, primarily, a  theory of meaning a s  
behaviours, informed by an 'agent in action ontology' (Stamper et al., 2000). Consequently, the 
researchers’ attention is channelled to the extemalisation of meaning. While the outcome of 
meaning may be behavioural, the process is, essentially, a mental one. Stam per’s approach to 
meaning deliberately focus on actions and does not analyse phenomena that happen at the mental 
level. As a result, the critics of Stamper’s  line of work (e.g., (Andersen 2004; Jom a and Van
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Heusden 1998)) believe that several shortfalls may arise if organisational semiotics is used a s  the 
only theoretical lens with which to study meaning making.
Firstly, organisational semiotics offers little understanding of sign aw areness. The interpreter's 
reading of the sign may be divided in the direct effect actually produced by the sign upon the 
interpreter (Noth 1995) and the link established by the interpreter between that occurrence of the 
sign and a more general rule or habit (Andersen 2004). The direct effect occurs, according to 
Andersen (2004), because interpreters have guidelines regarding the occurrence and the meaning 
of the sign:
‘If these rule-oriented interpretations were not available we would have no reason for 
seeing the [representamen] as signs of [an interpretant].’ (page 41)
In the absence of such mental rules, the argument goes, the representamen would not be noticed 
by the interpreter, or even if noticed would not have been associated with the interpretant. An 
important question em erges, then, concerning what m akes an interpreter notice a representamen 
and ignore others. Is it something to do with the representam en or, instead, with the interpreter? 
Organisational semiotics does not offer a conclusive answer to this question.
A second limitation of organisational semiotics relates to semiosis. Semiotics studies the creation of
meaning by an abstract interpreter, who can be an individual, a group or a social community (Liu
2000). Regardless of the definition of the interpreter, the focus of analysis is, always, how the
technical and social contexts influence the interpretation. Yet, a s  noted by Helmhout and colleagues
(2004), Charrel (2004) and many others, organisations are environments in which actors work
together. Furthermore, the actions of referent others have a determining impact on subsequent
behaviour, regardless of initial beliefs (Miller and Thomas 2005). The implication is that, when
studying meaning, the researcher needs to examine not only the existence of multiple perceivers,
but also the effect that one interpreter may have on another.
‘When actor A interacts with actor B to complete a certain task, both actors have to come to 
a certain agreement as to under which conditions a relation starts, under which conditions a 
relation ends and under whose authority this is taking place. Agreements are often reached 
by conflicts and compromises. In, for example, the employer-employee relationship, the 
employer wants wages to be as low as possible, while an employee wants the opposite. If  
both actors come to an agreement, the relation starts.’ ((Helmhout, Gazendam  et al. 2004), 
page 175)
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In the situation described by Helmhout and colleagues (2004) there is a  two way interaction and,
hence, the possibility to correct misunderstandings and review decisions. In other organisational
circumstances, however, the interaction is sequential, rather than simultaneous. The effect of
individual interpreters in one another is particularly relevant in the case of sequential encounters
given that, in such circumstances, the employee who first encounters the problem m akes a ‘go’ or
‘pass’ decision that, in fact, limits the strategic options available to the employee located next in the
decision chain (Andersen 2005):
‘The service agent who initially encounters a client may determine how other agents regard 
the client. First, initial encounters serve as gate-keeping functions as agents collect 
information about the client and communicate it to others as input for further processing. 
Thus, service agents must edit and filter information and neatly define the client. (...) 
Second, a further effect of this selectivity is that others downstream often lack the 
necessary information to form their own conclusions. Third, standardised procedures and 
forms for reporting such information are typically geared toward efficiency, and so cannot 
convey the richness and complexity of idiosyncratic perceptions.’ (Ashforth and Humphrey 
1997)
The output of semiosis by the first interpreter may have an impact in the input for semiosis of 
subsequent interpreters.
The third limitation of organisational semiotics concerns the role of norms. Helmhout e t al (2004) 
argue that while the concept of norms is well developed in organisational semiotics, this body of 
research is unable to answer such questions a s  how actors team, select and use norms in order to 
cooperate effectively, which configurations of norms em erge in a certain environment or whether 
the em ergent configurations of norms correspond to known organisational configurations. Recent 
work in this field draws on the work of cognitive scientists, rather than semioticians (Helmhout, 
Gazendam et al. 2004). R esearchers in the field of cognition noted that agents have limited ability 
to represent and process information about the environment (Simon 1976; Zandt 1999). In order to 
com pensate for those limitations, the agents developed ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics (Gigerenzer, 
Todd et al. 1999; Gigerenzer and Selten 2001) such a s  the imitation of the behaviour of others who 
are successful or the use of culturally transferred stereotypes (Bouissac 2003). It is those factors 
that seem  to explain norms learning, selection and use, rather than any other factors traditionally 
considered in organisational semiotics.
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In summary, organisational semiotics, by approaching meanings a s  behaviours, offers limited 
insight into the cognitive restrictions (Desouza and Hensgen 2005) that organisations’ employees 
face, as  well a s  into dynamic meaning making processes, particularly those involving sequential 
interactions. This is not a criticism of the work developed so far by Stamper, Liu and other 
semioticians. Rather, it is a recognition of the limitations brought about by the ontological 
foundations of this particular theory -  Or, in W alsham’s  terminology, a s  mentioned at the end of 
section 3.1.5, a recognition of what the organisational semiotics lens makes the researcher 'not 
se e ’.
Early attempts to address this limitation (e.g., (Ashforth and Humphrey 1997; Jom a and Van 
Heusen 1998; Andersen 2004)) suggest that cognition based theories may be a valuable 
complement:
‘Representational activities can be studied, both from a cognitive (focussing on the 
empirical reality of the behaviour) and from an interpretative (focussing on the meaning of 
the behaviour) perspective. As (cognitive) mental activity, this representational behaviour is 
studied by cognitive science. As representational activity, however, the cognitive mental 
behaviour is the object of semiotics. Thus
cognitive science and semiotics meet in an effort to understand man, the animal 
symbolicum, and human culture.’ (Jom a and Van Heusden 1998).
This thesis follows this trend, and draws on a second theoretical body that looks specifically at 
issues of cognition in meaning: classification theory.
3.2 Secondary theoretical lens: classification
The study of classification and categories has attracted extensive attention among the cognitive 
sciences:
‘It is a widely held view in cognitive and social psychology that the ways in which people 
understand the world, act upon it and react to it depend upon how they categorise it. This 
implies that the study of categorisation is capable of revealing some of the most 
fundamental organising principles of human thought and action. ’ (Edwards 1991)
The existence of categories supports numerous functions in social and individual life. At the social 
level, categories enable communication (Dutton and Jackson 1987; Potter and Wetherell 1987; 
Edwards 1991; Parsons 2002). At the level of the individual, categories facilitate reasoning (Smith
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and Medin 1981; Kurtz and Gentner 2001; Markman and Gentner 2001; Gilbert 2006), assist in
decision making (Gladwell 2006; Laurent, Ward et al. 2006), assist in prediction (Rosch 1978; Smith
1988; Chen and Bargh 1997; Parsons 2002), and allow for cognitive economy. Cognitive economy
is the mechanism by which individuals retrieve information about an object or a causal relation from
memory rather than having to derive it by reasoning processes every time that they encounter the
object or the situation (Guidagni and Little 1983; Siegler and Shipley 1995; Gentner and Wolff 1997;
Gentner and Wolff 2000). Cognitive economy plays such a fundamental role in life that Malcolm
Gladwell (2005) even went in so far a s  to claim that:
The only way that human beings could ever have survived as a species for as long as we 
have is that we’ve developed... (an) apparatus that is capable of making very quick 
judgments based on very little information’ (pages 11-12).
The concept of ‘category’ is a fundamental one in cognitive science, and its definition has evolved
over time. At a point, the concept w as so  ambiguous that it led Bertrand Russell (1946) to remark:
‘What exactly is meant by the word ‘category’, whether in Aristotle or in Kant and Hegel, I 
must confess that I have never been able to understand.’
Appendix 5 provides a brief overview of the evolution of the concept of category for the interested 
reader. The current understanding of categories has stabilised around the conceptualisation of 
categories a s  entities that are fuzzy at the boundaries and inconsistent in the status of their 
constituent members (Markman and Gentner 2001), and that vary for different agents.
One of two outcomes will occur, when a person observes a novel episode: he or she may assimilate 
it into an existing schem ata or, alternatively, the person will accommodate  the new stimulus in a 
new category, which, in turn, may be the result of creating new schem ata or of simply modifying an 
existing one (Piaget and Inhelder 1969; Potter and Balthazard 2004). Cognitive scientists, who 
study classification, have long examined how and why people classify one particular event in a 
specific category. The way in which such researchers conceptualise these issues is outlined next.
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3.2.1 The assimilation I accommodation process: How 
classification occurs
Category members may be bound together by common intrinsic attributes or, alternatively, by
features which only hold in relation to other objects (Barr and Caplan 1987; Medin, Lynch et al.
2000; Kurtz and Gentner 2001; Gentner and Kurtz 2006; Laurent, Ward et al. 2006). Categories
defined by intrinsic attributes are called ‘entity categories’, w hereas those categories defined in
relation to others are described a s  ‘relational categories’ (Gentner and Kurtz 2005). The matching
process varies with the type of category:
‘Entity categories are characterised by rich sets of intrinsic features and feature 
correlations. Relational categories are characterised by sparse, rule like relational 
structures. (...) Relational categories are more mutable and less well-remembered... and 
more slowly acquired than entity categories.’ (Gentner and Kurtz 2005)
Goldstone and colleagues (Goldstone, Medin et al. 1991; Goldstone 1996; Goldstone, Steyvers et 
al. 2003) proposed that categories may appear in a continuum, ranging from entity to relational 
categories, rather than an either/or situation. Furthermore, Goldstone and others noted that agents 
relied differently on relations and attributes a s  a  function of scene properties. This position 
reinforces the view that context plays a role in how people classify observations.
R esearchers addressing what determines that a stimulus is assimilated or accommodated in a  
category have investigated whether there are som e properties of an attribute that make it more 
central to the definition of the category than others. One of the conclusions reached is that surface 
properties seem to be much more relevant in reasoning than deep similarities (Mantaras, McSherry 
et al. 2005), and that a given feature is more central to a category than another one when it is more 
interconnected with others (Sloman, Love e t al. 1998).
Equally important for the matching process is the position of the feature within a relational structure 
(Gentner, Holyoak et al. 2001; Markman and Gentner 2001; Kokinov and French 2003), in particular 
whether the feature is deem ed to be a cause  or an effect (Ahn and Kim 2000; Rehder 2003; Proctor 
and Ahn 2005):
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‘People weight causes more heavily than effects in categorisation... and commonly infer 
many features from an unseen cause when reasoning (...) Clinicians’ beliefs about inter­
symptom relations will affect their inferences about other unknown features patients may 
have.’ (Proctor and Ahn 2005)
Gentner and Kurtz (2005) further proposed that observations are particularly relevant for the 
formation of entity categories, leading to 'fast, fluent categorisation’. In contrast, relational 
categories seem ed to be learned well when an explicit rule is given.
In conclusion, there are several factors that affect whether a stimulus is assimilated into an existing 
category, or not. The factors are related with both the type of category and the property of the 
features that define the category, and are summarised in table 3.6.
Table 3.6 -  Factors affecting  the  m atching p ro cess
Factors
F eatu re’s  properties Surface properties are better remembered than deep ones 
Interconnected properties are well remembered 
Properties seen a s  cause are better remembered than ones deem ed 
as  effect
Type of category Entity categories have more interconnected properties and, hence, 
are better remembered than relational ones 
Observations are well remembered in the case  of entity categories 
Rules are well remembered in the case of relational categories 
Scene properties affect whether agents rely more on entity or, 
instead, relational categories
In cases  where the agent is unable to assimilate an observation into an existing category, and has
enough motivation and time, he or she may attempt to integrate the available information in a  more
piece meal fashion (Hamilton, Sherman et al. 1990). The rejection of a previously established
schem a, however, requires considerable effort from the individual:
‘The acceptance of an idea is a part of the automatic comprehension of that idea, and the 
rejection of the idea occurs subsequent to and more effortfully than its acceptance.’ (Gilbert
1991)
Dunbar, who conducted observation and experimental work in the field of molecular biology, 
reported that scientists, when faced with a new or unexpected result -  which happens in more than 
50% of the experiments - will go to great lengths to explain the unforeseen outcome a s  a result of 
experimenter error before they abandon their existing schem as and develop a new explanation for 
the observations (Dunbar 2001).
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Gilbert (2006) witnessed the occurrence of similar cognitive rigidity in business decisions, and
illustrated its impact on decision making in organisations by referring to the computer industry:
'IBM’s mainframe business continued to expand for nearly 20 years while D EC built its 
minicomputer business. IBM’s capabilities in mainframes continued to fit that market, even 
though they were poorly aligned with the minicomputer market that would eventually invade 
the mainframe business.’ (Gilbert 2003)
The main conclusion is, then, that people are more likely to assimilate observations into an existing 
category than accommodate them into a new category.
3.2.2 The role of filters: why stimuli have varying likelihood of 
being noticed
Boisot and Canals (2004) suggested that two kinds of filters impact on perception and 
conceptualisation:
‘Perceptual filters first orient the sense to certain types of stimuli that operate within a given 
physical range. Only stimuli passing through this initial filter get registered as data. 
Conceptual filters then extract information-bearing data from what has been so registered. 
Both types of filters get “tuned” by the agents’ cognitive and affective expectations (Clark 
1997; Damasio 1999), shaped as these are by prior knowledge, to act selectively on both 
stimuli and data.’
The filters lead agents to recall information that is sufficiently novel to merit attention, yet not so 
unusual as  to wholly violate existing perceptions of reality (Cohen 2001; Lehman, Chiu et al. 2004). 
Evidence of filtering has been found in numerous areas of cognitive activity. For instance, studies of 
eye witness memory found that crime victims were more likely to recall stimuli when these  were 
consistent with highly typical events (Shaw, Bjork et al. 1995; Macleod 2002; Migueles and Garcia- 
Bajos 2006):
'Retrieval-induced forgetting was produced in low-typicality actions, while typical actions of 
[mugging] were not affected by inhibition (...) The high-typicality actions16 were 
representative of [mugging]. They supplied relevant information on how the facts unfolded 
and were causally and temporally interrelated (...) The low typicality actions17 of the 
event... were more circumstantiaf (Migueles and Garcia-Bajos 2006)
16 Examples: T he  mugger approached the woman unnoticed’ or T he  woman shouted for help’
17 Examples: T h e  mugger covered the victim’s  mouth’ or T h e  mugger escaped down narrow 
streets’
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Furthermore, observations of professional basketball players led Laurent and colleagues to 
conclude that:
'It seems that [players] organise their search quiet independently of the stimulus, having 
their visual search cognitively driven.' (Laurent, Ward et al. 2006)
In other words, filters not only influence absorption of the available stimuli, but they also seem  to 
drive what people look for in the environment.
Additionally, research suggests that the filters may have a self-fulfilling effect in the sense  that how
people interpret the stimuli is influenced by their a priori expectations (Wisniewski and Medin 1994;
Chen and Bargh 1997; Dunn and Spellman 2003; Quinn, Hugenberg et al. 2004). Yamauchi and
Markman (2000) went even further and demonstrated, in laboratory tests, that the label of the
category had a  stronger effect in which features were perceived by the participants than any other
particular feature. Moreover, when participants were told the category nam e a s  well a s  some
information to contradict the label, participants would still infer category-typical features consistent
with the category name.
‘How the person views the problem and creates the appropriate prove can be influenced by 
increasing the salience of categories of traces. Simply providing labels for categories or 
giving a single example of a category tends to cue attention and creates the appropriate 
probe to search the category of traces.’ (Potter and Balthazard 2004)
Not only are people more likely to notice stimuli that are category consistent, but they are also more 
likely to recall such information quickly and accurately than category inconsistent one (VonHippel, 
Jonides et al. 1993; DiMaggio 1997). In particular, when information about a  stimulus is ambiguous, 
people tend to distort the information available toward conformity with unambiguous attributes of 
category mem bers (Carmichael, Hogan et al. 1932; Loftus 1979; Koehler 1993; Dunbar 1995; Kuhn 
1997).
R esearchers have suggested a number of factors that my increase the significance of the filtering
effect. In particular, filters seem  to be more acute when there is a  time gap between the occurrence
of the stimuli and its recollection, as  illustrated by the following quote:
‘Consistency in reported features over a 2-month period increased as the delay between 
the initial test and [the event] increased. Central features (e.g., Where were you?) were
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reported with greater consistency than were peripheral features (What were you wearing?) 
but also contained a larger proportion of reconstructive errors.’ (Schmidt 2004)
Furthermore, the significance of the filtering effect is higher for highly emotional events:
‘The results demonstrated reconstructive processes in the memory for a highly 
consequential and emotional event and emotional impairment of memory processing of 
incidental details... [ There is] schematic selection, wherein information relevant to the gist 
of an emotional event is selected and schematically irrelevant features are losf  (Bamier, 
Hung et al. 2004)
Finally, the filtering effect also increases with expertise in the field (Schyns and Rodet 1997;
Schyns, Goldstone et al. 1998):
‘Our position argues for a continuity between representations of different-skilled individuals: 
from novice level, where similarity judgment is based upon comparison between entities... 
towards elite levels of expertise... the gradual building and use of representations’. 
(Laurent, Ward et al. 2006)
Further studies focused on how individuals classify in the presence of incomplete stimuli.
Researchers suggested that when information about a stimulus is incomplete, people tend to use
general information about typical category membership to fill in for information not presented
(Freeman, Romney et al. 1987; DiMaggio 1997; Gilbert 2006). Dutton and Jackson (1987) reported
how upon hearing a passage describing a person pounding a nail, people inferred the presence of a
hammer, whereas Parsons (2002) noted how people will usually infer the existence of a fire, upon
noticing smoke. In this sense, categories impose a self-reinforcing bias by causing people to
generate missing information to fulfil an anticipated categorisation:
‘The initial interpretation shapes future interpretation... The phenomenon of self- 
perpetuating frames appears to be robust at multiple levels of analysis, imposing 
constraints on the ability to embrace competing frames simultaneously.’ (Gilbert 2006)
In summary, the cognitive representation built over time of an object, once it has been categorised, 
is an inaccurate, simplified picture that matches the category’s  mental schem a more closely than 
did the original exemplar (Alba and Hasher 1983; Dutton and Jackson 1987). It is inaccurate in the 
sense  that it does not represent all members of the category, and simplified because it tends to 
refer to category-consistent information, only. This is because a) category consistent stimuli is 
generally more noticed and better recalled than inconsistent ones, b) information is distorted to fit in 
existing categories and c) constructing errors of memory occur.
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3.2.3 Relevance for the study of profiling
Classification theory offers significant contributions to the understanding of meaning making, a t the 
level of the individual person. This section considers how classification theory may contribute to the 
study of the em ergence of particular profiles of money laundering behaviour.
The study of classification assists the researcher in understanding how people perceive, act upon 
and react to the environment that surrounds them (Edwards 1991). Profiling is, in essence, a 
classification process characterised by 'attributing to the entire category certain characteristics that 
are probabilistically indicated by membership in the category, but that may still not be possessed by 
a particular member of the category1 ((Schauer 2003), page 4). Drawing on classification theory to 
study profiling may assist comprehension of how profilers understand the behaviour being 
modelled, and respond to it. In this sense, profiling is studied a s  not just a mental construct but also 
an observable action. The link between perception and action, in turn, mirrors organisational 
semiotics’ conceptualisation of meaning a s  behaviour.
The discussion of factors affecting how classification occurs, in section 3.2.1, alerts the researcher 
to issues that may affect profiling. In particular the features used to describe the money laundering 
behaviour may impact on how well the profile is recalled by its users and, a s  a  result, the outcome 
of the matching process. In addition, whether the profile is of an entity or relational nature, may also 
impact on the matching process. Furthermore, contextual factors influence the nature of profile in 
use. This last point is, again, shared with organisational semiotics, whose researchers, as 
discussed in section 3.1, study meaning in the social and organisational context (Liu 2003).
The works mentioned in section 3.2.1 also addressed the rigidity of categories. In particular, the 
works highlighted the great extent to which classifying agents will go to fit an observation into an 
existing category, before they review the definition of the category or even create an entirely new 
one. In addition, it was noted in section 3.2.2 that filters affect which stimuli are noticed and how 
accurate they are recalled, may lead to information distortion and to memory errors. As a result, 
over time, categories become ever more inaccurate, simplified pictures that match the mental
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schem a more closely than the original exemplar. The relevance of these insights for the study of 
profiling is that the researcher needs to be aware of, and focus his or her attention on, the various 
mental constructs rather than on the phenomenon being observed. Whether the observed 
behaviour is profiled a s  suspicious or not may have more to do with the pre-existing mental models 
used by the profilers, than the particular attributes observed. The finding also has implications a s  far 
as corrective m easures are concerned, in particular regarding the organisation's ability to review 
and develop new profiles.
In summary, the study of classification processes adds a valuable angle to the study of profiling, 
and aids in the fulfilment of this thesis’ objectives. The primary objective of this research is, a s  
described in section 1.5, to examine the effects of technology, analyst and context in financial crime 
profiling. Classification theory, with its focus on mental processes, is particularly well suited to 
support the researcher in untangling how profilers perceive, classify and react to particular 
observations. The theory is, however, limited in the insight that it can offer on particular aspects of 
profiling, which are discussed next.
3.2.4 Critique of classification theory
Research into classification processes has focused on how persons perceive objects or events in 
the environment. Various classical and current works in the field of classification theory have hinted 
at the role of context in classification, a s  reviewed in appendix 6 and summarised next. For 
instance, social psychologists have long documented how observed social behaviour influences 
subsequent individual behaviour (e.g., (Festinger 1954; Milgram, Bickman et al. 1969)). More 
recently, field studies noted that certain schem as fail to transfer across seemingly related situations, 
while others transfer when they should not, a s  illustrated by those students that may excel at 
mathematics’ exercises in class, and yet struggle at applying the sam e mathematical concepts in 
non-classroom concepts (Bassok, Chase et al. 1998; Elsbach, Barr e t al. 2005). The early 
assumption that a given schem a would be applied in the sam e manner across time and cognitive 
context, a s  long a s  the subject matter remains similar, has been clearly challenged and replaced by 
the understanding that classification is, indeed, affected by context.
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One branch of research has explored how physical contextual attributes interact with schem as and 
form temporary cognitive systems. Karl Weick, in his study of the 1949 Mann Gulch disaster in 
which 13 firemen died, noted that firefighting tools, while being a contextual artefact, are also a 
defining attribute of the firefighter’s  self schem a (Weick 1993; Weick 1995). The outcome of the 
interaction between schem a and artefact affect perception, a s  well (Elsbach, Barr et al. 2005).
Pickel (2005) noted that, while the physical context is important, the functional adequacy of a
schem a is socially determined:
‘Individual minds not only think, but at the same time also act, and they do so in particular 
social contexts’ (Pickel 2005)
The study of the interaction between mental schem as and context suggests that a  focus on either 
the categories or the context provides an incomplete picture of categorisation processes in 
organisations (Lant 2002). Rather, research should focus on ‘situated cognition’, that is, how 
categories emerge a s  a result of the interaction between individual schem as and context, at a 
particular point in time (Lave and W enger 1991; Cook and Brown 1999; Lant 2002). Contextual 
attributes both evoke and shape particular schem as, and schem as make particular contextual 
attributes salient (Mitchell, Smith et al. 2000; Cramton 2001; Carlile 2002; Sole and Edmondson 
2002; Elsbach 2004):
'At times... a dominant schema [drives] understanding and action... At other times, this 
mediation results in, essentially, a melange of existing schemas that like blended spices 
create a single experience containing complex flavours.’ (Elsbach, Barr et al. 2005)
While the importance of studying the context is clear, strictly this topic falls outside of the core 
interest of classification theory: a focus on the individual. As a result, in classification studies, the 
context tends to be an extraneous factor to be controlled, rather than one to be actively included in 
the analysis (Ashforth and Humphrey 1997). The cognitive science’s  focus on individual 
mechanisms of classification, while insightful, provides a narrow view of classification. Holistic 
understanding of classification in organisation requires a framework that addresses both the context 
and the individual.
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3.3 Research framework
The theoretical understandings reviewed in this chapter highlighted that meaning, while imbued in 
everyday organisational practice, is a  complex activity developed by individuals within the context of 
the organisational groups that they belong to. This activity is increasingly performed with the aid of 
technical artefacts. The practice of classifying stimuli and assigning them meaning is composed of 
several layers with different features and represented differently. The impact of each layer on the 
process of meaning and in the final outcome is felt in different ways and, therefore, must be studied 
by drawing on appropriate relevant analytical tools.
This section examines how organisational semiotics and classification may complement each other, 
a s  well a s  where conflicts might emerge. The section concludes with the presentation of the 
research approach followed in this thesis.
3.3.1 Comparing and contrasting the two theories
Section 3.1 articulated the elements that determined what meaning an agent ultimately gives to a 
data object, according to the organisational semiotics perspective. They are the sign, a s  the vehicle 
for meaning, and semiosis a s  the process of meaning making. The meaning of the sign is 
em bedded in the subsequent behaviour. Furthermore, semiosis is influenced by the affordances 
and the norms. The relationship between the various semiotic concepts is illustrated in figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 -  Meaning in organisational semiotics
Dependent,
variables
Independenl
variables NormsSigns
Semiosis
Affordances
It is important to em phasise that the relationships outlined in figure 3.2 are descriptive, rather than 
deterministic. Organisational semiotics does not attempt to predict the behaviour that will result from 
a given sign, in the presence of particular affordances and norms. Instead, organisational semiotics
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provides a framework for the researcher to elicit ambiguity in meaning, and identify eventual 
conflicts in the organisation about the signs.
Section 3.2 outlined the classification theory perspective on meaning. Meaning is, once more, 
materialised in actions. The elements that determine what meaning an agent ultimately gives to a 
data object are the existence of a  particular data object and the mental classification process. 
Moreover, the mental process is shaped by assimilation / accommodation dynamics and filters. The 
filters affect both which features of the data object the agent will notice, a s  well a s  how the agent 
will interpret the stimuli. The relationship between the various cognitive concepts is illustrated in 
figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 -  Meaning in classification
Behaviour
Dependent.
variables
Classification
process
Independent
variables Stimuli
FiltersAssimilation / 
accommodation
The relationships depicted in figure 3.3 are, again, descriptive rather than deterministic. The figure 
describes factors that may affect interpretation of a given stimulus and, therefore, the resulting 
behaviour, rather than foretell which interpretation will em erge form the classification process.
Organisational semiotics and classification theory both study meaning making processes, albeit 
focusing on different aspects of the process. Organisational semiotics, a s  discussed in section 3.1, 
is an insightful tool to study external aspects of meaning but which does not equip the researcher to 
study phenom ena that occur at the mental level. Classification, on the other hand, a s  highlighted in 
section 3.2, is unparalleled to study individual mental processes, but is not traditionally alert or 
prepared to study context. In this sense, and a s  previously advocated by Ashforth and Humphrey
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(1997), Jom a and Van Heusden (1998) and Andersen (2004), the two theoretical angles reviewed 
in this chapter complement each other, paving the way for an enhanced understanding of meaning.
The two theoretical fields have various points in common. Namely, both fields conceptualise 
meaning a s  subjective, ambiguous and relational, and which is influenced by context and is 
materialised in the agents’ actions. In addition, the two perspectives agree that perceiving agents 
use signs / categories to structure the social environment and deal with ambiguity. Furthermore, the 
semiotic distinction between representamen and object mirrors that made in classification theory 
between object and schema. The semiotic representam en and the cognitive object refer to that 
which needs to be classified or made sen se  of. In turn, the semiotic term object and the cognitive 
term schema refer to the concept of reference that is activated by the meaning making, or 
classification, process. Henceforth, for the purpose of this thesis, the semiotic term representam en 
and the cognitive term object are regarded as synonyms and interchangeable, a s  are the semiotic 
term object and the cognitive term schem a. Furthermore, in order to avoid confusion between the 
cognitive term object and the semiotic term object, the thesis will adopt the terminology outlined in 
table 3.7.
Table 3.7 -  Term inology used  in the research  fram ework
C oncept Sem iotic term Cognitive term Term adop ted
That which needs to be classified Representamen Object Data object
Concept of reference that is activated Object Schema Profile
The two theories differ, however, regarding the focus and the method of the analysis. Classification 
theory focuses on mental processes of matching data object and profiles, w hereas semiotics looks 
at the external factors affecting this matching process. Moreover, classification theory, which is 
predominantly a psychological theory, relies heavily on laboratory experiments where the contextual 
factors can be controlled and variances actively monitored. Organisational semiotics, on the 
contrary, is largely inspired by the work of the logician Charles Peirce, a s  described in appendix 2, 
and tends to use observations and content analysis a s  research methods.
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The author of this thesis does not regard such differences of focus and method as  inconsistent. 
Rather, the differences between semiotics and classification theory reflect the different positions 
from which each field looks at the sam e fundamental issue: that of making sense of particular facts 
or observations. Each perspective is like a prism (Ashforth and Humphrey 1997) or lens (D'Cruz 
2004), providing a  different, but not incompatible, reflection of the sam e research problem. The 
author believes that, by integrating these two perspectives, it is possible to achieve a richer and 
more robust understanding of the process of constructing and sharing meaning in an organisational 
setting. An overview of this integration is provided in the next section.
3.3.2 The research framework
Organisational semiotics, in its inception, never adopted a mentalistic notion of meaning, focusing 
instead on the externalisation of the interpretations, and studying the factors that affect semiosis. In 
the past 10 years, however, more and more semioticians following on Stamper’s  tradition have 
noted that sign interpretation is, essentially, a mental process. Such semioticians, a s  described in 
section 3.1.5, note that the existing tools do not enable the semiotic researcher to fully understand 
how employees of an organisation create and share meaning, and have, consequently, called for 
the development of a cognitive informed, organisational semiotics framework. The research 
framework here proposed, and that guides the present thesis’s  collection and analysis of data, 
addresses such calls. The framework is firmly based  on organisational semiotics, but adds on a 
dimension that focuses attention on individual mental processes.
The author advocates that the understanding depicted in figure 3.3 enhances that depicted in figure 
3.2, and addresses the calls by Ashforth and Humphrey (1997), Jom a and Van Heusden (1998) 
and Andersen (2004), among others, by providing the individual agent’s  angle to the semiotic 
process. The holistic understanding that em erges from joining the two frameworks is illustrated in 
figure 3.4 and can be described this way: the behaviour that results from the attribution of meaning 
to a particular sign is the result of both the meaning vehicles available and the meaning processes. 
Different agents may react differently to a  particular sign because they focus on distinct attributes of 
the sign, as a result of cognitive filtering processes, or a s  a result of differences in what the agents 
are afforded to do, the norms that guide the agents’ behaviour or the agents’ mental activity.
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Furthermore, such mental activity is characterised by assimilation / accommodation mechanisms, 
a s  well as  filtering processes.
Figure 3.4 -  Research Framework
Dependent
variables
Semiosis
Mental process
Independent
variables
Signs Affordances Norms
FiltersAssimilation / 
accommodation
In summary, meaning is created subjectively and socially, leading to subtle differences between 
groups of knowing agents. Semiotics provides the tools to identify and model the signs, the 
affordances and the norms relevant to the interpreter and, therefore, fills in the contextual gap 
identified by researchers working on situated cognition. Similarly, classification theory enriches the 
understanding of the mental process of the interpreters, and the meaning making mechanism.
The framework hence proposed does not attempt to predict the behaviours resulting from any 
combination of signs and semiosis. Instead, it aim s to offer a lens for viewing the world (Orlikowski 
and Robey 1991; Walsham 1995; Gregor 2006), namely to study the complex and subjective nature 
of meaning, and which includes a technical, a  social and an individual dimension. The author 
believes that the framework here described and depicted in figure 3.4 is not only applicable to 
profiling, but also offers the integrated approach advocated by Hildebrandt and Backhouse (2005).
The author suggests that, in the context of profiling, the signs consist of the knowledge objects 
available to or in the organisation - examples include identity data such a s  the customer’s  date of 
birth, name and address, a s  well a s  activity data such a s  the customer’s spending patterns or 
product acquisition -  and their corresponding meanings for specific interpretants. The affordances
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are the possible actions that the organisation’s  employees and technical system s can perform, such 
as  manipulation of data or access to information. The norms are the range of socially accepted 
actions. Acceptance may be informal, formal or technical, and will condition perceptual, evaluative, 
cognitive or behavioural actions. The assimilation / accommodation dynamics refers to the matching 
between observed behaviour and the existing reference profiles, a t an individual level. Lastly, the 
filters are the cognitive constraints that determine the perception and interpretation of the signs.
There are various types of signs in the organisation, a s  mentioned in section 3.1, som e more 
conducive to ambiguity in meaning than others. Moreover, the affordances may be real or 
perceived, and their realisation is contingent on the affordances’ elements. Norms are specific to 
each organisation and where the different groups to which an agent belongs have divergent norms, 
conflicts may arise. Additionally, a s  mentioned in section 3.2, categories are rooted in experience 
and not uniform across agents. Therefore, research into classification processes ought to focus on 
the person engaging in cognitive activity, rather than on the attributes of the objects being 
classified. Assimilation occurs more frequently than accommodation, and is influenced by the type 
of category and the property of the features that define the category. Finally, the cognitive 
representation of an object is an inaccurate picture that does not represent all m em bers of the 
category. It is also a simplified picture because it tends to refer to category-consistent information, 
only. This is because failures to recall certain stimuli, distorted recall of ambiguous stimuli and gap 
filling in the c a se  of absent stimuli.
The framework outlined in this chapter guides the collection and analysis of the field data. The next 
chapter presents the research methodology that guided the data collection effort.
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4. Research Methodology
The current chapter outlines the methodological approach used in the thesis. The first section 
presents the arguments for the use of a qualitative case study a s  the guiding research strategy. The 
second section outlines the data collection methods and tools. The chapter concludes with a 
summary and reflection on the coherence of the approach presented and the goals of the thesis.
4.1. Research Strategy
The Information System s field has been described as a ‘rich tapestry of different methodological 
approaches’ (Becker and Niehaves 2007), which results from the field’s  multidisciplinary nature. At 
the level of the research paradigm, it is common to distinguish between positive and interpretive 
research (Walsham 1995; W eber 2004). The differences between positivism and interpretivism, 
traditionally mentioned, are ontological, epistemological and methodological (Orlikowski and 
Baroudi 1991; Chen and Hirschheim 2004).
Ontologically, positivist researchers conceive of reality a s  something that exists objectively and 
independently of human experience, while interpretivists em phasise that reality is constructed 
through human and social interaction (Burrel and Morgan 1979). Epistemologically, positivists tend 
to obtain knowledge using hypothetic-deductive, testable theories w hereas interpretivists aim to 
acquire knowledge through the understanding of human and social interaction (Walsham 1995). 
Methodologically, positivists tend to collect evidence adopting a value-free position and employing 
objective m easurem ent tools, in particular quantitative tools like surveys, whilst interpretivists 
defend that the researcher needs to engage in the social setting investigated and adopt the 
participants’ perspective (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991; Chen and Hirschheim 2004). Against the 
clear-cut differentiation between positivism and interpretivism just described, authors such a s  
Alvesson and Skoldber (2000) and W eber (2004) propose that many of the metatheoretical 
differences between the two fields are inadequate. W eber (2004) goes even further and affirms that 
‘the rhethoric of positivism versus interpretivism... promotes unhelpful schisms among scholars’.
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Regarding the mentioned ontological differences, W eber argues for the distinction between the 
reality that exists and the researchers’ perception of it. Such argument mirrors Kant’s  (1999) 
distinction between things in themselves that exist independently of human consciousness, and the 
appearing of things to an observer. Such distinction m eans that knowledge acquirable by an 
observer is, inherently, restricted to the human consciousness (Becker and Niehaves 2007). For 
som e kinds of phenomena18, the perceptions will converge w hereas for others19 such agreem ent is 
not so straightforward.
As far a s  the epistemological differences are concerned, W eber (2004), who presents himself a s  a
positivist researcher, defends that there is ‘no foolproof way of knowing the reality because the
artefacts built and used to understand the world are all socially constructed:
‘[The researchers’]  culture, experience, history, and so on impact the research work they 
undertake and thus the results of their work’ (Weber 2004)
The main difference between positivists and interpretivists, a s  far a s  ontology and epistemology is 
concerned, is felt regarding the types of questions studied, the genre used to report the research 
and the extent to which the researchers try to make their personal biases and assumptions explicit 
when they describe their research (Weber 2004).
Concerning the methodological differences, W eber (2004) ag rees that positivists and interpretivists, 
by and large, tend to use different research methods. For instance, while the former tend to look for 
statistical regularities among large amounts of empirical data, collected through laboratory 
experiments, surveys and other tools, the later tend to prefer case  studies, phenomenology and 
other small-scale methods. Yet, as  Weber notes, the methodological distinction is not entirely 
precise: case  studies can be conducted within a positivist tradition, and inferential statistics may be 
used to detect regularities in interpretive studies that collect large amount of data. W eber suggests 
that the choice of method is influenced by pragmatic factors such a s  training, peer pressure or the 
type of insight sought by the researcher, rather than fundamental ideological differences. Becker
18 W eber gives the following example: What happens if we step off the ledge on the third floor of a 
building.
19 W eber provides this illustration: What happens when several individuals interact with each other.
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and Niehaves (2007) presented a similar view, arguing that the traditional link between particular 
Information System s’ research paradigms and specific research approaches is based  more on 
historic discourse than on philosophical logic.
In summary, the positivism vs. interpretivism debate is very much alive in the Information System s 
community and potentially evolving from a focus on irreconcilable philosophical differences, to a 
focus on pragmatic approaches for conducting and reporting the research effort. Nonetheless, it is 
useful to situate a research project in one of the two research traditions mentioned because that will 
influence ‘explicitly and implicitly the criteria that colleagues will use to evaluate (the) research’ 
(Weber 2004).
4.1.1 Research paradigm: within the Interpretive tradition
This study is concerned with how employees of an organisation build and use profiles, rather than 
with the composition of the profiles in them selves or whether or not such profiles accurately reflect 
the behaviour that they propose to model. It aims to find out ‘what is happening; to seek new 
insights; to ask questions and to assess phenomena in a new light ((Robson 2002), page 59).
The objective and the perspective of the present study make it particularly appropriate to follow an 
interpretive strategy of inquiry. Interpretive research 'focuses on the complexity of human sense 
making as the situation emerges; it attempts to understand phenomena through the meanings that 
people assign to them' (Klein and Myers 1999). The use of interpretive research methods in 
Information System s is ‘aimed at producing an understanding of the context of the information 
system, and the process whereby the information system influences and is influenced by the 
context ((Walsham 1993), pages 4-5), a s  well as understanding the social actions and m eanings of 
the participating actors in a social setting (Hirschheim and Smithson 1988). Interpretive research is 
an accepted research paradigm in information systems, having evolved from a very small proportion 
of publications in the early 1990s (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991), to around 17% of papers 
published in six well-known US and European-based journals in the period between 1993 and 2000 
(Mingers 2003), and whole special issues recently (Walsham 2006).
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The philosophical foundation of interpretive approaches to research may be linked to hermeneutics 
and phenomenology (Schwandt 1997), and the process is characterised by interpretation, a s  
opposed to apprehension, of the phenomenon being study. Interpretive researchers do not believe 
in an objective single reality, rather they attempt to explain the phenomena by accounting for the 
multiple meanings and beliefs of the social sphere (Keen 1991; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). The 
researcher adopts the perspective of som eone who is ‘inside’ the group being researched, and who 
is observing and interpreting what is happening (Trauth and Jessup  2000). A question that may 
emerge is whether it is possible for the researcher to claim following an interpretive approach, while 
being guided by a specific theoretical framework such a s  the one proposed in chapter three. The 
thesis’s author believes that this is, indeed, the case and points to the example of Orlikowski 
(2000), who used Giddens’ Structuration theory in her interpretive study of the use of technology in 
organisations.
Research is developed against a background of previous understanding, which influences the way
the phenomenon is perceived (Butler 1998; Becker and Niehaves 2007). While the research itself
enhances the understanding of the entire phenomenon, it occurs within the background of previous
understanding that the researcher may have about that sam e  phenomenon:
'Because empirical observations are inevitably mediated by theoretical preconceptions, our 
knowledge of organisations is fundamentally shaped by the subjective views through which 
we perceive data.' (Astley 1985)
The researcher cannot be expected to assum e a neutral position in relation to the investigation 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991), instead it is appropriate to distinguish between strong and weak 
constructionist views (Astley 1985; Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). In the former, the researcher is 
seen as inextricably linked to the account of the research and is presumed to enact the social reality 
that he or she investigates. In the later, the researcher interprets the data collected, including his or 
her observations, using a high degree of reflexivity in an attempt to develop an unbiased account of 
the phenomenon researched. Furthermore, Klein and Myers (1999) defend that using a se t of 
principles does not necessarily compromise the emergent nature of interpretivist research. What is 
needed is that the researcher does not adhere unquestioningly to such principles and, instead, uses
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them a s  a means for judgment. Klein and Myers further affirm that using principles in interpretive 
research makes all angles that have been considered by the researcher explicit, and provides an 
evaluative mechanism for others to judge the research work.
The present thesis adopts a weak constructivist approach in which the previous understanding
brought to the research is that profiling is a subjective process influenced by contextual factors and
individual processes, a s  discussed in chapter two. The research exercise aims to enhance the
understanding of how these factors interact and examine the impact of such subjectivity in the
emerging profile. The research framework described in chapter three does not make any
predictions regarding the goals of the research -  such knowledge will em erge from the analysis of
the findings from the empirical exercise. Additionally, the semiotic perspective that informs the
research is based on the assumption that the most suitable approach to studying problems in social
settings is a  subjectivist one:
‘Whereas objectivism assumes a single reality and explains differences of ideas as 
aberrations, subjectivism treats different ideas of individuals as starting points for a shared 
reality... [It] emphasises the abilities of individuals, their freedom to choose courses of 
action and the moral responsibility of their choice, as well as the uncertainty, novelty and 
strife they bring about. Importance is also assigned to the affective and cognitive behaviour 
of people as well as to their cognition. (...) The social world is studied by pursuing an 
understanding of the way in which the member of the society creates, modifies and 
interprets the world to which it belongs.’ ((Liu 2000), pages 24-25)
In order to increase reflexivity, the author w as guided by the principles suggested by Klein and 
Myers (1999). Namely, the author pursued understanding by moving between the analysis of the 
inter-dependent parts and of the whole, paying particular attention to the social and historical 
background of the research setting, developing an aw areness of how the author’s interaction with 
the subject of study may affect the results, relating the particular details discovered to wider 
propositions, engaging in dialogical reasoning and seeking out possible multiple interpretations. The 
next sections outline how these principles were put into practice in data collection and analysis.
4.1.2 Strategy of inquiry: Case Study
Regarding the specific direction for procedure, the author believes that the inquiry strategy that best 
fits the research question and objectives is the case  study methodology. The case  study
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methodology provides an holistic and rich perspective of the phenomenon under study (Creswell 
2003), and has been extensively used in Information System s’ research examining the role of 
context in shaping technology, a s  mentioned in section 1.4.
Robson (2002) describes case  studies, a s  ‘a  strategy for doing research which involves empirical 
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple 
sources of evidence’ (page 178). Yin (2003) further notes that, in a case  study, the boundaries 
between the phenomenon being studied and the context within which it is being studied are not 
clearly evident.
‘A case study is an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases) over 
time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich 
in context. This bounded system is bounded by time and place, and it is the case being 
studied -  a program, an event, an activity, or individuals (...) The context of the case 
involves situating the case within its setting, which may be a physical setting or the social, 
historical, and/or economic setting for the case.’ ((Creswell 1998), page 61)
Case studies have been shown to be the most appropriate methodology to follow when there is a 
focus on organisational rather than technical issues (Benbasat, Goldstein et al. 1987), and the 
researcher is looking for a  tool that enables the capture of reality in great detail and involving a 
great number of variables (Galliers 1992). The case  study methodology may draw on multiple 
sources of data to bring out the details from the viewpoint of the participants (Yin 1994), and allows 
for various interconnected levels of analysis (Pettigrew 1990).
The researcher acknowledges, however, that the case  study methodology has its flaws. One of the 
criticisms levelled at case studies a s  a method of inquiry is that it is difficult to generalise from 
findings (Spencer and Dale 1979; Galliers 1992). Saunders and colleagues (2007) note, however, 
that the difficulty in generalising is not necessarily a handicap of case  studies as, traditionally, the 
researcher does not aim to produce a theory that is generalisable -  rather, the researcher using 
case studies is usually trying to explain what is happening in the particular research setting. 
Furthermore, Walsham (1993) notes that the validity of the findings from a case  study rests on ’the 
plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning applied in describing and presenting the results 
from the cases and in drawing conclusions from them' (page 15), and that, in this sense, case 
studies are capable of producing four types of generalisations: the development of concepts, the
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generation of theory, the drawing of specific implications and the contribution of rich insight. To this,
Yin (1994) adds that case  studies may not be generalisable to populations, but that it is possible to
generalise to theoretical propositions. Furthermore, Saunders and colleagues (2007) note that the
robustness of the findings can always be tested for robustness in follow up studies, developed in
different research settings. Additionally, a s  Bryman (1988) notes, 'within a case study, a wide range
of different people and activities are invariably examined so that the contrast with survey samples is
not as acute as it appears at first glance’ (page 90). Finally, Lee and Baskerville (2003) note that:
‘A theory may never be generalised to a setting where it has not yet been empirically tested 
and confirmed. Along the same lines, neither an increase in the sample size in a statistical 
study nor an increase in the number of sites in a multisite case study would be an indicator 
of greater generalisability of a theory to new settings (...) Whether research is conducted 
quantitatively or qualitatively, there is only one scientifically acceptable way to establish a 
theory’s generalisability to a new setting: it is for the theory to survive an empirical test in 
that setting.’
The second criticism commonly made of case  studies is that such methodology does not offer 
control of variables and is liable to subjectivity in the interpretation of the results (Galliers 1992; 
Comford and Smithson 1996). Yet, such bias may be present in all forms of research strategies (Yin 
1994; Walsham 2006), a view long exposed by Geertz (1993 (1973)) who said of interpretive 
research in general that ‘what we call our data are really our own constructions of other people’s 
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to’ (page 9). The way to a s se ss  and verify 
the quality of the data collected, is to use and triangulate multiple sources of data (Van Maanen 
1979; Eisenhardt 1989; Mingers 2001; Saunders, Lewis e t al. 2007).
4.1.3 Style of involvement: towards neutral observation
Walsham (2006) describes the level of involvement of the researcher in the fieldwork a s  a 
spectrum, changing over time. At one end of the spectrum is the ‘neutral observer* whom Walsham 
describes as:
‘[A researcher who] the people in the field situation do not perceive ...a s  being aligned with 
a particular Individual or group within the organisation, or being concerned with making 
money..., or having strong prior views of specific people, systems or processes’ (page 
321).
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At the other end of the spectrum is the full action researcher, ‘trying consciously and explicitly to 
change things in the way that they feel best (ibid). Table 4.1 sum m arises the main advantages and 
disadvantages of increasing the level of involvement between researcher and research unit.
Table 4.1 -  A dvantages and  d isadvan tages of high involvem ent levels
A dvantages D isadvantages
o Good for in-depth access to people, issues 
and data;
o Enables observation or participation in 
action, rather than merely accessing 
opinions;
o Field participants may be more willing to 
cooperate because they see the researcher 
a s  trying to make a valid contribution to the 
field site;
o May increase the relevance to practice of the 
research work done.
o Very time consuming;
o Field subjects may be less open and honest 
with the researcher in cases  where he or she 
is perceived to have a  vested interest; 
o Danger that the closely involved field 
researcher becom es socialised to the views 
of the people in the field and loses the benefit 
of a  fresh outlook on the situation; 
o R esearchers may lose critical distance on the 
value of their own contribution and perhaps 
represent it in too positive a light.
Source: adapted from Walsham (2006)
Continued involvement with the field situation may push the researcher towards a more involved 
stance (Walsham and Sahay 1999; Walsham 2006), in particular in the sense  that the organisation 
involved may expect some form of advice and feedback, in return for the time and effort that the 
organisation’s employees dedicated to the study.
.The author sought to present herself has a neutral researcher and all communications with the 
organisation and interviewees stressed that the purpose of the exercise w as to collect data for the 
author’s  doctoral research. However, various members of the organisation, namely those working in 
the head office, becam e very interested in the study, and asked for the author to share the study’s 
findings with them, at a later stage. The author and the representative of the organisation agreed 
that the form of feedback should take the form of a presentation to mem bers of the organisation, 
including both those who had participated in the empirical study, and others not initially involved. 
The presentation took place in May 2006, and lasted for approximately one hour.
4.1.4 Data presentation and analysis
Semiotics is a valuable interpretive research methodology to represent the shaping of an 
organisation’s operations within the particular social context that it is embedded in (Corea 2005).
Page 100
Organisational semiotics, in particular, offers tools to present the divergent and, sometimes, 
conflicting views that may emerge in an organisation (Stamper, Althaus et al. 1988; S tam per 1993). 
One such tool is Semantic Analysis (SAM) which enables the analyst to specify the elem ents that 
compose the information system, and the relations between them. The semantic model represents 
the patterns of behaviour of an organisation, or the possible actions that m em bers of the 
organisation can perform (Stamper, Liu et al. 2000), with a focus on the responsible agents and 
their repertoire of behaviour (Liu 2000). The patterns of behaviour -  the affordances - are 
ontologically dependent on the agent performing them (DeMoor 2002). These dependencies are 
represented graphically by lines, with the antecedents on the left and the dependents on the right 
(figure 4.1). Three key components need to be present in the resulting ontology chart (Tan and Liu 
2003): the agent responsible for the action, represented by an oval; the affordances relevant for the 
agent, represented by a rectangle and the ontological dependencies linking the agents and the 
affordances, represented by a line or an arch.
Figure 4.1 -  Example of ontology chart
person
society
.nation state
lourly rate
imdget
task
requires
project
works in
employs
works on
(department)
:sponsible for
Source: Stamper, Liu e t al. (2000)
The ontology chart m aps the vocabulary and the temporal relationships between the perceptions 
that those words represent (Stamper 1996).
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Another tool available, in organisational semiotics, is Norm Analysis (NAM) which assists the 
capture of the various norms that condition the realisation of the affordances and state under which 
circumstance the ontological elements start or cease  to exist (DeMoor 2002; Liu, Sun e t al. 2003). It 
is a systemic approach to eliciting the norms that direct, coordinate and control the agent's actions 
(Liu 2000), as well a s  the triggers that may activate such norms (Stamper, Liu et al. 2000; Tan and 
Liu 2003).
In addition to studying contextual factors, in AML profiling, the researcher is also examining the role
of cognition by studying individual’s  mental schem as. Capturing psychological categories poses
great methodological challenges to the researcher
'[Categories] are something inside our heads. The methodological problem is of course that 
we have no access to other people’s minds except by observing what they do and listening 
to what they say.' ((Andersen 2004), page 40)
The author analysed what the employees said and did in search of discemable patterns (Maitlis and 
Lawrence 2003; Balogun and Johnson 2004; Maitlis 2005) of category composition. Furthermore, 
the researcher organised the emerging them es (Yin 2003; Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007) in two 
categories: identity and transaction features. Following on from this stage, the author developed 
‘snapshots’ (Jom a and Heusden 2000; Heusden and Jom a 2001) for each interviewee. The 
snapshots enabled the researcher to understand the relevant conceptual schem as (Khatri, Vessey 
et al. 2006) and create descriptions of the content of the category of ‘Money Laundering Behaviour’ 
for the various respondents.
Next, the researcher examined the narrative accounts resulting from the structured interviews 
through ‘talk and texts in interaction’ (Potter 1996; D’Cruz 2004), in order to identify instances of 
stimuli filtering, a s  discussed in section 3.2.
4.1.5 Unit of analysis: AML at BFI
The case  study chosen for this thesis is the AML initiative at a  UK based financial institution, to be 
referred to a s  BFI. The researcher aimed to study the consequences of various stakeholders’ 
perceptions and actions on the activity of profiling and detecting potential money laundering activity
Page 102
at BFI. Organisations are abstract entities and, a s  such, pose challenges to the researcher aiming
to study them. The semiotic authors, Heusden and Jom a (2001), characterise the challenge of
studying organisations in the following way:
‘Although in general we have little or no difficulties in speaking and thinking about 
organisations, describing the empirical reality of organisations is far from easy. Where 
should we look for organisations? How should we study them? Organisations are markedly 
elusive. They cannot be treated as empirical entities. What you perceive, when ‘looking' at 
organisations, are artefacts (buildings, machines) and behaviour (linguistic and other). But 
neither artefacts, nor behaviour are ‘organisation-like, in themselves.’
In a separate line of work, Charrel (2004) has noted that an organisation is com posed of multiple 
actors each having his or her own ‘viewpoint’. Viewpoints consist of Peirce’s  three components of 
the sign in addition to ‘the Actor, who uses or produces the sign (...) and... the context, the 
conditions in which the sign is used of produced" (page 107). Charrel com pares a particular 
employee’s viewpoint on a  particular subject to a situated sign and describes the task of an 
information system researcher a s  one of eliciting the 'universe of viewpoints’ and integrating them. 
Further, Charrel argues that reasoning about the different viewpoints ‘facilitates the discovery and 
management of all significant differences which are the sources of sense... (and) traces both the 
communications and the meaning process that constitute the final collection of requirements’ 
(pages 109-110)
The researcher is, then, faced with the question of whether to study all members of the organisation
or focus on a sub-set. Additionally, the researcher ought to decide whether the analysis should
include artefacts as well as  people. Heusden and Jom a (2001) address this issue and suggest that:
'What is needed, therefore, is something that relates artefacts and behaviour to create a 
more or less coherent whole. Such a relation is a representation, shared, at least in part, by 
a number of interacting actors. It is the representation that gives both artefacts and 
behaviour their meaning. (...) The empirical material (of semiotics) consists of represented 
artefacts and behaviour. The artefacts are not, in themselves, representations. But they 
become so when used in the semiotic behaviour. Representations are empirical entities, 
insofar as they are aspects of (human) behaviour. Our empirical research is thus research 
into mental processes. ’
Responsibility for AML at BFI rests with the Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) and his 
team, hereafter referred to a s  the MLRO unit. The activity of monitoring how custom ers use BFI’s 
products and services, looking for signs of money laundering, is a dynamic process that also 
involves branch personnel and an automated monitoring system. Therefore, the author felt that the
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unit of analysis that most completely relates artefacts and behaviour, in relation to AML initiatives at 
BFI, should be extended to include not only the MLRO unit but also the branches and the 
automated system. This study is, thus, a single, embedded case  study (Yin 2003) which exam ines a 
number of logical sub-units within the organisation.
The researcher opted to use a pseudonym for the field organisation and disguise the identities of 
the interviewees. Liebenau and Smithson (1993; 1994) argued for the disclosure of the 
organisation’s  identity, in order to increase contextual information and validation. However, given 
that the subject discussed in this thesis is of an extremely sensitive nature, with links to law 
enforcement and crime detection, it was felt that the disadvantages to the organisation and the AML 
initiative far outweighed the benefits for the research community of disclosing such information.
4.2. Data collection
Case studies may use quantitative or qualitative methods, or even a combination of both (e.g., 
(Kaplan and Duchon 1988)). The two methods differ not only regarding the collection tools used, 
but also regarding the type of analysis that they enable, a s  summarised in table 4.2.
Table 4.2 - Distinction betw een quantitative and  qualitative da ta
Q uantitative data Qualitative da ta
Based on meanings derived from numbers Based on meanings expressed through words
Collection results in numerical and 
standardised data
Collection results in non-standardised data 
requiring classification into categories
Analysis conducted through the use of 
diagrams and statistics
Analysis conducted through the use of 
conceptualisation
Source: Saunders, Lewis et al. (2007)
Saunders and colleagues (2007) further argued that:
'A contrast can... be drawn between the “thin” abstraction or description that results from 
quantitative data collection and the “thick” or “thorough” abstraction or description 
associated with qualitative data’ (page 472).
This study draws on qualitative data collection tools, which are particularly suited for research 
requiring a complex and holistic picture with detailed descriptions of the informants’ views (Creswell
1998), and to explore multiple realities (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Data collection took place
Page 104
between November 2004 and Septem ber 2005. The study used a combination of primary and 
secondary data sources, as described next. The combination of various data sources provided the 
author with confidence that the data collected constitutes a comprehensive view of the 
phenomenon under study (Eisenhardt 1989).
4.2.1 Secondary data collection tools
The study drew on documentary secondary data, in particular, analysis of the docum ents identified 
in table 4.3. Secondary data serve to provide comparative and contextual data (Saunders, Lewis et 
al. 2007). Namely, the documents analysed in the context of this study enabled the researcher to 
gain insight into the ways definitions of money laundering are delineated at the institution, a s  well a s  
into how the practice of detecting and reporting suspicious money laundering behaviour is 
operationalised.
Table 4.3 -  D ocum ents collected and analysed
Type Description
Paper o AML guidance document for all members of staff 
o Reporting instructions distributed to all members of staff 
o AML guidance document specifically for customer facing staff 
o Investigation process ‘crib sheets’ distributed to AML analysts 
o Customer information booklets prepared by BFI
o Customer information booklet prepared by regulator and law enforcement agency 
o AML analysts’ evaluation forms
Electronic o AML training software 
o AML aw areness section on BFI’s Intranet 
o Referrals dashboard
o Generic file descriptions detailing the data that BFI extracts from the legacy 
system s and how it is put in to the automated monitoring system 
o Presentations by the provider of the automated monitoring system
Some authors note that the initial purpose for data prepared may affect how it is presented and that
such potential bias is a limitation of using secondary data in research (Stewart and Kamins 1993; 
Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007) -  however, for the purpose of the current study, such bias w as not a 
disadvantage given that its goal was exactly to elicit predispositions and ideas surrounding the 
preparation of the documentary data in use in the organisation.
It is however important to acknowledge that documentary sources, on their own, were insufficient 
sources of data for the study. This is because what is written in these docum ents may not
Page 105
necessarily reflect what is done in practice. D’Cruz (2004), who researched Child Protection
practice in Australia, noted that:
‘No amount of organisational regulation can entirely suppress the interpretation by 
practitioners of what is prescribed in policies and procedures, and how these may be 
implemented" (page 2)
The researcher combined the analysis of the documents mentioned above with collection of primary 
data, as described next.
4.2.2 Primary data collection tools
The analysis of documents w as triangulated with interviews and observations of various BFI 
employees. Interviews are ‘the main road to multiple realities' ((Stake 1995), page 64) and enable 
the researcher to discover things that are not directly observable, such a s  feelings, thoughts and 
intentions (Patton 1990). When deciding whom to interview, the researcher w as guided by both 
relevance and practical considerations. As described in section 4.1.5, the relevant unit of analysis 
for the thesis is the MLRO unit, a s  well as branches and the automated system.
The MLRO unit is of manageable size, a s  described in chapter five and, consequently, it w as 
possible for the researcher to interview all team members, including all those linked with the 
operation of the automated system. It was not possible, however, to interview staff that worked in all 
branches of BFI for both practical and access reasons. Accordingly, the researcher selected a small 
sample of all branches, following a non-probabilistic sampling method: purposive sampling. The 
purposive sampling technique is appropriate for research exercises that aim to explore key them es, 
in depth, using a small sample (Neuman 2000; Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007). The selection of 
specific units for the exercise is dependent on the research’s  objectives (Patton 2000). The 
researcher aimed for maximum variation within a homogeneous sample (Patton 2000). The 
homogeneity derived from choosing the subgroup of London based agencies and selecting two 
branches that had similar sizes and job functions, and that had been exposed to similar training 
programmes. Within these, the researcher asked BFI’s assistance in identifying two branches that 
were exposed to markedly different types of clients. This meant that the researcher could explore 
varying conceptualisations of money laundering within a particular branch, a s  well a s  across the two
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branches studied. The data hence collected, while unlikely to be representative of the whole 
population of BFI branch personnel, should assist the researcher in documenting uniqueness and 
emerging themes (Patton 2000). Given these param eters, BFI facilitated access to one branch 
located in the city of London and another one located in East London. BFI also facilitated access to 
its largest branch, for the purpose of conducting a pilot study.
The author used both structured and semi-structured interviews (table 4.4), which were all voice
recorded and transcribed. The semi-structured interviews consisted of a  list of them es and
questions to be covered, which was adapted for the specific job role context of the interviewee.
Semi structured interviews provided the researcher the opportunity to ask interviewees to explain or
build on their responses, the opportunity to collect a  rich and detailed se t of data, and are
particularly relevant in interpretive studies (Saunders, Lewis e t al. 2007).
1 The main reason for the potential superiority of [semi-structured interviews] for obtaining 
information is that the flexible and responsive interaction which is possible between 
interviewer and respondent(s) allows meanings to be probed, topics to be covered from a 
variety of angles and questions made clear to respondents’. (Sykes 1991)
Table 4.4 -  Summary of interview s conducted___________ __________________
Participants Sem i-structured S tructured
Managers (MLRO unit) 5 -
Analysts 5*° 4
Systems administrator 3 1
T rainer 2 -
Branch staff*1 9 9
However, semi-structured interviews present a  potential problem of reliability, in the sense  that 
alternative researchers might elicit different information from the interviewees (Marshak, Keenoy et 
al. 2000; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al. 2002), or because the interviewee is unwilling to or unable 
to provide the information required (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007). In order to increase reliability, the 
semi-structured interviews were complemented by observations and by structured interviews, where 
the researcher looked very carefully for discrepancies between actual behaviours and those 
described in the interviews.
20 One analyst left the organisation shortly after the semi-structured interview
21 Excluding the branch where the pilot study took place
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Another limitation of semi-structured interviews is that it is difficult to make generalisations about the 
entire population (Yin 2003). In the present study, the entire population of the MLRO unit a s  well a s  
the 2 branches studied were included in the interviews. Therefore, while it is not possible to 
generalise from this study to all BFI branch staff, or to all banking organisations, it is still possible to 
generalise for the units investigated.
The structured interviews consisted of an interviewer-administered questionnaire, based on a 
predetermined set of questions, identical for all the interviewees. Questionnaires are perfectly valid 
inputs for interpretive studies, and can be very useful complements to purely qualitative data 
collective tools (Kaplan, Farzanfar et al. 2003; Mingers 2003; Walsham 2006). The choice of 
interviewer-administered, rather than self-administered, questionnaires posed the disadvantage that 
the respondents might have felt inclined to choose an answ er that they thought would be desirable 
(Dillman 2000). However, the researcher felt that interviewer-administered questionnaires were a 
particularly suitable method due to the increased response rate of this method and the ability to 
route different subgroups of respondents (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007), a s  well a s  the eventual 
necessity to clarify complicated questions (Oppenheim 2000). The questions for the questionnaire 
emerged from the research framework described in the previous chapter, in particular regarding 
cause and effect relationships (Ghauri and Gronhaug 2005) between the respondents' stated 
opinions and attributes and their exhibited behaviour (Dillman 2000). The decision to study the link 
between opinions and behaviours is also in line Ciborra’s  (2001) call for information system s 
researchers to examine moods and human emotions.
The questionnaire had four parts. The first part consisted of identity and transaction data for a 
fictitious customer. The data, while fictitious, was inspired in real cases and w as developed with the 
help of BFI’s AML trainer. The second part consisted of questions in a Likert-style scale (Corbetta 
2003), in which the respondents were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with several 
statem ents regarding the fictitious customer. The third part used a semantic differential rating scale, 
where respondents were asked to rate their attitudes towards AML, on a series of 10 bipolar rating 
scales. Each bipolar scale described a pair of opposite adjectives, designed to anchor the 
respondents’ attitudes (Haried 1972; Haried 1973; Houghton and Hronsky 1993; Saunders, Lewis
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et al. 2007) towards the activity of detecting and reporting potential money laundering behaviour. 
The adjectives focused on three factors (Stamper 1973): evaluation, potency and activity of the 
task. Evaluation referred to the purpose of the task, potency to the impact of the task and activity to 
the dynamic character of the task. The adjectives used for each of the three factors are summarised 
in table 4.5. Due care w as taken to vary the position of the positive and negative adjectives, in order 
to reduce the tendency of respondents to only read the adjective on the left side of the page (Kervin
1999). The final section consisted of category and open questions designed to obtain a 
demographic profile of the respondents.
Table 4.5 -  Sem antic differential factors
Evaluation Potency Activity
Bad / good 
Harmful / beneficial 
Unrewarding / rewarding 
Unpleasant / pleasant 
Useless / useful 
Not worthwhile / worthwhile
Ineffective / effective 
Powerless / powerful
Flexible / rigid 
Mobile / Static
As endorsed by Bell (2005) and others, a pilot version of the questionnaire was tested  in one 
branch not included in the final sample. As a result of the pilot, the questionnaire w as significantly 
shortened in order to avoid antagonising the interviewees (Walsham 2006) and to increase 
response rates (DeVaus 2002; Edwards, Roberts et al. 2002). Additionally, some of the questions 
were rephrased to improve clarity (Fink 2003; Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007).
The author conducted the structured interviews with the branches' personnel face to face. The 
structured interviews with the MLRO unit personnel took place via the telephone. The author 
considered this method to be more practical than conducting an additional round of face to face 
interviews because it allowed the researcher to talk with the respondent at a time that best suited 
him or her, a s  opposed to scheduling several interviews on the sam e day which might required the 
respondents to interrupt their work, or the author making several trips to the organisation’s office. 
Additionally, the researcher had already established personal, face to face contact with the 
interviewees in various previous occasions and she w as confident that a reasonable level of trust 
had been established between interviewer and interviewee (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007).
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Foddy (1994) stated that, in order for interview findings to be valid, four requirements must be 
accomplished: 1) the researcher is clear about the data required and designs a question, 2) the 
respondent decodes the question in the way the researcher intended, 3) the respondent answers 
the question and, 4) the researcher decodes the answer in the way the respondent intended. The 
researcher addressed the first requirement by carefully developing questions from the research 
framework as well a s  adapting questions used in other interview guides and questionnaires 
(Bourque and Clark 1994). In order to address the second and fourth requirements, the researcher 
asked the respondents to provide a narrative account of their decision making process, therefore 
allowing respondents to answer the questions in their own way (Fink 2003), allowing the researcher 
to confirm or complement the interpretation of questions a s  well a s  providing an insight into how 
respondents understand and organise their reflections of what occurred (Jones and Candlin 2003). 
The interviews had 100% response rate, and no question remained unanswered, therefore 
addressing Foddy’s  third requirement.
The data collection exercise also included the systematic observation, recording, description,
analysis and interpretation of BFI employees’ behaviour. Observation is particularly suitable when
the research looks at what people do (Stewart and Kamins 1993), a s  opposed to what they might
say they do. Additionally, observation allows the researcher to best become acquainted with the
respondents' context (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007).
‘In the social sciences we cannot hope to adequately explain the behaviour of social actors 
unless we at least try to... learn (their) symbolic world1 ((Delbridge and Kirkpatrick 1994), 
page 37)
Gill and Johnson (2002) developed a fourfold categorisation of the role that the participant observer 
can adopt, illustrated in figure 4.2. This study used an ‘observer a s  participant’ approach, where the 
respondents were aware that they were being observed and of the purpose of the study. Such 
approach w as not only more ethical than the complete participant or complete observer roles, but 
also allowed the researcher more freedom to take notes, than would be possible in a participant a s  
observer or complete participant roles.
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Figure 4.2 -  Typology of participant observation research roles
{ParticipatesObserves
Revealed Concealed
 ^ _________________________ .—"
Researchers identity
Source: adapted from Gill and Johnson (2002)
In order to overcome what Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994) described a s  the greatest threat to the 
reliability of participant observation, observer bias, the researcher used the ‘informant verification’ 
technique (Saunders, Lewis et al. 2007), in which the researcher presented her account to the 
participants for them to verify the validity of the conclusions. The researcher also used recording 
devices, with the knowledge and consent of the respondents.
4.3. Conclusion
The major departure point for this study was to study subjectivity in profiling, from an integrated 
perspective. Scholars from varied fields of research, from data mining to specific applications, 
acknowledge that the process may be influenced by contextual and cognitive factors. However, 
despite various calls for research examining the role of such factors in the profiling process, a s  well 
a s  the impact on the emerging profile, a multi-disciplinary approach to the study of profiling has 
been largely absent from the relevant literatures.
The primary theoretical lens informing the present thesis is organisational semiotics. This lens was 
chosen because of its appropriateness to study issues of meaning in organisations. Organisational 
semiotics rejects the notion of absolute meaning, in favour of a conceptualisation of meaning as 
subjective, relational and dependent on the context. A second theoretical lens was drawn upon in 
order to address the limitations of primary lenses, and add richness to the analysis: classification 
theory. Classification theory originates from cognitive psychology and focuses on understanding 
individual mental p rocesses of meaning. Albeit originating in different fields, and traditionally using 
different methods, the two lenses are, for the purpose of this study, considered not only 
complementary but also compatible, because both theories conceive of meaning a s  subjective,
Participant a s  observer Complete participant
Observer a s  participant Complete observer
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relational and dependent on the context. Additionally, both fields follow a  descriptive, rather than a 
predictive approach, to the phenomenon analysed.
Chapter four presented the methodological approach for the thesis, and substantiated the choice by 
linking it with the theoretical underpinnings informing the study. The author opted for an  interpretive 
case study, in which the research’s  position tended towards that of neutral observer, even though 
towards the end of the project there w as increased participation in the form of a feedback session. 
The chapter further outlined the qualitative data collection tools chosen for the thesis, and explained 
how information w as triangulated, through the use of multiple sources. The next chapter outlines 
the findings from the fieldwork.
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5. Fieldwork
The case  study described in this chapter refers to the development of information system s in a UK 
based financial institution, for the purpose of detecting suspicious money laundering activity. At the 
time of the study, the role and the process of AML initiatives within the organisation were 
undergoing significant changes, in line with major transformation occurring elsewhere in the 
industry. BFI’s  ultimate objective is to find the most cost effective method to infer criminal activity 
from exhibited banking behaviour.
The following sections present the data collected in the field study. The first section provides an 
overview of the process of detecting money laundering in the case  study organisation, highlighting 
the changes occurred over time. The subsequent four sections present the data collected according 
to the methodology outlined in chapter 4. The final section sum m arises the main empirical findings 
about the classification processes emerging in the organisation.
5.1 Detection of money laundering at BFI
This section sets the case study under analysis, and describes the information system s in place. 
BFI22 is a publicly traded company, and one of UK's major financial services groups. It w as created 
in the 19,h century and expanded both by organic growth and through mergers and acquisitions.
BFI has a UK-wide network of branches and automatic teller machines (ATMs), Internet and 
telephone banking services, a s  well a s  a limited provision of services through a third party 
commercial organisation. BFI’s largest business unit, contributing to over three quarters of the 
group’s profit, is retail banking. The retail business includes the provision of current accounts, 
savings, personal loans and mortgage services. In addition, like other financial institutions, BFI 
developed a number of partnerships with suppliers of services such a s  insurance, long term 
investment products or credit cards.
22 All nam es and identifiers have been disguised to protect the privacy, security and commercial 
interests of the organisation analysed
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5.1.1 Evolution of AML at BFI
The unit in charge of developing and implementing an AML programme at BFI is headed by the 
MLRO, and shall be referred to, in the context of this thesis, a s  the MLRO unit. The MLRO unit went 
through three distinct periods in its history that, in turn, reflect wider changes in the organisational 
and external environments.
Initially, AML initiatives a t BFI were responsibility of the compliance department. Consequently, the
role of the AML at BFI was, essentially, one of guaranteeing that the organisation w as complying
with the FSA requirements a s  far a s  internal policies were concerned. As recently a s  December
1999, there w as simply one person looking at money laundering referrals in the company, and the
entire MLRO unit consisted of three persons, only. The whole period up to mid 2002 w as
characterised by low investment in the unit, reflecting the low priority given to AML nationwide. The
FSA had just taken responsibility for AML, and a s  one member of the MLRO unit described:
‘It wasn't a priority for anybody... we put a tick in the box as far as compliance was 
concerned but did very little else.’ (Interview, MLRO)
In 2002, the FSA held audits at several financial institutions. Appendix 7 provides a  brief overview
of the risk framework guiding the FSA audits. The FSA felt that a  number of institutions had not
m ade enough effort to prevent and detect money laundering and, subsequently, applied very hefty
fines, a s  detailed in appendix 8. FSA audited BFI in 2002. The assessm ent focused, among other
things, on the m easures in place at BFI to avoid it being used to process the proceeds of crime.
FSA did not fine BFI but, in the light of the heavy fines imposed on other institutions and the
subsequent negative media attention that such institutions received, BFI took FSA’s
recommendations very seriously. The MLRO confirms that:
‘Our biggest thrust (...) is that we don’t want to be fined. Period. ’ (Interview, MLRO)
‘The thing that has pushed all this has been the FSA saying “you are not doing enough” (...) 
FSA thought that we should deploy more resources to it... and we started to build the team 
to where it is now.’ (Interview, MLRO)
BFI recruited staff to analyse referrals, to develop and deliver training activities, and to administer IT 
related projects. In 2003, the unit acquired an automated transaction monitoring system (ATMS), 
based on a neural network solution. Budget constraints dictated the choice between alternative
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success stories started to em erge26 and the links with other prestigious institutions becam e stronger
and stronger, the unit gained increased internal legitimacy. The MLRO unit started to cooperate
regularly with other units in the organisation, such a s  the fraud and marketing departments, in order
to develop monitoring algorithms and exchange intelligence, in general.
‘Before, we did not get many alerts from Fraud, but that has been changing.’ (Interview, 
MLRO)
‘Our marketing department (has) a very broad customer database. It has got details of all 
our customers and... the transaction activity that they perform (...) (They) combine certain 
data that is available -  e.g., socio-demographic information, socio-economic information 
about where the customer lives and what type of people live in that area, whether they can 
expect a high predominance of directors or small businesses, council houses... [It gives us 
an] idea of the financial position of our customer. The marketing database will provide us 
with an awful lot of information. ’ (Interview, System s Manager)
The structures of power have shifted a t BFI and, with them, the structures of authority and
responsibility. At the time of the empirical exercise, if the marketing team wished to launch a new
product, it had first to get clearance from the MLRO unit, certifying that the product and the
accompanying literature did not infringe the group’s guidance and policy on AML, for instance.
‘Operational areas may seek technical support from the team. For instance, if the marketing 
department decides to launch a new product, they have to clear it with ourselves. (Check) if 
what they are advertising actually meets the requirements that we have regarding customer 
identification, etc... Also the marketing literature must be cleared with [the unit] to see if it 
meets the requirements. ’ (Interview, Inspections manager)
The change in power is not complete, however, a s  illustrated by the following quote from an
interview with the MLRO:
‘If we want to do a data extract... we have to go and beat up people in the system or call 
on favours. There is no real established channels, there is no awareness in the business 
(and there is no real imperative, anyway) to give us help with that’.
5.1.2 The MLRO unit
At the time of the field study, the MLRO unit consisted of 14 people, including the MLRO (figure 
5.2). The MLRO is legally responsible for the group’s  compliance with the relevant law and 
regulations, and oversees both the retail and the wholesale banking businesses. He participates in 
several executive committees and steering groups, thereby contributing directly to the decisions of
26 The unit had recently received confirmation from the FIU that it had greatly assisted in the 
detection of a human trafficking ring.
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the executive team. In addition, the MLRO is expected to create an AML culture in the organisation 
and contribute to the management of the group’s  financial risks. Money laundering is seen  by som e 
in the industry a s  inextricably linked to fraud, particularly in the case  of terrorist financing, and, 
therefore, likely to originate direct losses to the financial institutions, in addition to the general 
negative impact in society in general.
Figure 5.2 - Composition of the MLRO unit
Retail policy 
(2 persons)
MLRO 
(1 person)
Analysis 
(5 persons)
Inspection 
and Training 
(3 persons)
W holesale policy 
(3 persons)
The Wholesale and Retail Policy team s perform a legal advisory role. In particular, they examine 
the relevant regulation and industry guidance, in order to develop company wide policies and 
guidelines. The Analysis team investigates all alerts received and, when applicable, prepares and 
submits referrals to the FIU, a s  discussed in section 5.1.5. The Inspection and Training team 
enforces implementation of internal policies regarding the opening of accounts, a s  well a s  the 
maintenance of both client and transaction records. The Inspection and Training m anager also 
works, together with the Policy manager, towards the simplification of identification procedures in 
order to minimise disruption to the clients. One example of simplification is the move from paper- 
based identification to electronic one. The Trainer’s  role is, naturally, to develop and deliver training 
sessions across the group. Moreover, the Trainer identifies relevant topics to cover in the training 
sessions, and decides which branches or business units receive face to face training and which 
ones receive training via the Intranet, instead. The MLRO unit deem s face to face training a s  more 
effective than electronic one, but given the fact that there is only one trainer available for the whole 
group, the former type of training is reserved for those units considered to have a particularly high 
risk of exposure to money laundering activity, or which face complex forms of money laundering, as 
is the case  of international banking transactions.
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5.1.3 Detecting money laundering
In order to detect potential money laundering, BFI instructs members of staff across the whole 
organisation to monitor customer transactions, and to report anything unusual to the MLRO unit. 
The analysts’ team  reviews all alerts received and, when one analyst deem s that the observed 
pattern of transaction is, indeed, illegitimate, he or she reports it to the country’s  FIU. The process is 
outlined in figured 5.3.
Figure 5.3 - The monitoring process
S c r u t i n y
R e p o r t
A n a l y s i s
R e f e r r a l
‘S u s p i c i o u s ’ b e h a v i o u r
A l e r t
S A R
’U n u s u a l '  b e h a v i o u r
B a n k i n g  b e h a v i o u r  
( e . g . ,  d e p o s i t  in c a s h )
BFI aims to refer transactions and customers that will be valuable to the FIU:
‘We try to train colleagues not to report defensively. If you can’t decide (whether a particular
alert is suspicious or not), you should go back and do more work’ (Interview, MLRO)
Such quest for highly relevant referrals, however, needs to be achieved in a timely and cost- 
effective manner. Specifically, BFI aims to review each alert and decide whether to file or report the 
alert within 10 working days27 of its reception by the MLRO unit, and within a fixed budget. The goal 
to be cost effective, in turn, m eans that BFI needs to be able to handle information in an  effective 
way. In other words, BFI needs to be able to identify what the FIU considers valuable referrals, and 
needs to communicate this understanding upstream in the process chain, up to the point where 
observed transaction behaviour is first divided into what is considered normal and reasonable
27 This is an average. The target is likely to increase when a large number of members of staff are 
on annual leave, or a s  a result of major external events such requirements for information on a 
large number of accounts from law enforcement units. Similarly, the target is likely to decrease, 
otherwise. The annual average, however, is expected to be below the ten days limit.
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behaviour and what is deem ed unusual activity. The next section examines the origin of the profiles 
in place at the organisation, highlighting issues of information quality.
5.1.4 Profile development at BFI
The MLRO team scans the environment, in order to collect information and examples of which
banking behaviour corresponds to money laundering or terrorist financing.
'There is nothing around. It is just case studies. When I started the job, I wanted 
information. I wanted people to tell me what to tell the staff. I wanted to know what the 
trends were, what were the scams. And you don’t have that information. You have to build it 
from your own files, experiences, or going from seminars and conferences. You have to try 
and develop it yourself.' (Interview, trainer)
One source of factual information is the law enforcement agencies, for instance via confirmation
that a  SAR submitted by BFI resulted in a prosecution:
'We had a couple of cases where we had good hits - for instance, a human trafficker that 
we helped to get arrested coming out of the branch. It was a huge success and it is good 
feedback to the team. Because we don’t get a huge feedback...’ (Interview, Analysts’ 
manager)
BFI obtains input from Law Enforcement Agencies’ court production orders, a s  well:
‘We are asked to provide a lot of witness statements. We often get production orders and 
we noticed that they were invariably on accounts that we haven't spotted before. Our action 
there is reactive. ’ (Interview, MLRO)
The trainer explained how factual information is used in training sessions:
7 told them of the stolen vehicles that went to [country x] and other countries that [drive on] 
the left. I told them about the scam and the referral we had. When we investigated, it was a 
[specific type of commercial organisation], and the only thing that was happening was 
money coming into the account from [country x], and then going out. But there was nothing 
else: no salary payments, no bills...’ (Interview, Trainer)
Whilst the information obtained via the law enforcement agencies is the one that most clearly 
establishes the relationship between banking and criminal behaviour, it still suffers from severe 
limitations. Firstly, it does not occur systematically. And, secondly, it tends to deal with unique, 
unrepeatable events upon which a judgement must still be made regarding the application of that 
knowledge to other situations.
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Most information available at BFI is of a  speculative nature, instead. For instance, one member of 
the MLRO unit read in the news28 that, in order to fund its terrorist activities, the IRA ran a business 
empire that included the smuggling of fuel, in particular agricultural diesel, from the Irish Republic 
where duty is considerably lower to Northern Ireland. Consequently, the MLRO unit decided to 
introduce a rule in its ATMS that singled out businesses with a SIC29 code that relates to fuel, and 
that were located in the border towns. The accounts flagged were subsequently investigated by the 
analysts who, in the absence of intelligence regarding which filling stations were under the control 
of the IRA and, therefore, which were the specific patterns of transactions of a ‘legitimate’ filling 
station a s  opposed to an IRA controlled one, could only but guess which stations were engaged in 
suspicious activity.
In summary, the definitions used by BFI, regarding which observed banking behaviour is suspicious 
or not, are a conversion of factual and speculative information, originating in a variety of sources. 
The intelligence team  converts that information into general definitions of what is suspicious 
behaviour. Such definitions, in turn, are converted into rules used across the organisation. The 
intelligence team is composed of four m embers that also hold other roles in the MLRO unit, as 
illustrated in figure 5.4.
28 Transcript available in appendix 9.
29 The Standard Industrial Classification codes are used to classify business establishm ents and 
other statistical units by the type of economic activities they are engaged in. Information on the 
origins, legal basis and many other aspects of the UK’s  SIC system is available in
http://www.statistics.aov.uk/methods gualitv/sic/default.asp
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money laundering is a secretive occupation, whose perpetrators usually take great care in
disguising and, as  a result, most available knowledge about financial crime is of a  speculative
nature. The team is acutely aware of the nature of the process:
‘We are not always going to get it right. We try. And I think that where we have learned the 
most is the cases where we get it wrong. We pull those cases and go through that... it is 
subjective, you know...' (Interview, Analysts' manager)
Additionally, the money being laundered may be the proceeds of any form of criminal activity, 
providing a myriad of possible alternative modus operandi. Finally, it has not been demonstrated 
that there are patterns of banking behaviour that refer exclusively to legitimate underlying activity.
In the lack of such uncontested models of behaviour, the monitoring process is one characterised 
by subjectivity, in the sense that what is considered unusual to one observer may seem  perfectly 
reasonable to another
‘[Staff] don’t see everything the same (...) We all have suspicions about different things.’ 
(Interview, Trainer)
A view that is supported by the analysts’ manager:
‘There are differences in [the analysts] approaches. Part of my role is picking the best out of 
their approaches and manufacturing a team that is as consistent as possible in their 
approach’.
In order to lessen bias in the monitoring process, the organisation has introduced an information 
system consisting of an aggregate of rules, processes and artefacts implemented with the purpose 
of formulating descriptions of what constitutes suspicious activity, and disseminating this 
understanding across the organisation.
The MLRO unit conducts numerous and extensive brainstorming sessions. There are regular, 
scheduled sessions within the unit, less frequent sessions with other units of BFI and ad-hoc 
sessions with entities external to the organisation in order to gather the latest available information 
regarding the identity and the methods of money launderers. The MLRO team then crystallises such 
models of who money launderers are and what they do into rules, to be disseminated across the 
organisation.
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Dissemination of the rules is achieved through training activities delivered by the unit to all members 
of the organisation, which can have the form of structured, face to face sessions, computerised 
training packages or electronic updates. Furthermore, the rules are transformed into profiling 
algorithms that search through BFI’s databases of transaction records. Transaction data is fed into 
the ATMS from the organisation’s various legacy systems overnight, and SQL rules search through 
this data.
Alerts throughout the organisation show great variation. For instance, there are big differences
between the number and type of alerts raised by customer-facing employees as opposed to the
ATMS (figure 5.5). Additionally, there are huge differences across branches. For instance, the
MLRO unit found that those branches located in areas deemed to be under the control of a well-
known terrorist group, report far less suspicious activity than other, similar, branches:
‘It is difficult to actually say with certainty, but the implication is that our staff [in specific 
geographical area] is far too scared. Our automated system has told us that there is quite a 
lot going on that would be interesting and that we think that staff should have spotted and 
told us about. So, obviously there is still some fear factor, there is still no go zones.’ 
(Interview, MLRO)
Figure 5.5 -  Proportion of alerts by sou rce31, in 2005_________________________
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‘There is this particular person who works out in [call centre] and she rings me every other 
day, bless her. She reports everybody. You can’t discourage her because one of the 
reports that she does during the week could be right... but I do need to go and see her, to 
reassure her\
Finally, the MLRO unit has noted a marked surge in alerts as a result of training activity:
7 monitor referrals after my training. We usually see a pick after the training, and then it 
fades off. That is why we have to do the refresher training. You remind them in the training, 
and they go back to what they did two weeks (before) and that didn’t pay much attention 
then, and might refer it. That is why we get the peak.’ (Interview, trainer)
In summary, detection of money laundering at BFI consists of a constellation of actions, as well as 
related sub-actions, which, together, form the focal unit of analysis of this thesis, as discussed in the 
next section. The discrepancies between numbers reported, and type of activities flagged, highlight 
the importance of critically investigating the monitoring process at BFI.
5.1.5 The monitoring process
The monitoring process consists of matching observed banking behaviour with the prototypes 
developed by the MLRO team of what is legitimate behaviour for a given customer and/ or financial 
product. Various agents participate in the monitoring process, with the output of the analysis of one 
agent becoming the input for another agent. Behaviours that do not match the prototype at the 
scrutiny stage are categorised as ‘unusual’, while behaviours that do not match the prototype at the 
analysis stage are categorised as ‘suspicious’ (figure 5.6).
Figure 5.6 -  S tages of the monitoring process_________  ____________
# 1
•BANK staff (e.g., 
branch)
•ATM S
• External s ou rces  
(e.g., victim of fraud)
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O bserved
banking
behaviour
Unusual
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Referral to 
MLRO team : 
Alert
#2 • A nalysts Analysis
•A lert
• Client history
• Specific 
intelligence re: 
client or 
transaction
Suspicious
behaviour
Referral to FIU: 
SAR
The MLRO unit uses the two different labels to reflect that, in the first instance, there has been no 
qualified analysis of the behavioural pattern. It is also thought that by using a word with a weaker
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negative connotation -  unusual - employees will feel less worried about mistakenly referring a 
customer.
‘We make a distinction purely because otherwise there is an expectancy that everything 
that we get in this department is suspicious and therefore should be disclosed.’ (Systems’ 
manager)
Records of observed banking behaviour are first scrutinised by two types of agents: customer facing 
staff such as those working in BFI’s branches, contact centres or product units (e.g., international 
transfers), and the automated transaction monitoring system. When the observed pattern of 
behaviour is deemed unusual, it is reported to the MLRO unit. The analysts in the MLRO unit 
investigate the alert, alongside other input such as previous transaction history or intelligence on a 
given type of business. If the analyst agrees that the observed pattern of behaviour is not legitimate, 
the behaviour is referred to the FIU, generating a ‘SAR’. The FIU, an entity external to BFI, analyses
j-usseu in u ie  p re sen t siuuy. neris lor analysis, in
'sts as illustrated this thesis: the customer facing employees, the ATMS and the MLRO’s unit anal}
in figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7 -  C om ponents of the monitoring p rocess
5.1.6 Valuation framing
The key agents’ beliefs regarding the task of monitoring AML behaviour w as asse ssed  using the 
questionnaire described in section 4.2.2. More than one indicator w as used to m easure each of the 
three factors identified in table 4.5: evaluation, potency and activity. The indicators’ scores32 were 
averaged to produce the final score for each factor. As illustrated in table 5.1, the indicators’ scores 
were fairly consistent for each interviewee, a s  m easured by the standard deviation.
Table 5.1 -  Sum m ary of th e  resu lts
Evaluation Potency Activity
D escription Code Aver Std Aver Std Aver Std
Branch Low - Interviewee 1 BL1 3.5 2.8 3.5 : 2.1 3.5 0.7
Branch Low - Interviewee 2 BL2 5.3 1.4 3.0 • 0.0 4.0 1.4
Branch Low - Interviewee 3 BL3 6.3 0.8 6.5 I 0.7 2.0 0.0
Branch Low - Interviewee 4 BL4 6.3 0.8 6.0 : 0.0 3.0 0.0
Branch Low - Interviewee 5 BL5 5.2 1.0 6.0 : 0.0 2.5 0.7
Branch High - Interviewee 1 BH1 6.3 1.2 5.5 : 0.7 2.0 0.0
Branch High - Interviewee 2 BH2 6.0 0.9 4.5 ! 0.7 3.5 0.7
Branch High - Interviewee 3 BH3 4.7 1.6 6.0 ; 0.0 4.5 0.7
Branch High - Interviewee 4 BH4 6.0 0.6 6.5 ! 0.7 1.5 0.7
Analyst 1 A1 6.5 1.2 7.0 : 0.0 3.0 1.4
Analyst 2 A2 6.8 0.4 6.5 : 0.7 3.0 1.4
Analyst 3 A3 6.5 0.5 5.0 i 0.0 1.5 0.7
Analyst 4 A4 7.0 0.0 5.5 : 0.7 3.0 0.0
System manager SM 5.7 1.9 5.0 i 0.0 2.5 2.1
The respondents held a generally positive attitude towards detecting and reporting money 
laundering (Figure 5.8). The analysts were not only more positive than other members of staff, but 
they were also more consistently so. Of particular importance is the fact that all analysts considered 
that money laundering detection was extremely beneficial and rewarding, while only five out of nine 
branch employees considered it so. Members of the branch located in the economically deprived 
area, referred to a s  Branch Low, were less positive about the task than their colleagues in the 
economically privileged location, referred to a s  Branch High. When probed for causes that made 
AML monitoring unrewarding, branch employees mentioned that AML brought increased workload 
and originated the occasional clash with their sales target.
32 As described in section 4.2.2, the questionnaire used a series of 10 bipolar rating scales, each of 
them describing a pair of opposite adjectives.
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Figure 5.8 -  Evaluation of m oney laundering detection
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1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0
‘Potency’ measures the respondents’ belief in the power of AML. Overall, there are not big 
differences between the beliefs of the different groups (figure 5.9). The analysts exhibited the 
strongest belief in the system, whereas the employees located in Branch Low were more sceptical 
than those located in Branch High. The System manager was as sceptical about the power of the 
system as the Branch Low employees.
Figure 5.9 -  Potency of m oney laundering detection
Branch Low
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Analysts'
f p a m
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The factor ‘activity’ focused on whether detecting money laundering was a flexible and malleable 
task or, on the contrary, quite a rigid one. Responses to the left of the scale, i.e., below grade 4, 
indicate an opinion that money laundering detection is quite flexible. Activity is the indicator where 
responses were most consistent across groups of respondents (figure 5.10), with the system 
manager believing the most that ML detection is a flexible activity, closely followed by the analysts. 
There were not major differences between the two branches.
■ Evaluation
Figure 5.10 -  Activity of money laundering detection
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In summary, the BFI employees interviewed exhibited positive attitudes towards the task of 
detecting money laundering, were generally confident on its impact and saw the task as ever 
changing. As a group, the analysts were not only the ones with the most positive attitude but also 
the ones with most consistent replies. Section 5.2 looks at the portfolio of AML related actions 
available to each of the three types of agents.
5.2 Possible monitoring behaviours
This section builds on the discussion of the elements that constitute the monitoring process, and 
their prevalent attitudes, to focus on the actions possible for each element of organisation. BFI
JPfion examines which 
possible for the three key types of agents identified in section 5.1.5, and outlines the 
behaviours affordances on the monitoring process.
behaviours are 
impact of such
IFI employees’ general actions
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Figure 5.11 -  E
5.2.1 Branch employees
Branch employees Interact directly with the custom ers (figure 5.12). The direct interaction enables 
these employees to form very clear mental representations of what the usual behaviour for an 
individual customer is:
‘He would be the type of customer that would probably use a card, direct debits, etc...’ 
(Interview, Branch supervisor)
In addition, branch em ployees have general expectations regarding the behaviour of specific types
of custom ers, for instance depending on the professional occupation, or types of products such a s
personal vs. business accounts. Furthermore, direct interaction with the custom ers m eans that
branch staff observe and, therefore, potentially monitor not only the specific transaction but also the
custom ers them selves and special circum stances surrounding the transaction, for instance, whether
the custom er w as accompanied or not.
‘We had some (referrals) coming through (from the branches) that said: “the customer was 
a bit scruffy, he was smelly”. ’ (Interview, Trainer)
Figure 5.12 -  Branch em ployees’ actions
Suspicious 
Non suspicious
Person
uses deemsobservesInteracts duty#
works inBranch Report
Employee
5.2.2 ATMS
The MLRO intelligence team  considers intelligence from a pool of external and internal sources, 
ranging from law enforcement agencies to other financial institutions or anecdotal reports in the 
press, in order to develop the profiles, a s  described in section 5.1.4. Afterwards, the system s 
m anager describes the intelligence accumulated at decreasing levels of abstraction, and translates 
it to the query language, SQL, until specific unambiguous criteria are reached, a s  illustrated in 
figure 5.13. The process aims to connect otherwise disparate pieces of personal, product and 
transaction data into a  single formula.
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Figure 5.13 - Process of objectification of the money laundering definition
Obtain accounts with turnover above £20,000 in the last 30 days
For product range: personal account
identify Money Laundering
Obtain current accounts
‘Suspicious’ behavioir
'UnusuaT behaviour
Edit transactions in the last 20 days
Obtain transactions between £1,500 and £5,000
Edit customers Rung in postcode SE3
Obtain custom ers aged 20 to 40 years old
Flag account 1234567 of custom er J .  Smith
The system s manager draws on the physical characteristics of the data to design the ATMS for 
handling the available customer, product and transaction data. The system processes data and has 
no direct interaction with the customers. Consequently, the profiles can simply draw on transaction 
records stored in the database, a s  illustrated in figure 5.14. Another defining characteristic of the 
system is that it can only run a limited number of rules at a time. As a result, when the team  wants 
to monitor a new group of customers, a  particular SIC code or any other new profile, it needs to 
switch off one of the rules currently being run.
Additionally, the ATMS is quite limited in the input that it can consider for the monitoring process. 
For instance, given that not all legacy system s feed into ATMS, the system can only monitor a 
subset of all transactions. One example is the mortgage database that contains custom er 
information collected for the purpose of risk underwriting, such a s  the professional occupation of the 
clients and their expected annual income or the portfolio of financial products held. However, for 
technical reasons, the mortgage database is not linked with the profiling system. A second limitation 
is that the rules do not read text fields, such a s  notes from interviews between the custom er and 
one of BFI’s  financial advisors, meaning that monitoring focuses on numerical data, only.
‘We don’t carry details such as scratch pads, history names, notes that customer advisors
might use, telephone conversations, ... although some of the conversations could be
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useful, it is free text and we can’t run queries on them, so there is no use in having them 
into the system’. (Interview, System s manager)
Furthermore, the ATMS holds data for a limited period of time only. In summary, for the monitoring
activity, ATMS has access to a set of data that is only a  subset of all the data available in the
organisation and that consists of numerical data drawn from three legacy system s within a limited
time window. As the system s manager put it:
W e might have the data in our legacy systems, but [if it] is not one of the ones that we are 
feeding into our monitoring system... we can’t write any rules on that.
Figure 5.14 -  ATMS’s  actions
System
contains
Algorithm
allocates
detects
Database compiles
Suspicious 
Non suspiciou!
Records
generates
Person
transactions
Branch
5.2.3 Analysts
Analysts do not interact directly with the customers, contrary to branch employees. Staff in the 
analysis team  scrutinise patterns among various datasets, but excluding any intangible attributes 
such as the customer appearance a s  well a s  attributes that were not recorded on the database, a s  
is the case  of conversations between the branch employee and the customer. As such, the mental 
representations of the usual behaviour for an individual customer, a  type of customer or a  type of 
product may, in principle, differ from the representations held by branch employees because they 
are based on different data sets.
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On the other hand, the analysts have access to databases that branch employees don’t (figure
5.15), such as the entire portfolio of products that the customer has, and whether or not there have
been previous alerts raised on this customer:
‘It is about trying to build as big a picture of the customer as you possibly can, by trying to 
obtain as much information as possible from our records (including credit agency reports) 
and the Internet. Who their mortgage is with, where the direct debits are going to ../  
(Interview, Analyst 1)
7 am just looking through the account to see if there is anything else at all... Another large 
payment out, cash deposit, cheque deposit... (...) Just double check who it is going to. I am 
going to phone the department that deals with these payments and see if they have 
something on it. [Phone conversation] She told me that the payment has gone to [specific 
beneficiary]. I will do a quick check on the Internet (Google) (...) We usually have some 
history notes there. So that one tells me that there has been a file put together. That one 
has been previously referred. I will look at the reasons for those previous referrals.’ 
(Interview, Analyst 2)
Figure 5 .1 5 - Analysts' actions
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5.2.4 Comparison of possible behaviours
Different agents have varying access to information, a s  a result of their roles at BFI and, 
consequently, are able to monitor different elements, as  summarised in table 5.2 and depicted in 
figure 5.16.
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Table 5.2 -  Inputs for monitoring activity
Agent Interaction
with
custom er
Type of data available Behaviour observed
Branch Direct - Soft and hard (numerical and 
text) data
- Limited scope
Customer’s behaviour plus 
limited set and range of 
transactions
ATMS Mediated - Hard (numerical) data
- Time constrained
- Limited to databases feeding 
into the system
Wide range of transactions
Analysts Mediated - Mostly hard (numerical and text) 
data
- Possible indirect access to soft 
data via notes on customer files
Wide range of transactions, 
as well as customer 
behaviour via notes on alert 
reports
Branch employees tend to have a single view of the customer limited to the direct interactions with 
that customer, and access to a limited range of databases, whereas the ATMS can draw on various 
other sources, and the analysts can draw on even more sources of information. However, branch 
employees are also the ones most likely to capture soft data, analysts can also do that but to lesser 
extent and ATMS can not capture soft data at all. Lastly, ATMS is the agent most capable of 
monitoring complex trends in the data, followed by the analysts and the branch staff. The three 
agents participate in the same general monitoring behaviour and yet have very different abilities to 
do so, as a result of their roles in the organisation.
Figure 5.16 -  Nature of monitoring behaviour afforded
Hand vs. Soft da ta
Branch 
— • —  System  
-  - Analysts
Single vs. Multiple view Simple vs. Com plex calculations
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5.3 Permitted monitoring behaviours
This section outlines the technical, formal and informal forces that condition the perception, 
evaluation, cognition and behaviour of BFI’s branch staff, ATMS and analysts, a s  far a s  the 
monitoring activity is concerned.
5.3.1 Technical behaviours
Technical norms, a s  discussed in chapter 3, are exactly specified norms possible of being 
autom ated and executed by a computer. Technical norms reflect the very character of the technical 
artefact -  a computer based tool that performs routine analysis of easy to automate parameters.
Perceptual norms affect the process of developing SQL queries of money laundering behaviour,
illustrated previously in figure 5.13. In particular, such norms dictate how the behaviour is reflected
in the transaction patterns that the ATMS monitors. The task of the System s m anager is to translate
a complex fuzzy concept -  human behaviour -  to the structured query code of the automated
system . Or, as he put it:
‘They tell me in plain English what they want to see and I try and write it in the SQL system 
so that we can actually monitor it.’
The system s m anager needs to a sse ss  which data fields to monitor and how to assem ble them into 
one formula. The development of formulas is informed by data mining techniques such as  standard 
statistics:
‘We are trying to find out, first of all, a very basic profile... What are the differences between 
incidences of a customer of a certain age being disclosed as opposed to the incidence of a 
customer being that age in our entire data base? For instance, a finding may be that a 
customer aged between 25 and 40 years old is twice as likely to be disclosed as they are 
likely to occur in the entire customer base’ (Interview, System s manager)
Another technique used is market basket analysis33, such a s  the conclusion drawn from observation 
that terrorist financers tend to belong to a certain ethnic group who, in turn, are likely to live in a 
particular geographical area and be linked with a  specific type of SIC code business.
33 This technique takes its nam e from the idea of custom ers throwing all their grocery purchases 
into a shopping cart. It is based upon the premise that if som eone performs a specific action (e.g.,
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The evaluative norms guiding ATMS’s  monitoring refer to the value of specific SQL rules in use, as 
well a s  the source of intelligence behind such rules. The MLRO unit considered SQL rules that 
produced large amounts of output alerts unsatisfactory because such rules were deem ed too vague 
to be of any practical value and because they undermined the efforts to stay within specific 
performance targets34. Additionally, when a given rule stopped producing alerts, the system s 
m anager discarded or temporarily suspended it, a s  the MLRO unit believed that such rule w as no 
longer efficient. Lastly, a rule was considered to be particularly good when it flagged accounts that 
had also been noticed by a member of staff, but for different reasons, the rationale being that the 
rule is picking up characteristics of unusual banking behaviour that are not detectable by m embers 
of staff.
'Our staff got very excited with this case, when I mentioned it, (because) a member of staff 
had already referred it. That was really great in some respects...It proved something that is 
very important: that the ATMS really is duplicating the work that your staff were doing. The 
fact that it duplicated the case but for different reasons was great because it means that, in 
theory, that rule picks up stuff that staff may miss.’ (Interview, System s manager)
Evaluative norms also played a role regarding the source of input for the rules. The knowledge that 
another institution, widely regarded as a leader in AML monitoring, w as targeting certain 
geographical a reas and SIC codes quickly prompted BFI to develop similar rules. By opposition, the 
fact that another organisation is monitoring a given age group did not prompt BFI to apply that rule, 
which was justified by the fact that the given organisation faces ‘other type of money launderers’, a s  
defended by the system s manager.
Cognitive norms provide the rationale to truncate the rules. Keeping updated data on all custom ers 
is costly for the organisation and intrusive for the customer and, a s  a result the team  selects which 
data fields are particularly relevant for the exercise, and decide to update and use those fields only.
buys beer), then he or she is likely to perform another action or actions (e.g., buy crisps). In 
essence, it consist of examining a list of actions in order to identify which are most frequently 
performed together and in which sequence.
34 Linked with the conversion of ATMS alerts into referrals to the FIU, upon examination by the 
analysts’ team .
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‘If you went into our branch to open a simple savings account and deposit £500, and we 
cross-interrogated you about how much money you expect to pass through this account, 
from where are the funds coming from, what do you do for a living... They are going to say 
"Hey, do you want my money as a savings account or not?” (Interview, MLRO)
Static customer data such a s  professional occupation or marital status is usually considered of
limited value and, hence, not used in the exercise. The norms also determine which data objects
the team  considers particularly insightful. For example, one of the date fields considered is ‘account
opening date’. Yet, the team feels that such date is not the most relevant to reflect the relationship
between BFI and the customer and, consequently, the field actually holds the date that the
custom er first opened an account with BFI:
‘One of the date fields that we use is called the account opening date (AOD) - the AOD as 
is named on the system actually holds the relationship start date. So, in other words, it is 
the date that the customer first opened an account with us, not the date that he opened the 
specific account that we are looking at. Because we think, actually, that the relationship 
period with the customer is more interesting than the date they opened that individual 
account’. (Interview, Systems manager)
Additionally, cognitive norms dictate which thresholds to consider, or which accounts to monitor, 
and why:
‘We wrote a rule that says “from our personal account customers, tell us which accounts 
are receiving in excess of £100,000 in a 30 day period”. Initially, that prompted many cases, 
and over time, we brought that figure down to cases between £20,000 and £40,000 over 30 
days. It is for large cash amounts coming in to all personal customer accounts. If [the 
account is being used] for business, they are probably trying to avoid charges. But that 
could be an element of tax evasion, which is an element of [financial crime]. We are not 
sure where the money is coming from, because [the account] is not flagged up as 
business.’ (Interview, Analysts’ manager)
‘This rule targets cash deposits that have a total of cash deposits between [value x] and 
[value y] over a [specific]period. [£X] and [£Y] cash and it is round figures, specifically. (...) 
If you or I were going into a bank to deposit some money, perhaps we sold something in the 
second hand market, and we sold it for £163.99, the chances are we would bank £160 and 
leave the £3.99 in our pocket. So we assumed that fraudsters would be doing the same 
thing. So we are currently targeting ending in zero, but we are now starting to think 
“actually, normal behaviour dictates that we only put the nought in -  is it possible that, 
therefore, the money launderer might leave it at the exact £ and pence?” Should we be 
targeting the unusual end instances, rather than what the average person would do? So we 
are considering changing that rule -  because the whole reason why we came up with that 
rule became the exact reason why we shouldn’t use it. ’ (Interview, System s manager)
The ATMS’s behavioural norms are straightforward: the algorithms run overnight and, daily, the 
system produces a report with all the transactions that the SQL rule flagged. This list is handed in to 
the team of analysts who will, then, further investigate each of the alerts.
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5.3.2 Formal behaviours
The formal norms originate in BFI’s policy documents and other official communications. The 
Human Resources department distributes AML policy booklets to all members of staff who join the 
company, and the MLRO unit oversees the distribution of document updates to all members of staff.
The policy booklet contains very specific perceptual norms:
‘What is money laundering?
This is a process used by criminals to conceal the true origin and ownership of the 
proceeds of crime. It covers all forms of criminality and it allows criminals to maintain 
control over the proceeds of their crimes and, ultimately, provides a legitimate cover for 
their source if income’. (Internal document)
The document provides less straight forward, but nonetheless clear, evaluative guidance on what
should make staff suspicious, when monitoring the behaviour of BFI’s customers. A full transcript is
available in appendix 10:
‘What should make me suspicious: There are no defined “indicators* and your suspicions 
will likely depend on the context of a transaction. Nevertheless, you should be suspicious 
where any request for services, a transaction or a series of transactions is unusual either 
for the customer or for the Group. ’
In addition, the MLRO unit delineated a list of documents that customer-facing staff can accept a s  a 
proof of custom ers’ identify and/or their addresses. Such list is derived from FSA regulations and 
industry guidance.'
Finally, the MLRO unit published evaluative guidelines, transcribed in appendix 11, regarding a 
group of custom ers whose activity ought to be closely monitored: Politically Exposed Persons 
(PEP’s).
The formal documents also structure employees’ reasoning via the cognitive norms outlined. The
policy guidance document, for instance, instructs staff to question the customer’s motives:
'If there appears to be no reasonable explanation for a customer’s behaviour, you must 
make a report.’ (Internal document)
Furthermore, the documents highlight that ‘The aim of any money launderer is to make criminal 
money hard to trace (...) Likewise, terrorists want to preserve the secrecy of their networks.'
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(Internal document). Therefore, staff are encouraged to look for behaviour that could suggest that
the custom er is trying to disguise the source or the destination of the funds:
‘In its simplest form, cash will be deposited into personal or business accounts, (sometimes 
in numerous small amounts to avoid detection)... (The funds) can then be moved around 
easily.’ (Internal document)
BFI also tells its employees that money launderers may attempt to encourage staff to look for 
layering attempts:
'Money is moved through many transactions with the sole purpose of obscuring the audit 
trail (...) Transactions of this kind might be identified by a lack of a normal personal or 
business motive’. (Internal document)
In addition, the policy documents note that money launderers may use false identification 
docum ents to further hamper any audit attempts. Therefore, BFI instructs staff to look for forged or 
counterfeit documents. Regarding PEP’s, BFI notes that such persons cause concern because ‘by 
virtue of their public office, they might be more exposed to the risks of corruption’ (Internal 
document).
There are also som e formal behavioural norms that apply to all employees. BFI has summarised
the requirements of legal documents such a s  the Proceeds of Crime Act, which cam e into force in
2002, and the regulator's Money Laundering Sourcebook published in the sam e year and
subsequently updated, in an internal document distributed to all members of staff in which it states:
‘As an employee you have a number of personal legal obligations: you must not knowingly 
assist a money launderer (...) you must report suspicions of money laundering (...) under 
no circumstances must the customer know that a report has been made (...) If you were 
convicted (...) the maximum penalties are an unlimited fine and/or 5 to 14 years 
imprisonment’ (Internal document, original emphasis)
In another section of the internal document, it is printed in bold, capital, coloured font:
‘Do not tell the customer that a report has been made or treat the customer differently’
B ecause BFI is very sensitive to the risk of internal fraud, a  further recommendation is made in bold 
characters:
‘You should keep the information to yourself (you do not need to ask your managers 
permission to make a report). You should also continue to deal with the customer as normal 
unless otherwise instructed. ’
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5.3.3 Informal behaviours
This section looks at the existing mechanism s of approval or condemnation of specific behaviours. 
The section outlines how the group a s  a whole makes sure that its individual members do not 
deviate too far from the approved behaviour.
Perceptual, evaluative and cognitive informal norms are conveyed in a variety of ways, a t BFI, such 
as peers' discussion or training initiatives. In such sessions, staff will often review and discuss 
successful stories, such a s  publicly known cases  of money laundering for which BFI had submitted 
a SAR -  one example is the car smuggling case  described in section 5.1.4. In the meeting where 
the car smuggling case  was reviewed, the attendees were given copies of the SAR, a s  well a s  of 
the supporting related documentation such a s  account statem ents and cheques. The person that 
analysed and referred the case to the FIU described what made her look into the alert, which 
sources of data were consulted and, ultimately, why she decided to report it
Other times, the discussion may focus on ca se s  for which the law enforcement agency requested
information through a court production order, for instance, and that had not been previously
reported to the FIU by BFI.
W e received different types of (court production orders). It is very time consuming: you 
have to see why, all of the information they are asking for -  but at the same time it is very 
interesting because what you are actually looking at is pattern, trends and activities of 
potential money laundering. We learn from them.’ (Interview, Analysts’ manager)
‘There is an area (...) with two particular postcodes in which there are lots of factories and 
tertiary sort of shopping places. One piece of intelligence that we had was that the only two 
people who were ever convicted for being members of AIQaeda, in the UK, were actually 
from that area. We know that area and a lot of these factories (...) we can find customers 
who live in that area.’ (Interview, MLRO)
The analyst team and the system m anager will also share snippets of information about known
cases or modes of money laundering, for instance regarding a  news article that some one read on
the new spaper or saw on TV:
‘One of our rules came up because of a news article on the BBC: the reporter stood in front 
of, I think it was either a petrol station or a shop, and at the time one of our staff was 
watching the TV and saw it and said “I wonder if we have an account with that petrol 
station" We put it in, and we had. And it went from there.’ (Interview, Systems manager)
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Another source of meaning and procedures enforcement is the performance assessm ent. At the
time of the study, AML monitoring w as not a component of the assessm ent of branch employees.
'We have targets, for instance selling so many credit cards in a month, or loans... We all 
have the same targets based on how many hours we work. And it is our job to meet that 
target.’ (Interview, Branch employee)
In the case  of the analysts, however, assessm ent meetings take place monthly and items for the
assessm en t include not only how many cases  the analyst reviewed and how many SARs he or she
submitted, but also the reasons stated for making a referral.
7 look at figures from the database to see how (the analysts) are performing individually, 
who is taking their fair share of calls -  in this case, her average is 30% of calls that came in 
during the month. (...) (I) make sure that their decision is accurate, and that they put 
information into perspective. (This analyst) struggles with the end bit of the report, to say 
why she is disclosing or not. (...) (She) also needs to broaden her horizons. So, we have 
been doing some development with her, given her various books on dirty dealing... just to 
open her mind on what the criminals do. ’ (Interview, Analysts manager)
Peer discussion of known cases, sharing snippets of publicly available information and performance 
assessm ent influence group behaviour a s  summarised in table 5.3:
Table 5.3 -  Im pact on perception, evaluation and cognition
Norm Exam ple
Perceptual Awareness of specific forms of money laundering - e g . ,  processing of funds 
from a car trafficking ring, fuel smuggling, fraud, etc...
Evaluative Focuses attention on modus operandi -  e.g., specific SIC codes, and presence 
or absence of particular transactions such as salary payments or bills for raw 
materials
Cognitive Provides the rationale that allows staff to make sen se  of the observed behaviour 
-  e.g., cars in country X use the left side of the road
P eer discussion, sharing of information and performance assessm ent also influence reporting 
behaviour, in the sense that they signal what should have been reported but, upon further analysis, 
w as deem ed legitimate. Sometimes, the MLRO team may send confusing signals. For instance, on 
the one hand, the trainer actively encourages all m embers of staff to report anything that they 
consider unusual:
7 tell them why should you make a report, their obligations, the penalties that apply to 
them... knowing that you can go to jail. I am not trying to frighten them, but alert them. (...) I 
tell them to report. It is just a telephone call for them, and it saves them from being 
associated with that customer. We will do the (investigation) work in the background’.
A view supported by her manager who sta tes that:
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7 would rather have someone reporting to us even if it is of low quality, than not reporting\
However, a s  mentioned in section 5.1.4, with the example of the call centre employee who called 
very often, when the proportion of alerts from a given source and deem ed a s  false positives by the 
analysts is excessively high, the trainer will act.
A similar conflict applies to the ATMS:
'We have limited resources in terms of people -  we can write a fantastic rule, but if it kicks 
out hundreds of thousands alerts, we will be completely flooded, so we have to volume 
manage how many alerts we can deal with.’ (Interview, MLRO)
There is a  dilemma between the intention to obtain a wide base of alerts and the reality of limited 
analysis resources.
5.3.4 Summary of permitted behaviours identified at BFI
The technical norms expressed money laundering behaviour a s  one se t of SQL formulas, resulting 
from statistical and market basket analysis, the formal norms provide a clear, general definition of 
money laundering and the informal norms focused on specific instances of the crime.
As far a s  evaluative norms are concerned, the technical guidelines defined the value of specific 
rules a s  a function of output volume and overlap with alerts raised by customer facing employees, 
a s  well a s  guidelines regarding sources of intelligence. The formal norms identified possible signs of 
alarm regarding specific transactions, behaviours, identification documents and even professional 
occupations. The informal norms guided the employees’ attention towards specific modus operandi.
Technical norms affect cognition in the sense  that the limited feasibility to update certain data fields, 
determ ines its use in monitoring. Such norms also affect the content of particular data fields and the 
specific value of the quantitative thresholds. Formal norms instruct employees to question the 
motives underlying the observed behaviour, in particular attem pts to disguise source or destination 
of money, a s  well as  attempts to obscure the audit trail. Informal norms also address the motivation
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or business rationale for the observed behaviour, but focusing on the specific instances of money 
laundering.
Lastly, regarding behaviour, the technical norms determine that the ATMS monitors transactions 
and reports alerts on a daily basis. Formal norms declare an obligation to report suspicion, without 
alerting the customer, and stress the negative consequences of failing to do so for both the 
organisation and the employee. Informal norms are somehow conflicting, a s  far a s  the first stage of 
monitoring is concerned. A summary of the norms identified at BFI is provided in table 5.4.
Table 5.4 -  Summary of behaviours identified at BFi
Norms Technical Formal Informal
Perceptual - SQL formula;
- Rules derived from 
statistical and market 
basket analysis.
- Clear definition of 
money laundering in 
general sense.
- Definition of specific 
instances of money 
laundering.
Evaluative - Value of rules and 
intelligence sources.
- Signs of alarm. - Specific modus 
operandi.
Cognitive - Which data fields are 
used, their content and 
threshold.
- Motivation for 
observed banking 
behaviour.
- Motivation for 
observed banking 
behaviour.
Behavioural - Daily transaction 
monitoring;
- Automatic reporting.
- Obligation to report 
suspicion, without 
alerting customer.
- Possible conflict, 
regarding production 
of alerts.
5.4 Individual perceptions
The empirical findings presented in the previous sections focused on the contextual forces shaping 
the creation of meaning at BFI. The current section, in turn, add resses the mental representations 
(section 5.4.1) and activities (section 5.4.2) of the individual mem bers of the unit of analysis.
5.4.1 Content of categories
The individual definition of what constitutes non-legitimate patterns of behaviour is very consistent
across the branches visited, and focuses on cash based transactions:
'What makes me suspicious is people bringing in large amounts of cash, and drawing it out 
the next day... and unusual transactions on their account...asking for lots of money to be 
withdrawn.' (Interview, Cashier)
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One consequence of the generalised view that the criminal activity of money laundering is 
characterised by the movement of large amounts of cash is that branch employees, in general, 
believed that colleagues in cashiering roles were more exposed to money laundering attem pts than 
any other role:
‘ When I was doing cashiering, you would see people withdrawing lots of money and things 
like that. You have to be suspicious.' (Interview, Customer advisor)
Similarly, another customer advisor, when asked whether she faced attempts to launder money in 
her job, said:
‘Not so much in my role. But when I was on the counter, yes. I saw people bringing in large 
amounts of cash, and drawing it out the next day.’
Those members of staff with senior roles, such as supervisor or branch manager, tended to include
qualifiers in their definitions. The qualifiers used by the interviewees included the time mediating
between transactions, and whether or not the amounts were in round figures:
‘Somebody continuously bringing cash in and taking cheques out, that would be suspicious. 
If it is the odd amount, £254.13, you know it is a credit card payment or a mortgage 
payment. But if somebody is bringing in £1,000 in cash... paying it in and then taking 
cheques straight back out, that is suspicious to me. Somebody paying in a large sum of 
money... (or) drawing out a large sum of money would be suspicious, because nobody in 
these days handles cash/ (Interview, supervisor)
Respondents also mentioned subjective criteria such a s  the client’s  attitude, m anners and types of 
questions asked. Additionally, the members of staff in one branch located in one area of London 
that is economically deprived and which houses a high proportion of members of a particular ethnic 
origin felt that they were more likely to face attempts to launder money than the members of stafF of 
another branch located in an affluent area of London.
All but one member of stafF in the branches mentioned the inability to fulfil the identification 
requirements as potentially suspicious. The member of staff that did not define money laundering in 
term s of one’s  ability to prove his or her identity worked a s  a cashier in the branch located in the 
deprived area. When probed, it emerged that this cashier had had difficulties opening a  bank 
account when he first arrived in the country, because he w as staying with a relative and, therefore, 
could not produce the mentioned utility bills. A branch m anager also mentioned that older and less 
educated persons had difficulties producing the required identification documents, and yet they
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might not be money launderers. She further supported the argument by mentioning the case  of 
som eone she knew personally. In summary, perceptions seem  to be spiced up by personal 
experiences.
Finally, one branch interviewee also mentioned that clients with certain professional occupations, 
such a s  solicitor, were unlikely to engage in criminal behaviour, even though common evidence 
does not support this understanding.
The ATMS’s  definition was a more complex version than that used by the cashiers and advisors - 
cash  transactions are still monitored, but only if they fall within given thresholds and intervals of 
time:
‘If somebody deposited £1,000 on day 1, and then £100 each on day 2, 3 and 4, but also on 
days 2, 3 and 4 took out £270, that would alert because it is 75% of what happened on 
days 2, 3 and 4. But, of course, that withdrawal may also be in respect of the £1,000 that 
went in and, suddenly, it is not 75%, it is considerably less, and it may not be so unusual. ' 
(Interview, System s manager)
Additionally, specific locations are closely monitored, via postal codes, for instance:
‘Another thing we did since the Bank of Ireland robbery is, we targeted all Northern Ireland 
postcodes because we wanted to see what sort of money was moving around Northern 
Ireland... Initially, we got some good fruit from that rule. We got quite a few disclosures.’ 
(Interview, System s manager)
Furthermore, BFI monitors businesses that it believes to be particularly a t risk of being used for
laundering money, either in general or a s  a result of specific events:
W e currently target Money Service Businesses (MSB)... We have [several] customers 
operating MSB that never said to us that it would be part of their business when they 
opened the account. Does it become greater than their primary business? Is there a wider 
interest in the agents to do that?’ (Interview, System s manager)
W e started looking for [specific good] running across the border between Southern and 
Northern Ireland (as a result of news in the media). Let’s monitor the border town postcodes 
for businesses that involve the sale and purchase of [specific good].’ (Interview, System s 
manager)
Lastly, ATMS definitions may focus on specific attributes:
‘Last week, or the week before, ... there was a production order where the customer lived 
on a caravan site. It was a permanent resident, but on a caravan site (...) [I] ended up 
writing a rule that says “tell me all accounts that transact tonight that have the work caravan 
either on the 1st, 2nd or 3rd lines of their address" ' (Interview, System s manager)
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The definitions will often be reflected in composite rules:
‘This (rule) is basically saying: return me information on accounts that have been opened 
between [so] and [so] years (ago), and (are) transacting (an) amount higher than £1,500 in 
cash, the customer was born between year [so] and [so] and the address for the account is 
[specific postcode] . ' (Interview, System s manager)
In summary, the ATMS's definitions are not only more varied than the branch ones, but they are
also more specific and may embody a larger number of parameters. It is also interesting to register
that the system s manager a s se sse s  the existing rules and, eventually, fine tunes existing rules or
develops new rules, regularly:
W e have a fortnightly brainstorming meeting where we chat amongst ourselves. We say: 
Are there any ideas, anybody has got to bring to the table that we might want to look at in 
the automated system? We brainstorm. Or we look at our existing rules and see how they 
are performing and whether or not we want to change them slightly.’ (Interview, System s 
manager)
The analysts use very elaborate, composite formulas. These m embers of staff judge the observed
pattern of behaviour against qualifiers such as  the type of customer, for instance his or her
professional occupation.
‘This is a self-employed person, £25,000 income in 2004, when he started the relationship 
with us, a painter /  decorator. He is a self-employed painter, so I would expect the odd cash 
deposit into his account, cheque deposits because he has been paid for services. Perhaps, 
transactions going to DIY stores or suppliers, etc... and income and credits in line with the 
£25,000.’ (Interview, Analyst)
‘it is not a black list but there are certain occupations that you certainly think that deserve a 
closer look such as [examples provided].’ (Interview, Analyst)
The analysts also look at the utilisation of the account:
'He told us that he is a painter, but... this account is clearly being used by someone who 
owns a shop, so he either told us the truth and then changed is occupation to own a shop, 
or he opened the account for somebody else who perhaps couldn’t get banking facilities 
and they are using the account. ’ (Interview, Analyst)
The length of relationship with the bank is an equally important criterion. The probability of a 
particular unusual banking behaviour being reported is higher for a new client than for an existing 
one. Past transaction behaviour provides the analysts a pattern of what is customary behaviour for 
a given client which, coupled with insight from specific interactions with personnel at BFI, such a s  
notes from an interview held for the purpose of deciding on conceding a mortgage, or other ad-hoc
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investigation tools such as  a  visit to the business premises to which the account corresponds,
reassures the analysts that they are not in presence of suspicious behaviour.
‘He is putting a lot of cash in and the account was opened only recently. There isn’t a lot of 
activity that we can look at to provide a pattern or history for this customer.’ (Interview, 
Analyst)
Similar to the branch staff, there are elements that reassure the analysts that a  transaction is 
legitimate.
‘Everybody knows [international organisationJ. I am not going to look into that because I 
know that [international organisation] is a registered company. (...) There is also a [large 
transaction] to open another account (...) It went to a building society, probably an 
investment or something that he has got there. I am not going to worry about that because 
that is traceable, as well.’ (Interview, Analyst)
Finally, there is also an element of ‘intuition’ with som e referrals being justified because ‘something
w as not right’, without the analysts being able to pinpoint a  specific reason. Such decisions reflect
implicit assum ptions about what is a rational way of using one’s  money.
‘It is trying to build a picture based on everything that the customer has told us, and then 
comparing it to what you think that account should look like.’ (Interview, Analyst)
Figure 5.17 -  Representations' snapshot_______________
Analysts utilisation o f  accoun t 
ATMS
G eographical a rea  B usiness activity
Branch m anagers
Round figures
Cashiers
C ash
Identification docum ents 
{Client’s  attitude)
Time mediating transactions / defunding
{Specific attributes) Length o f relationship 
Source of ca sh  Intuition
In summary, cash seem s to be the defining element of suspicion for all those interviewed. The 
branch em ployees’ definition of money laundering is the narrowest and the analysts’ definition is the 
widest, from the three groups of agents considered. Additionally, those branch em ployees with 
m anagem ent or supervisory responsibilities had more sophisticated definitions than their 
colleagues. The ATMS definition is the one that reveals most flexibility: it can change fortnightly not 
only regarding the specific parameters, but also regarding the focus of the definition altogether. The
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relationship between the individual representations is depicted in figure 5.17. In this figure, the 
criteria in brackets seems to be exclusive to the group of employees identified in the left hand 
comer of each box.
5.4.2 Filters
The interviewees were presented the case study and asked, among other things, to rate on a 7 
point scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree whether they considered that the 
described behaviour was suspicious. On average, the interviewees at the branches were less 
inclined to consider that the observed behaviour was of an illegitimate nature, while also exhibiting 
more variation in the responses than the analysts interviewed (figure 5.18). Values to the right of 
axis mean that the interviewee agreed35 that there was some element of ‘unusualness’ or 
‘suspicion’; whereas values to the left of the axis mean the opposite. Values at the axis, as in the 
case of the interviewee coded ‘Analyst 1’, mean that the respondent was unsure or unable to reach 
a decision.
Figure 5.18 - Interviewees propensity to classify  the behaviour described
Branch t 
Branch Low - Intersew ee 3 
Branch Low - Interuew ee 4 
Branch Low - Intenaewee 5 
B ranch High - lnter\iew ee 1 £  
Branch High - In tersew ee 2 
B ranch High - Interviewee 3 £  
Branch High - Interviewee 4 tr
A nalyst 1 I 
A nalyst 2 
A nalyst 3 
A nalyst 4 
S y s tem  m anager
I □  Susp icious I
Some of the attributes noticed by the interviewees and considered when analysing the cases are 
similar across the board. All interviewees mentioned the fact that the subject in the case study was 
transacting frequently in cash, and most considered that the specific type of account was not the
35 From ‘slightly’ to ‘strongly’ Values to the right of axis mean that the interviewee agreed (from 
slightly to strongly) that there was some element of unusualness / suspicion; whereas values to the 
left of he axis mean the opposite. Values at the axis (e.g. interviewee CP1) mean that the 
respondent was unsure or unable to reach a decision.
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most suitable for the frequency of deposits and withdrawals exhibited. However, the reasons
advanced for suspicions differed. The branch interviewees questioned the origin of the money.
They were convinced that a self-employed electrician would not earn the stated amount of money:
‘It is dodgy. Where does he get all this money from?’ (Interview, Branch Cashier)
‘So, nothing coming out of account, only paying in cash, and out by ATM.... it is specially 
the cash factor (that makes me suspicious). In this day and age, most people use a card. 
He would be the type of customer that would probably use a card, have direct debits, etc... 
It is the cash factor and at this age he should use card. ’ (Interview, Branch supervisor)
The analysts, however, were not too concerned with the source of the cash. Rather, they thought 
that there w as som e element of tax evasion.
It is also interesting to note that the hypothetical case  study mentioned that there were regular cash 
and cheque deposits. Yet, the interviewees tended to mention the first form of deposit, and not the 
second, which is a  widely accepted trigger of suspicion, because cash leaves no ‘traces’, it conveys 
no information regarding its origin.
‘He only ever deposits in cash. ’
‘His situation is a two-way thing -  he is living and has account in the area... but he is using 
cash, only. A lot of money per week.’
All interviewees expressed concern over the two international transfers that occurred since the 
customer opened the account -  just over one year ago -  which went to another account under the 
subject’s  name. The analysts mentioned the payments a t the local DYI store, a s  fitting the 
professional occupation described when the account opened. Such information w as not specifically 
recalled by the branch interviewees.
The branch interviewees tended to mention that the subject’s  wife w as unemployed, w hereas the 
information given in the case w as that it was not known what the subject’s  partner did for a living.
Some interviewees at the branches and one of the four analysts expressed concerns over the ‘type 
of business done’ by the ethnic group to which the subject in the case  study belonged. However, it 
is important to note that no mention w as made in the case study to the subject’s  nationality or 
ethnicity. The subject in the case  study w as described a s  being a UK national with the surname
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‘Baptist’, a name that has appeared in the English Census since, at least, 1891. Yet, it was promptly 
assumed that the subject was an immigrant, possibly of Caribbean origin.
Hence, the interviewees react to quite similar triggers -  namely, cash payments into the account 
and ATM withdrawals - most likely as a direct result of the extensive training activities carried out 
throughout the organisation. But that the reasoning increases in sophistication in the case of the 
analysts, particularly in what concerns the predicate criminal activity. There is also the prototype 
that foreign is equivalent to danger, as in the case of the international transfers and the surname.
The interviews also investigated the likelihood that employees would report the observed behaviour. 
Given the group’s formal behavioural norms, interviewees should not discuss the case with their 
colleagues. Additionally, those employees who had considered the behaviour as unusual or 
suspicious should feel obliged to report the case, whereas those that had considered that the 
behaviour was legitimate, should not make a referral. The behaviour of the analysts was consistent 
with the formal norms: all those who considered that the banking behaviour was suspicious, 
declared that they would report it to the F ill and they tended to say that they would not discuss the 
subject with a third party (figure 5.19).
Figure 5.19 -  Propensity to report vs. classification of behaviour
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Branch High - Interviewee 4 
Analyst 1 
Analyst 2  
Analyst 3  
Analyst 4 
System  manager 
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However, the results are not so unambiguous for the branches. One third of the interviewees gave 
replies inconsistent with the policy guidelines on reporting. The discrepancy is even stronger with 
regards to discussion of the case with a third party: with the exception of one branch manager, all
Page 149
interviewees would discuss the case with a third party, with five out of nine interviewees stating that 
they were very or extremely likely to do so.
Furthermore, no significant correlation was found between the likelihood of discussing the case and 
the perceived feasibility of either detecting or reporting suspicious behaviour (figure 5.20). The lack 
of correlation suggests that discussion occurs because it is not perceived as going against any rule, 
rather than as way of assuring oneself that the right decision has been made.
Figure 5.20 -  Confidence on detection skills vs. likelihood to  d iscu ss  su s p icion
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Finally, the interviews also investigated whether the interviewee believed that his/her colleagues 
had similar views on the case. This question aimed to assess the perceived social norms, from the 
point of view of the interviewee, and the results are presented in figure 5.21. The analysts tended to 
believe that their colleagues would reach a similar decision when analysing the case. The branch 
staff, however, exhibited much less coherent views: only 3 of the 9 interviewees were convinced 
that their colleagues held similar views of what money laundering is.
In summary, the test case was more likely to have been noticed by the analysts than by the branch 
personnel. The case study would not have been picked up by the ATMS because even though 
there is a rule that flags similar patterns of transactions, the values specified in the case study do 
not fall within the thresholds currently in place. The specific banking behaviour might have been 
picked up by another rule, if it matched any of the post codes currently being monitored. Yet, 
unusual behaviour is less qualified than suspicious behaviour and, therefore, staff in the branches
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should be more inclined to report the behaviour than staff in the analysis team. The social norm is 
less strong in the case of the branches, which might explain the variety in categorisations in this 
unit.
Figure 5.21 -  Perceived social norm s
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5.5 Key findings
The interviews, analysis of documents and observations enabled the identification of four key 
findings from the study, regarding the definition of suspicious behaviour, used for AML profiling at 
BFI. They are that there is not a specific, uniform definition of money laundering that is used across 
the organisation, that the definitions that do exist are relational in nature, rather than absolute, that 
the profiles are seldom based on factual information and, lastly, that the forces shaping the 
development and use of profiles provide, at times, conflicting guidance regarding what to monitor or 
what to do. The findings are described next.
5.5.1 No specific or uniform definition
There is no uniform, specific definition of money laundering in the industry or at BFI. While cash, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, constitutes the defining element of suspicion for all those interviewed, there 
aren’t much more points in common among the definitions adopted by the groups of agents studied, 
including the ATMS. The definitions identified at BFI range from the narrow and focused on 
particular instances of money laundering, to the general definitions of the crime.
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The branch employees’ definition of money laundering is the narrowest and the analysts’ definition 
is the widest, from the three groups of agents considered. Additionally, those branch employees 
with management or supervisory responsibilities had more sophisticated definitions than their 
colleagues. The ATMS definition is the one that reveals most flexibility, changing fortnightly not only 
regarding the specific parameters, but also regarding the focus of the definition altogether. The 
definitions in the BFI documents analysed are equally broad.
5.5.2 Relational definitions
The definition of suspicious behaviour is done in reference to what is assum ed to be normal 
behaviour for a particular type of customer or banking product As a result, a  particular transaction, 
for instance a large transfer out of a client's account, may be deemed suspicious or not, depending 
on factors such a s  the client’s  job, the length of relationship with the bank, the destination of the 
transfer or past transactions in that sam e account or another one held by the said customer.
In addition, the definitions include conjectures about the possible motives underlying the observed 
behaviour. The conjectures may relate to the economic rationale of the transaction, in which case 
they are based on assumptions about the legitimate use of money. Alternatively, the conjectures 
may focus on the extent to which the customer is trying to hide the source or destination of the 
funds, attempting to layer the money or endeavouring to use false identification documents, in 
which case  the inferences focus on the illegitimate use of capital.
Furthermore, employees with dissimilar roles, professional experiences and personal circumstances 
are sensitive to different factors. The organisation’s response to decrease such variability is to 
provide training and make increasing use of the ATMS.
5.5.3 Largely based on speculative information
Financial institutions are urged to monitor their custom ers’ banking behaviour and to report 
suspicious activity to the country’s Fill. Yet, no concrete directions are given to the institutions
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regarding what constitutes suspicion. Such ambiguity is partly due to the very nature of the 
phenomenon -  a secretive, illegal activity -  and also due to the fact that there is no systematic 
procedure to feed back into the monitoring institutions which suspicions were eventually confirmed 
or not. As a result, BFI’s  MLRO team  refers mostly to speculative information regarding the identity 
and actions of money launderers, collected in a non-systematic manner.
The input for the general definitions of what suspicious behaviour is, developed by BFI’s intelligence 
team, originates in a variety of sources ranging from ad-hoc media reports to participation in 
informal networks. Furthermore, the definitions in use are not necessarily consistent with evidence 
about the identity or the actions of money launderers.
5.5.4 Instructions are, at times, in conflict with each other
All interviewees were, in one form or another, exposed to conflicting instructions. Analysts, for 
instance, are a ssessed  on the quality of their reporting, which specifically includes investigating a 
matter at length and not engage in defensive reporting. Yet, the sam e analysts are also judged on 
the percentage of alerts that they analyse, and are expected to contribute towards the team 's goal 
of processing alerts within a particular period of time.
At times, the conflicting instructions are linked with the source of the directives. For instance, while 
the policy documents instructed employees to report suspicion without discussing the case  with 
colleagues or superiors, social practice at the branches signalled that it w as acceptable behaviour 
to do the opposite.
5.5.5 Concluding remarks
Chapter 5 described the information system in place at BFI to monitor financial transactions. The 
field data indicated some interesting aspects of the profiling of money laundering, a s  well as 
information about the elements shaping the construction and the content of the emerging profile, a s  
outlined in sections 5.5.1 to 5.5.4.
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The circumstances described in chapter 5 are ones where there is very limited empirical evidence 
to support the development of a profile, a s  specified in the main research question, presented in 
chapter 1. The thesis aims to investigate how, under such circumstances, categories em erge and 
how they are impacted in by the factors surrounding the profile development. In the present 
chapter, it was established that the emerging categories are far from unambiguous or absolute, and 
that they are, indeed, influenced by various, sometimes conflicting, forces. In other words, the 
findings discussed in this chapter opened the way for further analysis regarding the role of 
subjectivity of profiling, in particular the part that profiler and context play in the emerging 
categories. Such analysis is the focus of chapter 6.
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6. Analysis
The findings presented in chapter 5 confirm Desouza and Hensgen’s  (2005) claim that meaning is 
rarely absolute. Indeed, even within one specific organisation, BFI, the meaning attributed to the set 
of identity and transaction data presented for a  fictitious customer, and described in section 4.2.2, 
varied from ‘extremely likely to be suspicious’ to ‘unlikely / very unlikely to be suspicious’. The 
differences in meaning detected in chapter 5 are extremely consequential for BFI because the 
ability to detect money laundering activity is not only a regulatory requirement, but also a matter of 
resource efficiency.
This chapter analyses BFI’s emerging structures and procedures for AML detection. Additionally, it 
highlights how meanings emerge and are shared within the organisation.
6.1 How classifications emerge
The process of interpreting and acting on observed behaviour may be studied at various levels of 
analysis, focusing alternatively on the stimuli available for interpretation, the explicit or implicit rules 
that interpreting agents may draw upon or the actions of those sam e interpreting agents. Each level 
of analysis reflects a different way of interpreting and acting on the stimuli available (Stamper 1973; 
1996; Stamper 2001), as discussed next.
6.1.1 Stimuli available
The empirical data described in chapter 5 revealed that there are different types of stimuli available 
to each of the three groups of agents considered. For instance, branch employees refer to both 
objective data such a s  numerical and textual inputs for a relatively limited portfolio of products, and 
subjective data such a s  the customer’s appearance or behaviour. The ATMS, in turn, considers 
objective data about the customer and his or her transactions patterns across a relatively large 
number of product lines, only. The analysts, conversely, refer mostly to objective data, with the 
possibility of accessing subjective data indirectly, via notes on the customer’s files. The field data 
presented in chapter 5 also addressed conditions under which particular stimuli may or may not
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come to the attention of the profiling agents. Specific exam ples are the fact that a given customer’s 
behaviour may only come to the attention of the customer-facing employee if it is above a certain 
level of oddity for it to be noteworthy, as in the case  mentioned in chapter 5, of the large cash 
transfers from a multinational organisation to a particular customer’s  account. In the case  of the 
ATMS, the restrictions arise from the limited period of time for which data is held in the relevant 
databases, as well a s  the specific data fields that the system draws upon or the legacy system s that 
feed into the ATMS. In the case of the analysts, there is the oddity factor, a s  discussed for the 
customer-faced employees, to which another, important factor is added: a customer or transaction 
will only come to the attention of the analyst if one of the agents in stage 1 of the monitoring 
process36 raises an alert. These phenomena are summarised in table 6.1.
Table 6.1 -  P roperties of the stim uli used  in AML profiling at BFI
Level Stimuli available for the  classification p ro cess C onditions for stim uli to  be 
taken  into consideration
Branch Objective (numerical and textual) and subjective 
(e.g., appearance) data about the customer’s 
identity, transaction behaviour and other behaviour 
(e.g., whether the client is accompanied or not).
Data must be considered odd 
enough to be noticed by staff.
ATMS Objective (mostly numerical) data about the 
customer identity and his/her transaction patterns.
Limited time frame and data 
fields. Data must be in legacy 
system s linked with ATMS.
Analysts Mostly objective data (numerical and textual) about 
the customer’s identity and product portfolio, a s  well 
a s his/her transaction behaviour. Possible indirect 
access to subjective data via notes made by other 
employees on the customer files.
Data must be considered odd 
enough to be noticed by staff 
and agent in stage 1 must 
raise alert.
The insight derived from these findings is that it is not enough for the right stimuli to be in place, it is 
also necessary that the AML agents have the ability to process and extract meaning from the data 
(Neuman 2006) and that the m essage is received, in the first place. This last factor is the core of 
information theory, which addresses, among other things, technical conditions for the reduction of 
uncertainty in the transfer and reception of m essages or, a s  Shannon and W eaver (1949) described 
it, borrowing on physics terminology, the system 's entropy. The specific level a t which particular 
behaviours may pass unnoticed or, on the contrary, deem ed unusual is not the focus of this 
research. Nonetheless, the study highlights one key point regarding the em ergence of 
classifications in organisations: that the agent must be exposed and sensitised to the appropriate
36 The reader is referred to figure 5.6
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stimuli. This observation is particularly relevant in AML profiling where the output of classification by 
agents in stage 1 becomes the trigger for the classification activity of agents in stage 2. While the 
framework proposed in chapter 3 did take into consideration the role of the agent in perceiving the 
stimuli, it is not prepared to deal with a sequential meaning making process. This limitation is further 
discussed in section 6.3.2.
6.1.2 Contextual references in the classification process
The findings presented in chapter 5 also revealed the various AML agents’ attempts to structure the 
available data into a description of suspicious behaviour. All members of staff, including the 
system s manager, expressed such definition in English language. The definitions ranged from the 
general and abstract such a s  those expressed by the formal policy guidance documents described 
in section 5.3.2, to the specific characterisations that tended to be provided through ad-hoc and 
rather informal means. In the case  of the ATMS, the descriptions had to be further specified in the 
query language, a task that w as performed by the system s manager. Moreover, a s  noticed in 
section 5.5.2, the descriptions are relational and defined in reference to the supposed motive or 
rationale for the transaction -  BFI employees are asked to question whether the observed patterns 
would make sense  for a legitimate customer who w as not trying to hide the illicit origin or destination 
of the money. Furthermore, in the case  of the ATMS, the definition is specified within particular 
thresholds such a s  transaction intervals, or given the presence of qualifying attributes such as 
specific postcodes. The rules used by the BFI's AML agents to describe suspicious behaviour are 
summarised in table 6.2.
Table 6.2 -  R ules informing the classification  p ro c e ss
Level Rules for assem bling  a descrip tion Relational param eters
All
employees
General definitions provided by formal means. 
Som e specific definitions provided in mostly 
informal exchanges.
Look for the motive justifying the 
observed transaction, given 
customer and product profile.
ATMS General and specific definitions translated to 
SQL formulas.
Presence of specific thresholds 
and qualifiers
Cash, quite predictably, emerged a s  the common, defining elem ent of suspicion, alongside the 
existence of an  international dimension to the transaction. It w as also noted that the branch’s 
definition was rather general, whereas those in use in the ATMS and by the analysts tended to
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focus on specific aspects, acknowledging the array of money laundering behaviours possible. 
Moreover, among the branch staff, those employees with managem ent or supervisory 
responsibilities had more sophisticated definitions than their colleagues. The increased breadth and 
depth of the profiles used by the branch m anagers versus the other branch personnel, or by the 
analysts a s  opposed to all the other m embers of staff, fits with observations by cognitive 
researchers that categories are rooted in people’s  experience (Medin, Lynch et al. 1997; Medin, 
Lynch et al. 2000). The analysts have been exposed to the widest variety of ca se s  and information 
about money laundering, from among all the interviewees considered and, therefore, have the most 
sophisticated definition.
It is also important to note that the ATMS definition is not exempt of subjectivity. The SQL formula is 
but a reduction to the structured query code of human behaviour, which in itself is a complex, fuzzy 
phenomenon. The thresholds, choice of specific data fields or the decision to focus on particular 
products, a s  illustrated in figure 5.13, require the system s m anager to opt between various possible 
alternatives. The choices also focus the scope of the ATMS alerts and, later, the attention of the 
analysts in stage 2 of the monitoring process, on a small number of specific paths. The system s 
m anager m akes pragmatic choices based on his own understanding of the phenomenon, 
stereotypes (Chen and Bargh 1997) and conceptions of causality (Rosch 1973; Fiske and Taylor 
1991; Markman and Gentner 2001; Elsbach, Barr et al. 2005). In other words, there are one or 
more persons behind the technical component of the profiling process who, in turn, are embedded 
in a social structure. It is this em beddedness that led Bowker and Star (1994) to declare that 
software hides away ‘arguments, decisions, uncertainties and the processual nature of decision 
making\
The insight derived from these findings is that there are numerous factors, some rather explicit and 
formalised, others of a  rather informal nature that shape how agents structure the available data 
into a particular definition, or formula (Desouza and Hensgen 2002), used in relation to a given topic 
or for a  particular scenario. The nature and role of such shaping factors is the focus of section 6.2.
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6.1.3 Actions by the interpreting agents
Various elements of the data described in chapter 5 refer to how profiling agents operationalise 
meanings and classifications. As suggested by the research framework described in chapter 3, the 
individual operationalisations of meaning are sought in the agents’ actions. The discussion in this 
section distinguishes between the specific classifications used by each agent or group of agents on 
the one hand, and the effect of the classification on the other hand. When the analyses focuses on 
the actions of specific agents in a particular circumstance, differences in meaning among the 
various agents become apparent. The variances in meaning are illustrated, for instance, in the case  
of the alert described at the end of section 5.4.1, in which the analyst examines the two 
international transfers to a customer who lives abroad, and that were quickly followed by a 
withdrawal to the account of a building society, the agents in stage 1 and in stage 2 reached 
different conclusions. Stage 1 agents considered that the international origin of the money and 
subsequent transfer to another account were suspicious. However, the analyst in stage 2, who had 
access to information not accessible in stage 1, w as convinced that the transactions were 
legitimate. The analyst looked at specific instances to form her decision -  in particular, the fact that 
the transfer had originated in a well-known multinational corporation, and that the beneficiary of the 
defunding was a building society. Even though both customer-facing staff and analysts participating 
in the study tended to mention the international dimension as an element of suspicion, when faced 
with a particular alert, the analyst took into consideration various other factors before making her 
decision. In other words, the interviewees tended to mention similar classification triggers37, but the 
result of the profiling exercise varied between the three groups of agents, considered. This 
suggests that different agents attributed different weights to particular features of the category, 
possibly a s  a result of exposure to different category forming stimuli -  for instance, training.
Regarding the effect of the categorisation exercise, it was noted that BFI explicitly expects all its 
members of staff to report suspicious behaviour, without alerting the customer or discussing with 
colleagues. Once suspicion is reported, it generates consequences for the agent in the next stage 
of the profiling process and, eventually, to the customer being reported. The discussion with
37 Namely the cash deposits and the international transfers
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colleagues may, possibly, result in the client being forewarned of the investigation over his or her 
banking behaviour. The analysis of the agents’ behaviour, in the case of the hypothetical client, 
highlighted that, when unsure about the nature of the observed behaviour, customer facing-staff 
were reluctant to report to agents in the next level of the monitoring process and were likely to 
discuss the matter with their peers, w hereas the opposite tended to happen with the analysts. The 
decision not to report suspicious behaviour, and the decision to discuss suspicion are against the 
explicit requirements and leaves the agents in question vulnerable to sanctioning (Hechter and Opp 
2001).
This reluctance to report is, in fact, a paradox because the definitions used by the employees in the 
first level of the monitoring process contain fewer qualifiers than the analysts’, a s  discussed in 
section 6.1.2. In other words, there is a difference between the theoretical profile that might em erge 
from the explicit and implicit guidelines available throughout the organisation, and the actual profile 
that the agents reveal in their actions. Different groups of employees, in the sam e organisation, 
exposed to the sam e stimuli and subject to the sam e guidance may operationalise the concept 
‘suspicious money laundering behaviour’ in such ways. Distinguishing between the theoretical and 
the actual profile is important because it places the em phasis on the agent as a critical contributor 
in profiling. This topic is further explored in section 6.3.1.
It is not possible to talk about decision to report or to discuss with peers, in the case  of the ATMS. 
The formulas are specified so that, when certain conditions are present, the system will 
automatically flag the transaction, for the attention of the analysts. As such, the decision com es at 
the stage of the development of the formula by the system s manager, not when the query is run.
6.2 Factors impacting on the emerging profile
The present thesis adopts the view, expressed in chapter 1, that information system s are composed 
of three interrelated levels (Liebenau and Backhouse 1990; Liu 2000; Stamper, Liu et al. 2000; 
Lewis and Madon 2004): the technical level of hardware, software, data protocols and elem ents of 
the design of the technology, the formal level of rules, procedures, policies and other forms of
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bureaucracy, and the informal level of culture, system s of belief and politics. This section analyses 
how factors at each of the three levels of the profiling information system impact on the emerging 
profile.
6.2.1 Technical level
The input available for the development of AML profiles is of a speculative nature, a s  noted in 
chapter 5. It is only indirectly that particular transaction data, for instance a large deposit quickly 
followed by a large withdrawal, can be linked to illegitimate behaviour. Particular transactions are 
deem ed to represent suspicion through a  presumed cause  and effect link, rather than direct 
similarity. It is, in semiotic terminology, an ‘index’ and, a s  such, of m oderate abstractedness and 
likely to be somehow affected by social conventions am ongst the users of the sign (Fiske 1990; Liu 
2000).
Additionally, most reference profiles available are of an affective, rather than a descriptive, nature. 
They are based on assumptions about which transaction patterns represent illegitimate behaviour 
and, a s  such, are subject to ambiguity (Stam per 1973).
It is also important to reflect on the analysis presented in section 5.2, regarding the monitoring 
behaviour that each agent in the organisation is able to pursue, a s  a  result of his or her relative 
position in the organisation, and of the technical resources at his or her disposal. Having access to 
a variety of data sources, over and above quantitative data, seem s to contribute positively to an 
agent’s  ability to detect money laundering because it provides a richer view of the customer. 
Understanding the role of text and observations in successfully profiling money laundering is 
particularly important in the light of the em phasis placed by the financial regulator and most 
commercial institutions on data mining solutions for AML profiling, a s  mentioned in chapter 2.
The analysts are the group of agents that have the widest view of the customer and who draw on a 
variety of types of data. However, a s  noted in section 6.1.1, the agents’ ability to detect money 
laundering is hindered by the fact that they can only investigate the alerts received from agents in
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stage 1. In contrast, the ATMS draws solely on quantitative data suggesting that, in the present 
state of technology design, can contribute in a limited way, only, to the detection and prevention of 
money laundering.
6.2.2 Formal level
The rules, procedures and policies available a t BFI refer to both the definition of money laundering 
and how to detect it within the organisation, a s  well a s  the behaviours that employees are obliged to 
pursue whenever they are suspicious about the mature of an observed transaction behaviour.
One observation that em erges from the finding presented in chapter 5 is that the formal guidance is 
rather broad in terms of coverage: it is applicable to all members of the organisation. All employees 
are m ade aware that they are expected to be alert to attempts to launder money through the 
organisation, and to report any suspicion to the MLRO team. In addition, all employees are notified 
of the various m eans to raise an alert.
The second observation concerns the content of such guidance. The policy documents and other 
publications provided a generalist definition of money laundering, mentioned possible signs of alarm 
regarding specific transactions, behaviours, identification documents and even professional 
occupations, and instructed employees to question the motives underlying the observed behaviour, 
in particular attempts to disguise source or destination of money, a s  well a s  attempts to obscure the 
audit trail. Moreover, the documents declared an obligation to report suspicion, without alerting the 
customer, and stressed the negative consequences of failing to do so for both the organisation and 
the employee. The guidance is summarised in table 6.3.
Table 6.3 - Sum m ary of form al AML gu idance  a t BFI______________________________
Focus C ontent
Profile - Clear definition of money laundering, in general sense
- Signs of alarm
- Motivation for observed behaviour
Obligations - Obligation to report suspicion, without alerting customer
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The fact that branch staff discussed suspicion with each other, despite the formal guidance strictly 
dictating the contrary, could be because such employees are unaware that the organisation and the 
regulator do not sanction such action, or because staff do not understand the possible implications 
of that behaviour. The first gap might be addressed by clear, strong condemnation of discussion of 
suspicion among staff. The second gap might be addressed by raising aw areness among 
em ployees that criminals, particularly sophisticated ones, often use insiders to collect information 
and influence decisions.
It is possible to argue that the formal norms described in section 5.3.2 are, already, quite clear 
about the need not to discuss suspicion with colleagues and not to alert customers. In which case, 
the reason for the observed behaviour is that there are other forces within the information system 
that contradict the formal rules. Branch staff are influenced by the norms from the various groups 
that they belong to (Liu, Sun et al. 2001; Liebenau and Harindranath 2002). If the norms differ in 
direction, there is a conflict (Greenberger, Miceli et al. 1987).
In this case, it seem s that the formal level provides the background against which agents develop 
and use profiles. However, this level does not determine the actual interpretation and actions of the 
profiling agents. The informal level may weight more in staff behaviour than the formal one. The 
informal level of the information system is discussed next.
6.2.3 Informal level
The informal level of the information system analyses the culture, system s of belief and politics that 
surround the two other levels of the information system, analysed before. It w as noted, in chapter 5, 
that the agents have different attitudes towards AML, particularly a s  far as  activity is concerned, as 
illustrated in figure 6.1. Interestingly, branch personnel, who view the process a s  rigid, are also the 
ones who take into consideration the narrowest range of data objects.
Page 163
Figure 6.1 -  Summary of a ttitudes tow ards AML
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Additionally, the agents do not take into account all of the data objects available, as evidenced in 
the discussion of the hypothetical situation outlined in section 4.2.2. Indeed, all interviewees had 
access to the same information in the hypothetical situation presented. Yet, their perceptual and 
conceptual filters made them notice and react to different data objects (Boisot and Canals 2004), as 
well as fill in for information that was not specifically mentioned in the case (Freeman, Romney et al. 
1987; DiMaggio 1997; Gilbert 2006). The discussion of the hypothetical case permitted the 
observation of instances of Al,ta§| — ^ -----^ :-
euuu.ieu are .ew  diiu qune sirrfple, they point to the ldU,c cvc"  l,,uuy " u,e
nterpreters see and react to is not the same as what it is existence of a bigger issue: that what the i
rmal guidance. The stimuli available are perceived and offered to them in terms of stimuli and fo
' a n t i  l o l i o
Chapter 5 also highlighted that the analysts, a s  a group, were the ones that least filtered the 
available information. Yet, this is also the group of employees with most expertise in AML, as 
previously discussed. According to som e cognitive authors [e.g., (Schyns and Rodet 1997; Schyns, 
Goldstone et al. 1998; Laurent, Ward et al. 2006)] the higher the level of expertise, the stronger the 
filtering effect, a claim that is not supported by the empirical findings. Instead, branch employees 
were the ones that noticed the least number of data objects from those mentioned in the 
hypothetical case, in absolute terms. The key to this apparent paradox lies in the fact that it is not 
correct to discuss filtering in absolute terms. Branch staff and analysts refer to markedly different 
profiles of what money laundering is. The definitions increase in sophistication and feature 
interconnectedness a s  it moves from branch, to ATMS and to analysts (figure 5.17). If both groups 
shared a common definition of money laundering, than it might be possible to investigate the 
relationship between expertise and filtering. Given the existing definitions, however, it is not 
possible to either agree or disagree with the proposition.
Another important finding emerging from the analysis of the data described in chapter 5 is the 
identification of a gap between what the employees could potentially detect and what they focus on. 
In other words, the distinction between reality and perception -  where reality refers to the physical 
ability to profile particular behaviour, w hereas perception denotes what the user thinks and believes 
about that ability to profile (Norman 1999; Hartson 2003). In particular, there is a gap between the 
fact that all m em bers of staff in a branch are potentially exposed to money laundering38, and yet 
they tended to believe that only those in cashier roles were likely to encounter attempts to launder 
the proceeds of crime (figure 6.2). Investment advisors, for instance, who sell funds, mortgages and 
other investment products may be particularly exposed to attempts to hide and integrate illegitimate 
funds. Perceptions a t BFI are deeply influenced by cultural conventions and stereotypes.
It is also interesting to note that the perception by branch personnel that cashiers are the ones that 
experience money laundering attempts, and hence, are better positioned to detect and report it, is 
mirrored in this group’s focus on cash a s  a key defining elem ent of suspicion, a s  noted, for
38 The reader is referred to figure 5.12.
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instance, in section 5.5.1. Such finding echoes cognitive scientists’ claims that a  priori expectations 
are largely self-fulfilling (Dunn and Spellman 2003; Quinn, Hugenberg et al. 2004).
Figure 6.2 -  Perceived affordances of b ranch  sta ff
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Lastly, it is insightful to reflect on how cultural factors influence interpretation of and compliance with
formal guidance. The informal guidance detected at BFI focused on specific instances of the crime 
and guided the employees’ attention towards specific modus operandi, in opposition to the formal 
one that adopted a generalist definition. The informal guidance echoed the formal one in its 
emphasis on identifying the business rationale for the observed behaviour, the difference being, 
again, a focus on the specific instances of money laundering. The informal guidance regarding 
obligations emerging from the identification of money laundering, however, is, a t times, in conflict 
with the policy documents -  both regarding whether to report suspicion and regarding whether to 
discuss with colleagues. The informal forces are outlined in table 6.5.
Table 6.5 - Sum m ary of informal AML gu idance  a t BFI
F ocus C ontent
Profile - Definition of specific instances of money laundering
- Specific modus operandi
- Motivation for observed banking behaviour
Obligations - Possible conflict regarding production of alerts and 
discussion with colleagues.
Given that the observed staff behaviour is aligned more closely with the informal guidance than with 
the formal one, particularly in the case of branch personnel, any possible intervention from the 
MLRO unit to correct the behaviour must involve the branch informal norms and could, for example, 
start with educating the branch m anagers for the perils of internal fraud.
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A question that em erges is whether interventions in som e levels are easier than in others. Findings 
from classification theory posit that there is a relationship between the nature of classifications and 
the malleability of categories. Namely, in section 3.2 it w as noted that relational categories -  like 
money laundering definitions -  are more mutable, less well remembered, and more slowly acquired 
than entity categories (Gentner and Kurtz 2005). In addition, relational categories seem  to be 
learned well when an explicit rule is given (Gentner and Kurtz 2005) which is not the case of money 
laundering definitions, that tend to be speculative rather than explicit39, particularly so for the branch 
employees. At the ATMS level, it is important to note that legacy system s are extremely expensive 
and complex to replace. On average, a financial services firm needs five years to renew branch and 
other applications (Annesley 2005). Therefore, the rigidity of the perceptual norms, a s  far a s  legacy 
system s feeding into the ATMS database is concerned, is likely to persist, in practice.
6.3 Limitations of the research framework
The research framework presented in chapter 3 guided the collection and analysis of the empirical 
data, providing the integrated approach to the study of profiling advocated in chapters 1 and 2. 
There were, however, certain aspects in which the framework w as not entirely suitable to aid in the 
interpretation of the findings. Such limitations and remedial actions pursued are discussed next.
6.3.1 The role of the individual
The framework adopted of subjective and relational view of meaning, in which the perceiving agent 
plays a critical role. Furthermore, meaning is achieved by a combination of data object, the profile 
and the interpretant, as  outlined in section 3.3.2. The combination of the three components leads to 
a particular outcome (Hervey 1982), which is created and consumed within a  social and 
organisational context (Liu 2003). In the case  of BFI, there are, a t least, two distinct interpretants: 
one interpretant where ML detection is the principal occupation of the interpreter and the criterion 
against which the interpreter’s  performance is measured, and a second interpretant where ML 
detection is a secondary activity and is not a specific component of performance evaluation. The
39 Due to its secretive nature, a s  discussed in section 5.1.4
Page 167
first interpretant includes the analysts and the system s manager, whereas the second one refers to 
the branch personnel. The two interpretants have different attitudes towards AML, particularly a s  far 
as activity is concerned, a s  discussed earlier. However, it w as also noted that the analysis a t the 
level of the interpretant is not enough to understand the differences in emerging profiles -  even 
within one unit of analysis, there were several participants that were guided by different conventions 
a s  to how particular data objects and profiles were linked together, a s  summarised in table 6.6.
Table 6.6 -  Relationship  betw een in terpretant, in terpreter and  profile_______
Interpretant Interpreter Profile
AML a s  core activity Analysts Widest
ATMS Wide
AML as secondary activity Branch supervisor Narrow
Other branch staff Narrowest
In addition, it w as noted that it is important to distinguish between stimuli to which the agents are 
exposed to or even instructed to notice, and stimuli that the agents actually react to. This distinction 
is not directly addressed in organisational semiotics.
The implication is that the researcher needs to go beyond identifying the various interpretants 
conditioning the meaning making process, and take into consideration the particular circumstances 
of the interpreters. This insight also has practical implications in the sense that it suggests that 
profiling system s designers need to audit whether profilers filter the data objects to which they are 
exposed and, in particular, whether profilers ignore, distort or even make up key data objects.
6.3.2 Sequential encounters
The analysis of how classifications emerged, at BFI, raises a very important insight of significance 
to both theory and practice. It is the realisation that, even though at any one moment there is only 
one perceiver engaged in profiling, this is actually a complex process where the output of one 
agent's classification becom es an input into another agent’s  process. Specifically, the output of 
profiling by agents in stage 1 of the monitoring process becom es the trigger of profiling for agents in 
stage 2. The trigger effect is what Ashforth an Humphrey (1997) described a s  sequential
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encounters, and is addressed by neither of the two theoretical bodies informing this study’s  
theoretical framework.
In sequential encounters, the employee that first m eets the situation serves a s  a gatekeeper, 
influencing how the employees who subsequently encounter the sam e pattern perceive the 
situation (Ashforth and Humphrey 1997; Andersen 2005). In the particular case of AML monitoring, 
the stage 1 agent may not cause the agent in stage 2 to definitely report the case to the FIU, 
However, the customer facing employee and the ATMS certainly prevent the analysis and, 
eventually, detection of those cases not flagged for the attention of the agent in stage 2 of the 
monitoring process. The fact that profiling is a sequential process has two important consequences: 
it influences the stimuli available for stage 2 agents, and it conditions the overall performance of 
BFI’s AML detection efforts. These consequences impact on both the theoretical framework and in 
profiling practice.
The implication for theory is that meaning is a  dynamic process and there is interdependency 
between the various agents’ meanings, as illustrated in figure 6.3. The signs available for the agent 
in stage 2 are varied and include the output of stage 1 agent’s  classification. It is possible to extend 
this framework to consider further steps in the classification process. Similarly, it is possible to 
consider situations in which the signs available for stage 2 are totally dependent on stage 1’s 
classification, in which case the box ‘signs’ would be shown completely below the dotted line. In the 
case of AML monitoring at BFI, the box ‘signs’ overlaps the line because the agent in stage 2 
considers various other signs, in addition to the one provided by the stage 1 ’s  alerts.
The actual meaning of a particular stimulus, for an organisation is that operationalised by the 
actions at the end of the dynamic process. It is neither the meaning of agents in stage 1, nor the 
meaning of agents in stage 2. Rather it is a  combination of both. Agents in stage 1 act a s  
gatekeepers and influence the pool of stimuli available for agents in stage 2 and, therefore, 
condition, but do not determine, the final classification.
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Figure 6.3 -  Revised research framework
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It is interesting to note, as well, that the sign ‘meaning stage 1 ’ is of a different nature to the other 
signs. W hereas signs, in general, are an input to the meaning process, the particular sign ‘meaning 
stage 1’ is a required input for semiosis to occur. Additionally, the sign ‘meaning stage 1’ is pushed 
towards the stage 2 agent, w hereas the other signs are pulled by the stage 2 agent. In conclusion, 
the empirical exercise developed in the context of this thesis identified a classification of signs, in 
addition to the ones mentioned in section 3.1, based on their contribution to the meaning process.
To a certain extent, agents in stage 2 and those eventually further down the classification process 
constitute the w eakest link(s) in the profiling process because they can only analyse what others in 
the organisation alert them to (figure 6.4). The data mining literature reviewed in chapter 2 
em phasised that a  common problem in data mining is that the inputs that the domain expert 
considers important may not be represented in the input data (Apte, Liu et al. 2002; Danna and 
GandyJr. 2002). The most typical solution in such cases  is to use proxies or, alternatively, to narrow 
the analysis to those attributes that are particularly informative (Lenzen 2004). In AML monitoring, 
however, because of the ‘required input’ nature of the alerts, there are no proxies for alerts and it is 
not possible to narrow the analysis.
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Figure 6.4 -  Input for scrutiny and analysis
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The sequential process has practical consequences for the monitoring process, a s  well. Problems 
in the monitoring process occur when the input is wrongly allocated to a given category. In 
particular, when the agents in stage one wrongly consider that the observed banking behaviour is 
unusual or legitimate, and when the analysts consider that the input in stage 2 is suspicious or 
legitimate. If the input is wrongly allocate to the ‘unusual’ or ‘suspicious’ categories, there is a  ‘false 
positive’ error. If, on the contrary, the input is wrongly considered legitimate, there is a ‘false 
negative’ error (table 6.7).
Table 6.7 -  Categorisation of the classification outputs
Input deem ed illegitimate Input deem ed legitimate
Input refers to money 
laundering behaviour
True positive False negative
Input refers to 
legitimate behaviour
False positive True negative
Given that monitoring of banking behaviour follows a sequential encounter process, the output in 
one stage becom es the input for the following stage. As a  result, the successful detection of money 
laundering depends on the correspondence between the various prototypes of behaviour. The 
description of suspicious money laundering behaviour in stage 1 should match that of stage 2 and 
even that of stage 3. If the descriptions do not match, the agent in stage 2 will either be burdened 
with irrelevant alerts or, a t the other extreme, not alerted to likely instances of money laundering 
(figure 6.5)
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Figure 6.5 - Classification output of the three stages
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Agent in stage 3 deems: Criminal CriminalLegitimate Legitimate
Criminal Legitimate Criminal Legitimate
True false negative False false negativeTrue true positive False true positiveClassification:
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The situations where the classification is ‘true true positive’ or ‘true true negative’ are ideal because 
they mean that the financial transactions of a  person engaged in criminal activity have been 
detected or, alternatively, that the financial transactions of a legitimate customer have not been 
reported. In also shows that the prototypes of the agents in the three stages are ‘aligned’, that is, 
they would detected / not detect the sam e individual, even though the agents in each of the three 
stages are looking at different pieces of data.
The 'false true positive’ classification m eans that a legitimate behaviour has been reported to the 
FIU, because the prototypes of the agents in stages 1 and 2 do not match the stage 3 prototype, • 
however, no serious legal implications derive for BFI, though it may be argued that there is a waste 
of resources at BFI.
In the ‘true false positive' classification, the prototypes of the agents in stage 1 do not match those 
of the agents in s tages 2 and 3, but the prototypes of stages 2 and 3 are aligned. It m eans that the 
‘legitimate custom er’ has correctly not been reported to the FIU, even though it was flagged 
internally. Operationally, there is a w aste of internal resources.
The ‘false false negative’ case  m eans that legitimate behaviour has not been reported to the FIU, 
even though the prototypes of the agents in stage 2 are not aligned with those of the agents in 
stages 1 and 3. The behaviour was correctly considered legitimate in stage 1, and no legal or 
operational negative implications derive for BFI.
Page 172
The situations where the classification is ‘false false positive’, ‘true false negative’ and ‘false true 
negative’ are the problematic ones. Criminal behaviour has not been detected by BFI and there is 
the possibility of legal negative repercussions for the organisation. In the ‘false false positive’ 
situation, the behaviour was correctly flagged by the agents in stage 1, but deem ed legitimate in 
stage 2, resulting in w aste of operational resources. The ‘true false negative’ classification m eans 
that the behaviour would have been correctly reported to the FIU, should it have been referred to 
the agents in stage 2. However, because the transactions were deem ed legitimate in stage 1, the 
case never even reached the MLRO unit. In the ‘false true negative’ case, the pattern of behaviour 
would be wrongly deemed legitimate by the agents in both stages 1 and 2.
In summary, there is a range of circumstances that lead to observed banking behaviour being 
incorrectly reported or not reported, in som e cases  with significant legal or operational 
consequences. The legal implications are that if the BFI is seen a s  having been negligent or 
deliberately assisting the money launderer, it may be fined, the MLRO may be imprisoned and 
employees directly involved may also be fined or imprisoned (JMLSG 2006). The operational 
implications derive from waste of resources at the stage of scrutinising and/or analysing the 
transaction patterns. In this manner, it is essential for the organisation to minimise the likelihood of 
categorisation errors.
The next question of interest to BFI is whether or not the organisation is at a risk of mismatches 
between its employees’ classification of observed behaviour. The answer is, clearly yes. As noted, 
there are several differences between the stimuli considered by different groups of agents, a s  well 
a s  the reference profiles and how they behave once they are suspicious. That is not to say, of 
course, that the organisation is at a higher risk than other financial institutions. This study focused 
on in-depth understanding rather than industry comparisons and, therefore, its insights must be 
understood in that context. Additionally, it is important to note that the fieldwork considered a subset 
of customer facing staff only. It is possible that staff in contact centres, for instance, are guided by 
different informal norms, or be exposed to different data objects. In any case, the customer facing
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units monitored in this organisation are most likely well equipped to detect highly typical money 
laundering predicate crimes such as drug trafficking.
In addition, BFI needs to do enlarge the pool of scrutiny for profiling stage 2. The MLRO team partly 
achieves the extension of the pool of analysis by focusing ATMS monitoring on behaviour patterns 
different from those traditionally monitored by branch staff. However, ATMS’s monitoring capacity is 
also limited because the system can run solely a limited number of formulas at any one time. That 
accentuates BFI’s  risk of being able to monitor high volume low value crime, only, such a s  drug 
trafficking or the use of personal accounts for business purposes.
6.4 Summary of analysis and link with research question
The analysis presented in this chapter offered a number of interesting insights into the profiling 
process. It highlighted that profiling is a  dynamic process, involving various perceivers who act in 
sequential order. The chapter offers not only a graphical representation of the phenomenon but also 
an understanding of certain actions a s  triggers of subsequent profiling activity. In addition, it 
questioned the applicability of the solution typically suggested by the data mining community of 
using proxies or narrowing down analysis, to a  situation like AML profiling where such trigger- 
actions are present.
The analysis also raised questions regarding the suitability of quantitative data, the key input for 
automated monitoring systems, to model human behaviour. The analysis further em phasised the 
distinction between real and perceived ability to profile. It offers a theoretical contribution by 
suggesting that perceived ability is a  better predictor of meaning than the actual ability.
In addition, the chapter makes a practical contribution to profiling. It consists of explaining that it is 
particularly difficult to correct misconceptions in terms of what is money laundering behaviour 
because such behaviour is a  relational category. Relational categories are not learnt well in the 
absence of explicit rules and information.
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Lastly, the analysis at the level of the interpreter offered a methodological contribution, a s  well. In 
particular, it applied a cognitive data modelling tool -  the cognitive snapshots (Jorna and Heusden 
2000; Heusden and Jom a 2001) -  to the understanding of meaning in organisations. The result is a 
focus on existing meanings rather than on possible or likely meanings. Conducting the analysis at 
the level of the profiling agent also enables the diagnosis of filtering instances.
Profiling is, ultimately, a subjective process where individual perceptions and expectations, a s  well 
a s  characteristics of the technical, formal and informal contexts, shape the definition of money 
laundering. The distinction between data object, profile, interpretant and interpreter pursued in the 
present thesis, permitted the isolation of specific sources of variance in meaning. Moreover, looking 
at meanings a s  behaviours enabled a dynamic view of meaning, a s  a phenomenon that evolves 
within the organisational context, rather than an absolute entity that exists, independently, in the 
environment. Lastly, the analysis of the role of technical, formal and informal levels highlighted not 
only the sources of sanctioned behaviour, but also points of conflict various sources of guidance, as 
well a s  the relative force of those sam e sources.
Numerous researchers have been investigating the question ‘How can we detect financial crime?’. 
The answer to that challenge has centred on more and more powerful technical solutions and 
complex algorithms. This study provides an entirely different perspective on the topic, suggesting 
that cultural and individual preconceptions condition the perception and conceptualisation of the 
data and models available. Such preconceptions limit not only what agents see  in the environment, 
but also what they read in it. Furthermore, the study underlined the role of salient category features 
in the resulting shape of the profile. To be precise, profiling can have a  self-fulfilling effect by 
flagging those transaction patterns that profilers were looking for in the first place, through the data 
fields that they considered or the formulas that they developed in the first place. In summary, the 
study m akes it possible to refute firmly the data mining community’s  claim that technology lets ‘the 
data speak for itself’ (Williams 2006). Rather, the study suggests, data mining translates to the 
query language preconceptions existing in the mind of the profilers. Moreover, due to the industry’s 
long cycle of replacement of legacy systems, the prevalent mental representations and 
organisational discourse become frozen in the technical platform.
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The central argument of this thesis is a  conception of profiles a s  a situated construct The 
argument, which builds through sections 6.1 and 6.2, answ ers the research question ‘how do 
categories come to be construed and used in profiling, when only limited empirical support is 
available to support the emerging profile?’, which was subdivided in two secondary questions, 
namely ‘how do classifications em erge?’ and ‘what are the implications for the emerging profile?’.
The argument can be summarised a s  follows: The organisation develops formal definitions of the 
behaviours to be modelled. Due to the lack of empirical support, such definitions are traditionally 
speculative, and conveyed via affective, rather than denotative, information. Members of staff 
translate the definitions to query language. Staff, themselves, have preconceptions about the 
phenomenon and are bounded by cognitive limitations such a s  a limited capacity to absorb stimuli 
from the environment or various filtering processes. The m embers of staff are, in addition, 
embedded in a social context that guides behaviour implicitly and explicitly, for instance through 
assessm ent procedures or peer to peer communication. The translation to the technical platform is 
further influenced by the specific features of the platform, such a s  the number of rules that it can 
run, or how many months of data it can store. Another technical feature that affects the translation 
is the platform's integration with other databases. In the translation and output validation process, 
numerous decisions have to be made by the profiler, henceforth saturating the profiling process 
with subjectivity. It is also important to note that technological solution is only one element of the 
profiling process.
The complex phenomenon of human behaviour is only incompletely represented in the structured 
query language and the restricted automated system’s capabilities. Therefore, the organisation’s 
employees have a most important role to play in profiling. Staff have numerous service encounters 
with the custom er and are exposed to types of data that conveyed the subtleties of human 
behaviour better than purely quantitative data. Staff also play an important role at the level of 
analysis given that they can offer a  very sophisticated understanding and interpretation of the 
observed behaviour, even if staff can not commit such understanding to one specific, neatly defined 
formula. Finally, when the service process and, therefore, the opportunities for profiling, are
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distributed in sequential encounters, the employee who first encounters the customers or the 
transactions determ ines which signs other staff further down the profiling process will receive. First 
encounters have a determining role in the breadth of the profiling exercise.
The result of the process is a  profile that is imbued of subjectivity, and that tends to focus in highly 
typical behaviour.
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7. Discussion and conclusion
Chapter seven reviews, in section 7.1, the theoretical, methodological and practical research 
contributions made by this study. Section 7.2 acknowledges the limitations of the study, and section 
7.3 concludes the thesis by pointing future research directions that validate and expand on the 
findings presented in the previous chapter.
7.1 Review of contributions
The discussion of findings from the study permitted the identification of som e contributions for
practice, theory and method, which are reviewed in this section. Some of the contributions are quite
substantial, while others are merely validations of other researchers’ findings in the particular
context of this thesis, mirroring the situation described by Kallinikos (1999), with reference to the
contributions from his study of the computarisation of a dairy plant:
'Let it be clear, that like most studies, the present one does not develop apart from other 
investigations. It draws on their insights, critically approaches some of them, ponders and 
reframes others to explore clusters of ideas (...). (There) are some emerging themes that it 
offers as novel insights’. (Kallinikos 1999)
7.1.1 Contributions to practice
The discussion of AML profiling in chapter 6 highlighted that there are points in common between 
this activity and profiling in general in the banking industry. The barriers to segmentation identified 
by Meadows and Dibb (1998) and summarised in table 2.2 are remarkably similar to the obstacles 
to the monitoring of financial crime identified at BFI. In particular, the implementation of AML 
monitoring affects potentially all employees of a  financial institution, who have expectations and 
needs that are different, and sometimes in conflict, with profiling criminal behaviour. Similarly, the 
ethos of monetary privacy (Donaghy 2002) predominant in the banking industry is not supportive of 
the practice of actively having to disclose to third parties details about custom ers’ identity and 
banking activity. Moreover, the customer and transaction data needed to profile financial crime is 
quite different from that usually available in the organisation for product or marketing purposes. The 
regulator mandated the acquisition of some of that data, particularly pertaining to customer identity 
(BBA 2005), but additional data such as the purpose of the transaction or the motive for depositing
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or withdrawing cash is obtainable on an ad-hoc basis only, in what is traditionally seen a s  a  very 
intrusive process. The empirical study also echoed som e of the difficulties of detecting money 
laundering identified by the OTA (1995) report, Kunreuther (2002) and others mentioned in section 
2.1.4, such a s  the scarcity of validated profiles of money laundering, the difficulty of distinguishing 
between transaction patterns associated with licit and illicit conduct or the fact that implementation 
of such initiatives is rarely driven by a business rationale.
In addition, the empirical study identified new issues concerning the practice of profiling. The 
learning derived from those novel findings constitutes practical contributions to the industry. The 
dissertation makes practical contributions to three groups - professionals engaged in the 
development of software solutions for transaction monitoring, agents developing educational 
initiatives and those in charge of defining strategic directions for financial crime monitoring -  
summarised in table 7.1.
Professionals and researchers working in the field of profiling techniques have long faced difficulties 
in monitoring transactions in the absence of all the desired or needed inputs for analysis. The 
solution long advocated in the data mining literature is to develop proxies or narrow the scope of 
analysis. In the case of AML, however, there simply is no substitute or alternative for the existence 
of an alert. Therefore, the focus of data mining developers has to be on developing formulas that 
complement rather than overlap each other, in order to maximise the possibility of generating alerts. 
The second contribution as  far a s  data mining professionals are concerned is the finding that 
agents may not always notice all the data objects to which they are exposed to. The implication of 
this finding is that it is not enough for developers to make the input available, it is also necessary for 
profiling system s designers need to audit whether profilers filter the data objects to which they are 
exposed to and, in particular, whether profilers ignore, distort or even make up key data objects.
The second group of practical contributions concerns the agents developing educational initiatives, 
in profiling. Conceptions of money laundering behaviour bear resemblance, a s  described, to 
relational categories which are not leamt well in the absence of explicit rules and information. The 
fact that the cycle of replacing legacy system s in the industry is very long, further compounds the
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difficulty of correcting misconceptions. Therefore, it is crucial for trainers and those involved in 
developing AML aw areness programmes, in general, to intervene a s  early and as  convincingly a s  
possible. A second related contribution derives from the finding that profiling is strongly related with 
expectations and that these, in turn, are highly associated with the nature of the roles. Unless 
training programmes are able to change attitudes at the front line, in particular in customer facing 
roles, the financial institutions’ ability to detect financial crime will be limited.
The most significant practical contributions from the thesis, however, are probably those concerning 
the definition of strategic directions for financial crime profiling. The thesis pointed that, a s  a  result 
of the sequential nature of the monitoring process, false negative errors in stage 1 are more serious 
for the organisation than false positive ones. It is, therefore, key to identify the source of the errors, 
and address them. In the particular case  of BFI, it w as a case  of weak formal behavioural norms 
because, a s  the reader may remember, even though staff expressed doubts about the legitimacy of 
the transactions and therefore, according to the formal rules, should have raised an alert, they did 
not do so. Fortunately for BFI, behavioural norms are relatively easy  to change (Stamper, Liu et al. 
2000), but other organisations may face different sources of misclassification. Last, but not the 
least, there is no denying that profiling is a  subjective process. It is subjective at the level of the 
system s designers a s  a result of filtering effects and other cognitive conditioning factors, which are 
more general than the domain knowledge or personal bias previously identified by the literature 
mentioned in section 2.3.4. Additionally, profiling is subjective because it benefits greatly the 
inclusion of observational and textual data, which is gathered by mem bers of staff, rather than 
machines. Hence, rather than trying to replace staff by automated monitoring solutions, 
organisations ought to use both complementarily, and playing to each group's advantages.
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Table 7.1 -  Summary of contributions to practice
Group D escription
Profile developers - Focus has to be on developing formulas that complement each other, 
because it is not possible to use proxies or reduce analysis for critical 
inputs such a s  the existence of alerts.
- Need for audits on which data objects are filtered by the profilers, 
rather than just making more and more data objects available.
Training professionals - Importance of intervening a s  early a s  possible to correct 
misconceptions, when categories are of a relational nature.
- Relevance of programmes addressing attitudes and expectations, 
particularly for customer facing roles.
Strategic - Significance of identifying cognitive source of false negative errors in 
stage one of monitoring processes based on sequential encounters, 
and correct them.
- Benefits of embracing the subjectivity of the profiling process.
7.1.2 Contributions to theory
The theoretical orientation of this thesis is based on organisational semiotics, a theory chosen 
because it treats the information system s capabilities and the organisation's requirements a s  an 
integral unit (Ackerman 2000; Eatock, Paul e t al. 2002; Liu, Sun et al. 2002), and ‘(it) can link the 
mechanical to the social, combining as far as possible the strengths of both’ (Stamper 2004). 
However, organisational semiotics offers limited understanding of dynamic meaning making 
processes, particularly those involving sign aw areness, sequential interactions and the cognitive 
restrictions (Desouza and Hensgen 2005) that organisations’ employees face. Therefore, a 
composite theoretical framework was developed, in section 3.3, which complemented 
organisational semiotics with concepts from the theory of classification. The data presented in 
chapter five and subsequent analysis in chapter six, brought out interesting contributions for the 
bodies of knowledge that form the theoretical framework, a s  described next and condensed in table
7.2.
The concepts of signs, semiotic ladder, norms and affordances were, to an extent, useful to model 
and analyse the findings from the case study. However, the study also confirmed the w eaknesses 
mentioned in the organisational semiotics’ review developed in section 3.1. Andersen (2004) 
proposed that the direct effect actually produced by the sign upon the interpreter (Noth 1995) 
occurs because interpreters have guidelines regarding the occurrence and the meaning of the sign. 
At BFI, not all interviewees reacted to the sam e signs, and a relationship was, indeed, found
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between perception of particular signs and the specific preconceptions of the interpreters of such 
signs. Regarding semiosis, Helmhout and colleagues (2004), Charrel (2004) and many others 
em phasised that organisations are environments in which actors work together. The study showed, 
indeed, that even though at any one moment there may be only one perceiver engaged in meaning 
making over a particular sign, semiosis is, actually, a complex process involving two or more actors 
in sequence, and where the output of semiosis of the agents in stage 1 of the monitoring process 
becom es the trigger of semiosis for agents in stage 2, and so and so forth40. Furthermore, Helmhout 
et al (2004) argue that organisational semiotics is unable to answer questions concerning how 
agents learn, select and use norms, and that organisational semiotics tends not to study whether 
the emergent configurations of norms correspond to known organisational configurations. The 
thesis noticed varying levels of aw areness of, and reference to, particular norms, among the three 
groups of agents considered, and that there were indeed differences between formal organisational 
norms and informal group norms. The thesis makes a minor contribution to theory in the sense  that 
it validates the limitations identified by various semioticians, in the specific case of financial crime 
profiling. However, the study also makes contributions beyond simply reinforcing previous findings.
One significant contribution to the understanding of sign aw areness is m ade possible by adding a 
cognitive perspective on classification to the basic semiotic framework. It consisted of 
demonstrating that there is a  relationship between meaning and, not only specific interpretants, but 
also particular interpreters. Interpreters in the sam e interpretant group may still attribute different 
meaning to the sam e data object as a result of their specific experience (Medin et al., 1997, Medin 
et al., 2000) and exposure to reference profiles. In addition, the study raised one question 
concerning the direct relationship between expertise and level of filtering -  contrary to predictions 
derived from cognitive research, it was not the case that the group of employees with most 
expertise in the field were the ones that exhibited the strongest filtering effect. The study, therefore, 
raises the question of whether filtering effects should be thought of in relation to the level of 
sophistication of the initial category, rather than conceptualised in absolute terms.
40 While the study did not address the profiling process beyond the case study organisation, it 
illustrated the existence of further parties (e.g., figure 5.7)
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An additional significant contribution from this study to theory occurs at the level of semiosis. 
Drawing on the concept of sequential encounters (Ashforth and Humphrey 1997; Andersen 2005), 
the thesis proposed a conceptualisation of semiosis a s  a  sequential process, where the interpreters 
who first encounter the sign acts a s  gate keepers of the overall semiotic process. Therefore, the 
meaning reached by semiosis in stage 1, becom es a  sign in stage 2. Furthermore, the study 
suggested a classification of signs, in addition to the ones mentioned in section 3.1, based on the 
contribution of the signs to the meaning process and that distinguishes between signs that are 
merely an input to the process, from those that are a trigger element of semiosis. The 
conceptualisation is illustrated graphically in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 -  Sequential sem iosis
D ependen t
S ta g e  2
Independen t
S igns
D ependen t
S ta g e  1
S igns
Independen t
An additional theoretical contribution at the level of semiosis, referred to the distinction between real 
and perceived affordances, a concept well developed in direct perception psychology, but rarely 
addressed in the organisational semiotics’ literature considered. Specifically, drawing on cognitive 
scientists’ claims that a priori expectations are largely self-fulfilling (Dunn and Spellman, 2003, 
Quinn et al., 2004), the thesis suggests that perceived affordances are better predictors of meaning 
than the real affordances.
The final, and perhaps, most relevant contribution from this thesis to theory and, in particular, to the 
research question of ’how do categories come to be construed and used in profiling, when only
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limited empirical support is available to support the emerging profile?’ is that those participating in 
the profiling process are bounded by cognitive limitations that affect the agents’ ability to assimilate 
observations, and filter what is perceived and how it is conceptualised41. It is this insight into the 
individual interpreter that allows the researcher to begin to understand why different groups of 
employees, in one particular organisation, exposed to the sam e data objects and guided by the 
sam e formal norms understand the sam e concept, suspicious money laundering behaviour, in such 
varied ways.
Table 7.2 -  Summary of contributions to theory
Category Description
Major - Identification of a relationship between meaning and specific interpreters, even 
within a particular interpretant.
- Conceptualisation of semiosis a s  a sequential process, and identification of 
gatekeepers of meaning and of trigger signs.
- Reinforcement of the need to distinguish between real and perceived organisational 
affordances, and the proposition that perceived affordances are better predictors of 
meaning than the real affordances.
- Focus on matching and filtering as specific contributors to meaning in organisations.
Minor - Extension of applicability of organisational semiotics to the topic of profiling, and 
validation of the value of the concepts signs, semiotic ladder, affordances and norms 
to the understanding of the em ergence of meaning in the particular application of 
money laundering detection.
- Validation of the limitations previously identified by various semioticians regarding 
sign aw areness, static approach to semiosis, a s  well a s  apprehension of, and choice 
between, alternative norms.
7.1.3 Contributions to methodology
The study drew on a portfolio of qualitative data collection tools, combining primary and secondary 
data sources that would provide a comprehensive view of the phenomenon under study (Eisenhardt 
1989). In addition, the author used tools and methods such a s  the ontology chart, traditionally 
applied in research projects informed by organisational semiotics to analyse the divergent and, at 
times, conflicting views that em erged in the organisation. In addition, the author developed category 
'snapshots’ (Jorna and Heusden 2000; Heusden and Jorna 2001) for each interviewee in order to 
understand the relevant schem as (Khatri, Vessey et al. 2006). Lastly, the researcher examined the 
narrative accounts through ’talk and texts in interaction’ (Potter 1996; D’Cruz 2004) to identify 
instances of stimuli filtering. The combination of a  variety of methods from different paradigms has
41 The reader is referred to section 3.2.2, a s  well a s  figure 3.3.
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been advocated by respected information system s scholars (e.g., (Ciborra 2000)) a s  it leads to rich 
research results (Mingers 2001). That w as certainly the case in the present thesis, a s  without 
drawing on research methods and tools from the cognitive sciences, it would not have been 
possible to identify and map individual employees’ schem as. The result is a focus on existing 
m eanings rather than on possible or likely meanings. The combination of the methodologies 
provided a major methodological contribution of this thesis.
A second insight a t the level of methodology concerns the identification of multiple interpretants 
within the unit of analysis, a s  well a s  the identification of multiple interpreters within one interpretant. 
The effect is an em phasis on the need to cascade the analysis to the lowest level of meaning 
making, the interpreter, in the situation under analysis. The cascading effect is illustrated in figure
7.2.
Figure 7.2 -  Cascading effect of the analysis
Unit of analysis
Interpreter 1.1 /
Interpreter 1.2 o tjo c ,
Interpreter n.1 
Interpreter n.2Object Interpretant 1, Interpretant 2^ Object
Interpreter 1.n Interpreter 2. n Interpreter n.n
The two methodological contributions from this thesis are encapsulated in table 7.3.
Table 7.3 -  Summary of contributions to methodology_________________________________
____________________________________ Description____________________________________
- Use of cognition-informed methods to study organisational meaning, and in particular the 
addition of the cognitive snapshot tool to the portfolio of modelling tools from organisation 
semiotics.
- Importance of cascading the analysis of meaning to the level of the different interpreters.______
Page 185
7.2 Limitations of the study
The previous section listed the various contributions that the thesis makes to research and practice. 
Yet, the study also has some limitations that are important to acknowledge.
The empirical case  considered in this study concerned AML detection in a particular financial 
institution. Additionally, the study included only one type of customer facing staff, namely branch 
personnel. Therefore, it is possible to question the generalisability of the findings to other types of 
financial institutions, other organisational functions or other forms of financial crime.
Many of the organisational issues identified in this particular financial industry had also been 
identified in other studies of the industry, namely Meadows and Dibb’s  (1998) findings on obstacles 
to profiling in the banking industry, or Donaghy’s  (2002) mention of bank’s  privacy culture a s  an 
obstacle to active monitoring of customers. Similarly, som e of the technology related issues 
mentioned in the study, such a s  the inexistence of proven models of behaviour, mirror the findings 
from OTA’s  (1995) study of wireless transfers. Finally, the study raised issues related to the ATMS 
that, to an extent, reflect topics mentioned in the data mining literature reviewed in chapter 2. The 
many studies leading to conclusions similar to those presented in this thesis lend support to the 
claim that the findings may, indeed, be generalisable to other instances of profiling in the financial 
industry.
However, two important features of the phenomenon studied are that 1) the categories are 
relational and that 2) there are no established models of behaviour. Therefore, it is imperative to 
state that the major findings of the present study refer to profiling under conditions of ambiguity, 
only, and should be generalised to profiling in general.
A second important limitation is that the study considered only branch staff. Had it been extended to 
include staff that interacted with customers via technological media, only, such a s  those in the 
contact centres, the findings might have been very different. Perhaps staff in such functions have 
very different views of the customer, and very different perceptions about money laundering,
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therefore leading to a wider pool of alerts in stage t of the monitoring process. The information 
received from members of the MLRO team w as that the perception of staff in positions of 
technology mediated interactions with the customer had rather limited views on what is money 
laundering, strongly focused on the element ‘cash’. However, the study has not specifically 
analysed this particular stakeholder group and, therefore, the findings can not be extended to this 
particular type of customer facing staff.
Additionally, the study raised the question of whether filtering effects should be thought of in relation 
to the level of sophistication of the initial category, rather than conceptualised in absolute terms. 
Yet, strictly speaking, the thesis did not investigate the matter. Furthermore, the fact that the thesis’ 
empirical findings did not support the claims, by some cognitive authors, that experts reveal the 
strongest filtering effects, can not be taken a s  a rebuttal of the claim, because the thesis did not se t 
out to prove or disprove the relationship. If both groups shared a  common definition of money 
laundering, then it might be possible to investigate the relationship between expertise and filtering. 
Given the existing definitions, however, it is not possible to either agree or disagree with the 
proposition.
Lastly, the analysis of the findings concluded that, in BFI’s  branches, the informal behavioural 
norms did not reinforce the formal ones. In this particular case  of conflict between two norms, the 
informal group norms weighed more on behaviour than the formal norms organisational norms. A 
note of caution must be raised, however, that this particular finding should not be seen  a s  proof that 
in any situation of conflict between formal and informal norms, the later will rule over the former.
7.3 Future research directions
The final section of this thesis reflects on how the work developed and here presented can guide 
future research. The first natural extension of the study would be to include other banking 
organisations, larger and smaller. Even though these institutions are in the sam e business sector 
and are guided by the sam e formal rules, they are likely to have different cultural environments and 
probably even different technical solutions that they may have adopted for different reasons. Such
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extension would enable the researchers to develop an enhanced understanding of the role of 
technical and informal factors, as  opposed to formal ones, in profiling.
A second research avenue would be to extend the study to other types of organisation in the 
financial services industry. While existing studies on profiling in the banking industry and on 
wireless transfers modelling lend support to the claim that the findings may indeed be generalisable 
to other instances of profiling in the industry, it would still be extremely valuable to develop a similar 
study of AML profiling in other types of financial organisations, such a s  investment banking or 
insurance providers. Investment bankers tend to have closer, more personalised links with their 
customers, than retail bankers. Similarly, insurance providers collect significantly more identity and 
lifestyle data on their customers then retail bankers. In other words, different types of organisations 
in the financial industry are likely to have different views of customer and they may also have 
different attitudes towards detection of money laundering. A cross-sector study, examining profiling 
practices in other companies in the sam e industry, could investigate issues related to attitudes, the 
relevant norms and the resulting impact on monitoring behaviour, and whether there are similar 
filtering issues.
Thirdly, it would be interesting to investigate the role of third parties, such a s  the FIU, who have very 
different objectives and characteristics, in profile development. An extended study could explore 
inter-organisational profiling, including the agents in stage 3 of transaction monitoring. Such an 
extended study would involve financial services institutions, a s  well a s  FlUs and law enforcement 
agencies. The objective of the enlarged study is to investigate how the different cultural contexts, 
cognitive frameworks and technical system s affect the design and effectiveness of inter- 
organisational crime detection initiatives. The insights derived from such study could contribute 
critically to a country’s ability to detect and prevent money laundering.
A fourth research direction would be to focus on the role of norms in profiling, and explore how 
these are acquired and shaped through processes such a s  training, reward mechanisms, 
performance reviews and others. While the effects of such mechanisms were alluded to in this 
thesis, their role and importance were not fully explored. A longitudinal study, accompanying the
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organisation over several years, would certainly shed light over the impact over time of such norm- 
shaping events.
Similarly it would be interesting to investigate the role of training and rewards on schem as and 
processes. For instance, the thesis mentioned that the interviewees referred to some similar 
triggers such a s  cash and the international transactions, but then focused on different data objects 
depending on their jobs. This finding that different agents attributed different weights to particular 
features of the category, possibly a s  a result of exposition to different category forming stimuli -  for 
instance, via training -  or a s  a result of what they are geared to valued, a s  result of what they are 
rewarded on. Yet, the matter w as not fully investigated by the present thesis, and further studies are 
required to fully understand eventual interactions.
Finally, it would be most interesting to further explore the notion of relative versus absolute filters. 
W hether these  exist and whether or not such a distinction could explain the filtering situations 
observed a t BFI where, a s  the reader may remember, the theoretical relationship between expertise 
and filtering incidence w as not withheld.
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Appendix 1 -  Transnational, national and local AML rules
At the transnational level, the FATF developed a framework of AML guidelines, consisting of 40 
recommendations first published in 1990 and revised in 1996 and 2003, plus 8 special 
recommendations published in 2001 (FATF 2004; JMLSG 2006). Other international initiatives 
include the ‘Basel Declaration' signed by the members of the Committee of Banking Supervision, 
the United Nations’ Convention against Transnationaf Organised Crime, and the creation of the 
Egmont group of FlUs. The European Union also developed instruments to fight money laundering. 
The European Commission’s  AML directive provides the common ground for all member states, 
and it w as set out adopting a minimalist approach (Mohamed 1995) in order not to collide with the 
exclusive competence of member states such as criminal law, and to accommodate various 
sensitive issues such as secrecy laws (Mohamed 2002). As a result of the minimalist approach, the 
transposition of the directive into national law has resulted in uneven applications among member 
states. Som e states have strengthened the directive’ requirements42, while others have failed to 
implement it in full43.
At the national level, the first AML related legislation introduced in the UK w as the Criminal Justice 
Act of 1988. While it referred to drug trafficking and terrorism financing only, it specifically 
criminalised assistance in laundering money and failure to report suspicion. The first EC AML 
directive w as transposed into UK law through the Criminal Justice Act of 1993, a s  well a s  the 
Criminal Law Act of 199544 and the Proceeds of Crime Order of 199645. It extended the definition of 
money laundering to cover the proceeds of all serious crime. Additionally, it introduced the 
requirement for all regulated firms to maintain specific system s and controls to combat money 
laundering, and to obtain evidence of the identity of new customers (FSA 2003). Additionally, the 
Drug Trafficking Act of 1994 increased the powers of confiscation. The Terrorism Act w as approved
42 For instance, Belgium opted to set the minimum threshold for suspicious transaction reporting at 
€10,000, below the EU’s  suggested €15,000 level.
43 Austria has been criticised internationally for failing to implement full identification procedures for 
customers in “non-face to face” banking transactions.
44 Specifically for Scotland
45 Specifically for Northern Ireland
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in 2000, and am ended in 2001, and provides the law on terrorist financing. The Financial Services 
and Markets Act of 2000 gave statutory powers to the FSA to regulate the financial services 
industry in the UK, with money laundering appearing a s  a  top item in the FSA’s  agenda. Particularly 
since 2002, the FSA assum ed formal powers to supervise and enforce compliance with laws and 
regulations relating to money laundering, and binding all banks and other regulated institutions to 
have processes to detect and prevent this activity. The legal requirements were further 
strengthened with the introduction of the Proceeds of Crime Act (PoCA) in 2002 which extended the 
definition of money laundering and created a new imprisonable offence of failing to disclose 
suspicious transactions in respect of all crime (JMLSG 2006). The Money Laundering Regulations 
of 2003 extended the requirements to a number of sectors other than the financial services, but still 
did not apply to all types of businesses -  e.g., high street gambling is excluded from the regulations.
Alongside the legislation, British financial institutions usually consider the guidance notes prepared 
by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) since 1990. The JMLSG consist of the 
leading UK trade associations in the financial services industry (JMLSG 2006). Lastly, banks 
them selves issue their own AML policies regarding the launching of new products, training 
programmes and others.
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Appendix 2 -  Brief overview of semiotics
Semioticians may be loosely divided into two orientations, reflecting different perspectives on the 
issue of what determines the activity of comprehension within the communication process.
One branch -  sometimes referred to as  semiology -  posits that comprehension is m ade possible by 
the existence of rule-systems, which exist prior to any specific meaning making process. 
Henceforth, semiology is mostly concerned with classifying signs and investigating the rules that 
govern the relationship between the vehicle and the meaning (Eco 1976; Hervey 1982; Brannen 
2004). Key authors in semiology are Ferdinand de Saussure and Algirdas Julien Greimas, among 
others.
The other branch of semiotics -  often referred to a s  pragmatic semiotics -  defends that 
comprehension is an activity highly dependent on the context, and that any investigation of 
structure em beds assumptions about meanings, language use and function (Basunti 2004). The 
pragmatic branch of semiotics is based on the work developed by the logician Charles Peirce, 
further developed by Charles Morris and others, and investigates the sign effects, in particular its 
role in creating other signs (Hervey 1982; Price and Shanks 2004; Price and Shanks 2005). 
Pragmatic semiotics is wider in scope than semiology because it is not limited to the study of what 
signs mean, instead it includes the study of how signs mean, i.e. how meanings are m ade (Sturrock 
1986). Organisational semiotics is a sub-discipline of the pragmatic branch of semiotics.
Semiotics provides a comprehensive notion of communication to include any system of 
classification be it verbal, textual, visual or other (Martin and Ringham 2000). Performing a semiotic 
analysis of an organisation allows the researcher to elicit ambiguity in the meaning of the sign, 
identify eventual conflicts in the organisation about the signs, and recognise the consequences for 
the parties involved of the choice of signs.
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Appendix 3 -  The semiotic ladder
A3.1 Physical level
The physical level of semiosis focuses on the physical aspects of signs. Namely, this level 
considers the range of signs available and of interest to the organisation, and their properties (Liu 
2000). Signs are defined by their physical characteristics such a s  m ass, energy, spatial dimension 
or duration (Stamper, Liu et al. 2000). Additionally, the researcher needs to consider the 
characteristics of the sign carrier, such a s  energy and material requirements, so that ‘[information 
systems developers] can design physical devices for storage, transmission and representation of 
the signs’ (Liu 2000).
Desouza and Hensgen (2002; Desouza and Hensgen 2005) note that signs may exist in any form
associated with the five senses and intuition, and advocate a focus on quantity rather than quality:
‘At the [physicalf6 level, the task merely requires the gathering of data (...). At this stage 
the focus in on the quantity rather than the quality of the information. As data filters upwards 
in the model, it will quickly be thinnned’ (Desouza and Hensgen 2002).
The authors further argue that it is important to consider a broad selection of divergent sources,
within the organisation, the organisation’s partners or the public environment (Desouza and
Hensgen 2002), keeping an open mind:
'Literal thinking... impedes considerations that allow the data process to succeed along the 
levels of the semiotic model.’
Liu (2000) illustrates the physical level of semiosis explaining that, in a telephone conversation, the 
telephone lines must be connected by a telecommunications provider, first and foremost.
A3.2 Empiric level
The empiric level studies the statistical properties of the signs, and aims to establish a repertoire of 
reliable patterns of signs and use them with error rates that are low enough (Stamper, Liu et al. 
2000). Issues of interest to the semiotician include the validity of the data, in term s of legitimacy and
46 The authors use the term ‘morphological’ to refer to what Stamper describes a s  the physical level 
of semiosis.
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significance (Desouza and Hensgen 2005), a s  well a s  processing requirements such a s  coding, 
decoding, m easurements of entropy, desired level of detail summarisation (Desouza and Hensgen
2003) or channel capacity (Liu 2000; Desouza and Hensgen 2002). Empirics is more concerned 
with the content of the m essage than its meaning (Neuman 2006).
In a telephone conversation (Liu 2000), the voice signals need to be converted into electronic or 
optical signals and transmitted between the two telephones, to enable the empiric level of semiosis.
A3.3 Syntactic level
At the syntactic level, agents look at rules for assembling complex signs from simple ones (Liu 
2000), structuring data items into meaningful se ts  (Desouza and Hensgen 2003), and linking them 
according to some grammar or code (Desouza and Hensgen 2002), such as  a language’s 
grammatical rules or particular mathematical formulas.
At this level, a key determinant of success, a s  far as  meaning is concerned, is how well sign
relationships are defined across heterogeneous agents and objects (Desouza and Hensgen 2003).
Obeying the grammar is a condition for the existence of meaning, rather than a determinant of the
exact meaning that will be attributed to a sign, however. As Liu (2000) notes, of natural language:
‘Grammars of a natural language teach people how to construct grammatically correct 
sentences, but do not tell how to express semantic meanings. However, if one wants to 
express oneself precisely, to follow the grammar is one of the conditions’ (page 29).
In Liu’s  (2000) telephone conversation example, the two people involved must follow the sam e 
grammatical rules, to enable the syntactic level of semiosis.
A3.4 Semantic level
Sem antics acknowledges the role of the context, or ‘reality’ (Desouza and Hensgen 2003), in the 
formation of meaning. In particular, how people interpret the information available in relation to the 
topic or setting in which it is used (Desouza and Hensgen 2005). Sem antics highlights that meaning 
is relational, not just denotational (Goguen 2004).
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Literal, denotational meanings provide an unequivocal and logical mapping between any given sign 
and the object it refers to, and is independent of any context whatsoever (Searle 1979). However, 
a s  illustrated by Winograd and Flores (1987) and Andersen (1990), in most if not all social contexts, 
there is no such unequivocal relationship. Instead, background information is often necessary to 
understand meaning. Brannen (2004), for instance, describes how the word ‘bonus’ assum es two 
different meanings in the US and in Japan. In the former, the term bonus is seen a s  a reward for 
exceptional performance, but in the later it is a standard and expected portion of an employee's 
annual compensation.
The formation of meaning may also be influenced by time. The relationship between the sign and 
the object can have either static or dynamic components (Desouza and Hensgen 2002). In the 
former, the occurrence has the sam e outcome regardless of time. In the later, the value of 
“information’’ declines with the passing of time between the moment data w as collected and the 
moment the relationship was established.
The observation that a particular sign in a particular setting elicits a  particular response -  such as 
Pavlov’s salivating dog e x p e r i m e n t l e d  semioticians following Peirce’s  tradition to refer to the 
meaning of signs a s  behaviours (Stamper 1973; Hervey 1982; Liu 2000).
A3.5 Pragmatic level
The pragmatic level focuses on the role of the interpreter in establishing meaning. Pragmatics 
concentrates on the specific meanings of utterances and actions in use by actual speakers in 
concrete contexts (Searle, Kiefer et al. 1980). Furthermore, pragmatics investigates how such 
utterances and actions may reflect personal knowledge and experience (Dik 1989), a s  well as  
personal biases (Desouza and Hensgen 2002), intentions (Stamper, Liu et al. 2000), desires and 
beliefs (Liu 2000):
‘A process of verbal communication between two people can be modelled like this. The 
speaker and hearer each have their own pragmatic information base. The speaker’s 
pragmatic information base allows him to form an utterance with an expectation that the 
hearer will understand both semantic meaning and his intention. For example, by saying
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"I’m hungry”, the speaker expects the hearer will then interpret the sentence, with his 
pragmatic information, understanding that the speaker is actually saying ‘It’s time for lunch, 
let’s go to the cafeteria”. (...) Knowing pragmatic information of the opposite side can 
shorten the route of conversation and improve the efficiency. On the other hand, incorrect 
assumption of the pragmatic information of the opposite side can lead to the conversation 
going astray, (page 32)
The pragmatic information of the speaker may be communicated by or inferred from the theme, 
topicality and focality of the conversation (Dik 1979; Dik 1989), the time and location of the 
conversation or the use of specific words such a s  ‘propose’ instead of ‘order1 (Liu 2000). 
Furthermore, Searle an Vanderveken (1985) defend that the relative position of the speaker and the 
hearer, such a s  whether there is a relationship of authority or peerage among the parties involved, 
also conveys pragmatic information.
A3.6 Social level
The social level refers to the effect of the use of the signs by individuals (Stamper, Liu et al. 2000;
Stamper 2001) and it is, therefore, linked with the study of obligations resulting from the use of
signs, whether they are explicit obligations a s  in the case of legal contracts (Backhouse and Cheng
2000) or they are  implicit obligations resulting from social conventions of behaviour (Liu 2000):
‘For example, an “invitation” can lead to either “acknowledge but not accept” or “accept”. 
(...) In case of acceptance, the invitee has actually made a promise to the inviting person 
that he will fulfil his obligation, i.e., going to the party or dinner at the agreed time. 
Meanwhile, the inviting person has committed himself to receiving the guesf (page 34)
A3.7 Alternative conceptualisations of the semiotic ladder
While the six levels semiotic ladder is widely used by organisational semioticians to study semiosis, 
alternative configurations exist. In particular, the distinction m ade between pragmatics and social 
level is problematic for some semioticians (Goldkuhl and Agerfalk 2000; Agerfalk, Karlsson e t al. 
2002; Price and Shanks 2005). Goldkuhl and Agerfalk (2002), for instance, argue that the pragmatic 
and social levels are so intertwined that distinguishing between them is probably not only 
conceptually inelegant, but also misleading. The authors use two arguments. First, pragmatic 
intentions are usually directed from one person to another and, a s  such, are social by nature. 
Second, the successful performance of communication usually requires from the person knowledge 
of social acts. Agerfalk et al. (2002) recommend, instead, that the pragmatic and social levels be
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merged, but a distinction made between the personal and the social cognitive bases, as depicted in 
figure A.1.
Figure A.1 - The actability school approach to the sem iotic ladder
P e rso n a l  
C o g n itiv e  B ase
S h a re d  
C o g n itiv e  B ase
P ra g m a t ic s
S y n ta c tic s
E m p ir ic s
P h v s ic s
Source: Agerfalk, Karlsson et al. (2002)
P e r s o n a l  
C o g n itiv e  B ase
Other authors consider different numbers of levels, and slightly different terminologies. Desouza 
and Ramaprasad (2002), who also prefer a five stage model, use the term ‘morphological’ to 
identify what Stamper refers to as the ‘physical’ level, and amalgamate the social and the pragmatic 
levels into one (figure A.2). Liebenau and Backhouse (1990) as well as Liebenau and Harindranath 
(2002) consider four levels, namely empiric, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic, which link with the 
physical and the business worlds.
Figure A.2 - The evolutionary approach to  the sem iotic ladder
□
Source: Desouza and Ramaprasad (2002)
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In summary, som e authors do not consider the physical or the social levels a s  a focus of study in 
itself, while others disagree with the separation between pragmatics and the social level. This thesis 
uses the six levels framework because it clearly separates between the intended effects of the 
signs represented by the pragmatic level, and the actual effects of the signs, studied in the social 
level. Another reason for using the six levels framework is that it studies the technical and the social 
worlds a s  part of the meaning making process, rather than just starting and ending points.
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Appendix 4 -  Taxonomies of norms
Various taxonomies of norms exist, reflecting different study focuses. For instance, norms may be
classified according to their formality (Liu 2000; Stamper, Liu et al. 2000; DeMoor 2002). Informal
norms are habits and unofficial conventions that the members of an organisation follow, regardless
of whether such norms have been verbally agreed or not. One example of an informal norm is the
generally accepted convention that London investment bankers may w ear casual clothing on
Fridays but should not to do so on any other day of the week. Formal norms are those that have
been officially documented, such a s  national laws, industry regulations or organisational policies.
When formal norms are so exactly specified that they can be automated and executed by a
computer, they become technical norms:
‘Although human individuals are the principal embodiment of social and organisational 
norms, we are increasingly automating the application of norms so that we should think of 
the computer as an instrument for executing certain kinds of norms where it is more 
efficient but no less responsible to do so. Hence, we are also using the same norm-oriented 
model to explore some of the positive and negative impacts of information technology on 
the capacity of the organisations to change or learn' (Stamper, Liu et al. 2000).
Norms may, additionally, be classified according to form, in which case  it is possible to 
distinguishing between norms that have been made explicit, and those that are implicit only (Liu 
2000). Explicit norms have been communicated and agreed upon, possibly vocally. Implicit norms, 
or conventions, have never been discussed, but members of a community adhere to such norms, 
nonetheless.
Social psychology offers an alternative taxonomy, based on attitudes and that distinguishes 
between perceptual, evaluative, cognitive and behavioural norms (Liebenau and Backhouse 1990; 
Liu 2000; Stamper, Liu e t al. 2000; DeMoor 2002; Filipe 2004). Perceptual norms refer to how 
persons receive signals from the environment, and the vocabularies that such persons refer to in 
order to label their perceptions. Evaluative norms embody the beliefs that affect expectations 
regarding the observed signs. Cognitive norms refer to how people analyse the behaviours 
observed, and which patterns of cause and effect are imbued in the interpretation process. Lastly, 
behavioural norms dictate the appropriate actions that som eone ought to take in the face of 
particular events. Stam per and colleagues (2000) em phasise that perceptual norms are difficult to
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change and have profound effects on the organisation. The authors further note that evaluative 
norms vary between cultures, and tend to change slowly, w hereas cognitive norms change 
alongside developments in the technology of products and processes, and with improving 
knowledge of the relevant social and economic environment. Additionally, Stamper and colleagues 
underline that behavioural norms change frequently, namely a s  a response to new laws or formal 
rules. Different organisations exhibit different combinations of these four kinds of norms.
It is also possible to classify norms according to the tasks that they regulate (Liu 2000; Stamper, Liu 
et al. 2000). Substantive norms concern the core business functions and operations that contribute 
directly to organisational objectives, and direct the subjects’ performance in som e physical task 
such a s  the movement of goods. Communication norms specify patterns, structure and procedures 
of communication within an organisation, and have the role of ensuring that everyone knows what 
information should be kept and provided, and what actions should be taken and when. Control 
norms introduce sanctions and rewards, and act a s  a mechanism to reinforce that everyone does 
what he or she is supposed to do, a s  prescribed by the other two types of norms. Additionally, 
control norms influence the subjects by evaluating their conformity to other norms.
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Appendix 5 -  Brief overview of the evolution of the 
concept of category
The classical view of categories dates from Aristotles and is based upon the notion of categories a s  
discrete entities characterised by a se t of properties that are shared by their members (Edghill
2004), and upon which logical operations can be performed (Edwards 1991).
According to the Aristotelian or classical view, categories are clearly defined, mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive, exhibiting systematic patterns of within-category similarity and between- 
category difference (Kurtz and Gentner 2001). Consequently, any object belongs unequivocally to 
one, and only one, of the proposed categories. The classical approach to the study of categories 
further assum ed that agents categorised objects using the common features or attributes among 
those sam e objects:
'(The classical view) assumes that categories are logical bounded entities, membership in 
which is defined by an item's possession of a simple set of criterial features, in which all 
instances possessing the criterial attributes have a full and equal degree of membership.' 
(Rosch and Mervis 1975)
The classical view of categories is, therefore, merely descriptive (Margolis 2003). It does not explain 
why people have difficulty in defining categories that they employ (McNamara and Sternberg 1983), 
or why definitions often differ markedly between agents or even for the sam e agent over time 
(Rosch 1975). Additionally, people tend to disagree about whether a  particular observation is a 
member of one category or another (McCloskey and Glucksberg 1978; Barsalou 1989) thus 
questioning the classical view that objects will unequivocally belong to one category or not.
The work developed by Eleanor Rosch (Rosch 1975; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch 1978; Mervis 
and Rosch 1981) and George Lakoff (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987), however, challenged 
the view of categorisation as the process of grouping things on base of the presence of the sam e 
features of the objects and suggested. Instead, the authors treated categories a s  resemblance 
structures and categorisation as based on the similarities between the object and the mental 
representation of that object:
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‘Subjects... rate the extent to which a member of a category fits their idea or image of the 
meaning of the category name... and such ratings predict performance in a number of 
tasks.’ (Rosch and Mervis 1975)
R oss illustrated the role of mental models with numerous experiments:
‘(The) results confirmed that natural categories such as colours, lines, and numbers have 
reference stimuli in relation to which other stimuli of the category are judged (...) that there 
are ideal types which act as anchoring points for perception or conception'. (Rosch 1975)
The mental representations -  or schem as - are very persistent tem plates that structure cognition by 
identifying the prominent elements of a  situation (Billman and Davila 1995; Billman 1996; Pazzani 
2000) and by describing the causal relations between them (Rosch 1973; Fiske and Taylor 1991; 
Markman and Gentner 2001; Elsbach, Barr et al. 2005). The information stored in the schem a is a 
summary of the most typical features of members in a given category, and new exemplars are 
classified based on their similarity to stored exemplars (Zhang and Markman 1998), and their 
distance from other existing schem as (Rosch 1978; Kruschke 2005; Sloman and Lagnado 2005). 
Furthermore, similarity is determined by the matching between observed features and particularly 
salient or frequent features of the stored mental models (Hampton 1979). Other factors that may 
impact on the content of categories are encoding factors such a s  the person paying more or less 
attention to past episodes where he or she became exposed to particular elements of the situation, 
or the number of repetition of the events (Hintzman 1988).
Research into classification processes, therefore, requires from the researcher a focus on the 
mental representations of the person engaging in cognitive activity, rather than on the attributes of 
the objects being classified. Such an individualist understanding of categorisation implies that the 
system s of categories are rooted in people’s experience and, a s  such, not uniform in their 
composition (Medin, Lynch et al. 1997; Medin, Lynch et al. 2000). Indeed, even when two 
individuals agree on a lexical categorisation, the denotation of identities and behaviours might still 
differ (Schneider 2003). Loewenstein and Ocasio (2003) provide one example of such variety of 
composition:
‘The word Vice President means something different in a commercial bank, where the title 
is ubiquitous and the power of the occupant limited, than in most industrial corporations 
where the term is understood to imply a relatively higher status and rank.’ (Loewenstein and 
Ocasio 2003)
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Appendix 6 -  Brief overview of the role of context in 
cognition
The study of the role of the context in classification tends to be divided in two fields. On the one 
hand, there are those that argue that schem as exist ‘in the head’ and that the influence of context 
on schem as is via it triggering the activation of particular schem as depending on how the situation 
is framed. On the other hand, there are those that defend that context has primacy over schem as 
and actively influence the content of such schem as. The two views are presented, next.
Context a s  a trigger of existing schem as
The field of work looking at how context triggers categorisation is loosely defined a s  framing. One 
example of framing is that reported by Tenbrunsel and colleagues, in a study of preference for 
alternative environmental policies. Namely, Tenbrunsel et al. (2000) reported that framing a 
decision concerning environmental policy in terms of meeting standards or of developing solutions, 
influenced which environmental policy w as selected. And framing an event a s  a threat triggers 
different evaluative schem as, and hence actions, than framing the sam e event as an opportunity 
(Dutton and Jackson 1987; Dutton 1992; Papadakis, Kaloghirou et al. 1999; Gilbert 2006).
Technology, as  an element of context, may lead to framing in the sense  that the technical platform 
chosen to process or present the data may increase the salience of particular pieces of information 
and that, in turn, cues attention and influences how a person thinks about a given problem (Smelcer 
and Carmel 1997; Potter and Balthazard 2004).
Another element of the context that leads to framing is the exhibited or perceived behaviour of other 
persons. In particular, when a person is aware of or observes a particular behaviour in others, he or 
she is more likely to engage in that sam e behaviour (Milgram, Bickman et al. 1969; Fiske and 
Taylor 1991; Kallgren, Reno et al. 2000; Cialdini and Goldstein 2003; Cialdini 2005). The fact that 
donations to street musicians in a  heavily trafficked spot are influenced by the number of passers- 
by who put money in the musician’s  (Cialdini 2005) is an often cited example. Additionally, littering
Page 203
is known to be significantly affected by how clean the setting w as in the first place (e.g., (Reiter and 
Samuel 1980)) and this pattern is accentuated when the person’s  attention is purposely drawn to 
the actions of other persons (Cialdini 1996). Cialdini (1993) argued that the observation of the 
behaviour of others offers an information processing advantage and a decisional shortcut when one 
is choosing how to behave in a given situation. The reasoning is that if everyone is doing or thinking 
or believing it, it must be a sensible thing to do or think or believe.
In summary, different elements of the context may increase the salience of different attributes in the 
stimuli and, ultimately, lead to the observation being allocated to different categories. However, 
compliance with the social norm seem s to occur a t an unconscious level leading to what has been 
described a s  the attribution fallacy, that is the observation that not only are people very much 
influenced by the social context, but they tend to believe that they are not so influenced (Thomas, 
Kellogg et al. 2001; Cialdini 2003).
Context a s  a creator of schem as
In contrast to the approach that defends that schem as are stable and not determined by context, 
there are researchers who consider that context is influential for the content of the schem as -  that 
is, that schem as are socially constructed and, hence, a result of the context where they emerge 
(Sharma 2000).
Individuals participating in a social group -  such a s  an organisation - tend to represent the world in 
similar ways (Thompson, Levine et al. 1999; Elsbach, Barr et al. 2005; Mantaras, McSherry et al.
2005), a s  a result of the interactions between the various group m em bers (King 2005). Furthermore, 
members of different organisations have many different shared experiences, leading to individuals 
within an organisation thinking more like each other than like the mem bers of another organisation 
(Donaldson and Lorsch 1983). A strong organisational culture affects the thinking of the 
organisation's decision makers and, in turn, the goals and the attention of the group members 
(Peteraf and Shanley 1997). While culture does not rigidly determine the responses of its group 
members, 7f provides interpretive perspective for making sense of reality1 (Lehman, Chiu e t al.
2004).
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Douglas (1987), addressing the role of the organisation and organisational culture in shaping the 
cognition of individuals, defended that organisations restrain an individual’s  p rocesses of classifying 
and recognising, to the point that:
‘An answer is only seen to be the right one if it sustains the institutional thinking that is 
already in the minds of the individuals as they try to decide’ (page 4).
In addition to shared experiences, particular schem as may em erge a s  the result of the actions of 
particular members of the organisation. Studies in organisation sense-making have demonstrated 
that m anagers occupying strategic level roles a t the top of the organisation hierarchy are uniquely 
placed to influence how issues are interpreted in organisations (Daft and Weick 1984; Maitlis and 
Lawrence 2003; Lawrence, Mauws et al. 2005). However, the top m anagers’ interpretations may be 
shaped by sense-giving efforts of middle m anagers who engage in issue selling or who contribute 
to strategic conversations through provision of information (Dutton and Ashford 1993; Dutton, 
Ashford et al. 1997; Maitlis 2005), a s  well as exploitation of key relationships, managem ent of 
impressions and protection of formal authority (Maitlis 2004).
The process by which dominant groups determine the composition of categories, in turn, is linked 
with issues of processes of decision making in organisations. Maitlis (2005) suggested that decision 
making, in organisations, follows neither a homogeneous nor a random process. Instead, variations 
in decision making style can be traced back to different types of participation in and control of the 
process. In a longitudinal study of three organisations and 27 issue domains, Maitlis analysed how 
the sense  making process and the type of outcomes varies with the level and type of interaction 
between the organisation’s  leader and its stakeholders. The study examined how leader and 
stakeholders fuelled the decision making process with a particular form of energy: a  highly involved 
leader resulted in processes that were highly controlled, occurred in an organised and systematic 
fashion, and that took place through private meetings rather than public, open forums; highly 
involved stakeholders resulted in highly animated processes, characterised by intense exchanges 
of information, that remained active over an extended period of time. Furthermore, the study 
described how the outcomes varied with the type of social processes: high control processes led to
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unitary accounts, enacted through consistent, planned actions; high animation processes led to rich 
accounts, enacted in a series of actions.
On a separate line of work, Steen (2005) investigated the relationship between decision processes 
and outcomes. Steen noted that the beliefs that characterise an organisation’s  culture are not 
homogeneously distributed by all members of one organisation. Instead, employees higher in the 
organisational hierarchy tend to have more homogeneous beliefs than other employees. 
Additionally, older and more successful firms tend to exhibit more homogeneity of beliefs than other 
firms. Steen suggested that when the beliefs of the members of an organisation were aligned with 
those of their manager, the decision making processes were faster. Alignment of beliefs also 
increased the predictability of the outcomes of the decision making processes.
Regarding the type of organisation, Dougherty and colleagues (2000) proposed that:
‘There are qualitatively different systems of sense-making in non-innovative versus 
innovative organisations -  innovative organisations are that way in part because they have 
a system of sense-making that straightforwardly allows them to construct, bracket, interpret, 
and rethink the right kinds of (...) knowledge... People on innovative firms understand both 
knowledge and the linking processes in practice-centred, action terms’. (Dougherty, Borrelli 
et al. 2000)
Pickel (2005) added that more stable, powerful and socially significant system s tend to have clearer 
enforcement mechanisms of socially shared schem as. Lastly, a socially constructed category is 
more likely to be imposed on an individually constructed one when the person engaging in 
classification is cognitively busy (Knowles, Morris et al. 2001) or needs to make judgements under 
time pressure (Chiu, Morris et al. 2000).
The literature outlined in this appendix suggests that context affects cognition, be it in the sense  
that context makes particular stimuli salient and activates specific schem as via framing, or in the 
sense that the context actually determines the composition of individual mental schem as.
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Appendix 7 -  The FSA’s ARROW risk framework
Excerpt from the document “ARROW risk assessm ent framework" available at 
http://www.louisepryor.com/showTopic.do?topic=30
The FSA has developed the ARROW risk assessm ent framework with the following objectives:
» Help FSA meet its statutory objectives by focusing on key risks
■ Influence resource allocation to make efficient and effective use of limited resources
■ Use appropriate regulatory tools to deal with risks or issues
■ Undertake proportionally more work on a thematic (or cross-sectional) basis
ARROW stands for Advanced Risk Response Operating frameWork.
Firms are assigned to one of four supervision categories, based on the risk they pose to the FSA’s 
objectives, a s  perceived by the FSA. The ARROW framework describes how the FSA a sse sse s  the 
risk. Although the requirements are the sam e for all firms, the level of the FSA’s  involvement 
depends on the supervision category. Firms in category A can expect a close and continuous 
relationship; those in category D can expect little or no individual contact.
An extremely important aspect of the whole regulatory approach of the FSA is that only the risks to 
the FSA's objectives are considered. These objectives are concerned with market confidence, 
public aw areness, consumer protection and the reduction of financial crime. Risks to shareholder 
value, for example, do not explicitly concern the FSA.
The FSA a sse sse s  the risk that a firm poses to its objectives by considering the impact and 
probability separately. The unit of assessm ent may be the individual firm, or a business unit 
consisting of several firms (in large groups) or within a firm.
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The impact assessm ent depends on the size of the firm, and is expressed a s  high, medium high, 
medium low, or low. The size of the firm is m easured by premium income, assets/liabilities, funds 
under management, annual turnover, or other similar m easures, depending on the firm's sector.
The probability assessm ent is performed on a firm by firm basis, by considering each element in a 
matrix of risks. The thoroughness of the probability assessm ent depends on the impact rating of the 
firm. Low impact firms won’t be assessed  individually; high impact firms will be assessed  in great 
detail, with visits from the FSA; those in the middle will get desk-based assessm ents.
After performing the probability assessm ent, the FSA develops a risk mitigation programme (RMP) 
for the firm. The RMP will use a selection of regulatory tools intended to reduce the risks that have 
been flagged a s  requiring action. Usually, this m eans that the firm has to take some action: produce 
and implement a  plan for introducing a risk management process, for example.
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Appendix 8 -  AML related fines applied by the FSA
Table A1 details som e of the fines applied by the FSA following AML related audits.
Table A.1 -  Exam ple of fines applied by FSA following AML related aud its
Institution Fine Date
Royal Bank of Scotland Pic £ 750,000 17 Dec 2002
Northern Bank £1,250,000 7 Aug 2003
Abbey National companies £ 2,320,000 10 Dec 2003
Bank of Scotland Pic £1,250,000 15 Jan 2004
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich £ 150,000 6 Apr 2004
Bank of Ireland £ 375,000 2 Sep 2004
Source: adapted from FSA (2003) and Kitano (2005)
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Appendix 9 -  ‘The Times’ article
The article transcribed in this appendix w as obtained from 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article518611 .ece
The Times 
February 25, 2005
IRA pic turns from terror into biggest crime gang in Europe
The Republicans' crooked business empire rakes in huge am ounts 
By David Lister and Sean O’Neill
AN ANALYSIS of the IRA’s  involvement in criminal activities shows a huge range of operations, 
from smuggling to money laundering and from robbery to mortgage applications.
ALCOHOL
The IRA is believed to have perfected the recipe for Smirnoff Red Label vodka, among other spirits, 
and has a well-developed distribution network for its counterfeit products in pubs and clubs which it 
controls, particularly in Belfast.
Raids on illegal distilleries, mainly in border areas, have uncovered bottling and capping machinery 
and high- quality copies of brand labels. Many of the products are designed for use in pub optics.
Police found the seven-stage filtration machinery for deionising water not long after Diageo, the 
drinks company, had introduced the process at its plants. “They use industrial espionage to copy 
machinery, recipes and labels and are prepared to be very patient to get things absolutely right,” 
said a police source.
The IRA takes the production of counterfeit spirits so seriously that it even has a quality control unit. 
Diageo and other companies have countered with a security division which works with police and 
Customs on both sides of the Irish border. Last December Irish Customs seized 1,500 litres of pure
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alcohol on the Cooley peninsula, Co Louth, a s  well a s  printing presses and labels for a variety of 
vodka brands.
A Diageo spokesman said: “We are very concerned about this illegal trade. It impacts on our 
consumers, on government revenues and on us a s  the brand owners.”
ROBBERY
The IRA’s “elite robbery team ” is a dedicated unit allegedly run by Bobby Storey, its director of 
intelligence who is revered by republicans for his anti-surveillance expertise.
The group’s  income through robberies varies from year to year. According to Special Branch, 
Storey played a central role in the theft of £26.5 million from the Northern Bank just before 
Christmas and organised three other robberies which netted a further £3 million last year.
In each case the IRA used a tactic known a s  “tiger kidnapping”, where the family of an employee is 
held hostage to ensure his or her co-operation. Since April last year there have been eleven “tiger 
kidnappings”, a t least four of which have been blamed on the IRA.
In one such raid at the Makro cash-and-carry store outside Belfast last May, four staff were held at 
gunpoint, tied up and gagged. Cigarettes, alcohol and electrical items worth more than £1 million 
were stolen. In October the IRA stole cigarettes worth £2 million from a warehouse in Ardoyne, 
North Belfast, owned by Gallaher’s tobacco company. Over the past two years it has stolen 
cigarettes worth nearly £4 million from lorries passing through South Armagh. The IRA has also 
been able to import cigarette cargos through Dublin port.
In the Irish Republic smaller-scale robberies of security vans and post offices have been used to 
train new recruits.
CROSS-BORDER SMUGGLING
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Smuggling is a way of life in South Armagh, the heartland of militant republicanism. According to 
Customs, about half of Northern Ireland’s  filling stations sell fuel smuggled from the Irish Republic, 
where duty is considerably lower, at a cost to the Treasury of about £200 million a year.
Fuel smuggling, much of it organised by the notorious South Armagh ‘‘brigade’’, is now arguably the 
IRA’s  single largest source of income. “What the IRA love is excise and revenue frauds, and the fuel 
smuggling is on an industrial scale,” said a security source. “Diesel in the Republic is about 66 or 
67p per litre, so straight away you can make a profit of about 15p per litre.
“They get even more with agricultural diesel, which they buy at around 15-20p per litre, then use 
chemical processes to wash the dye and the markers out of it. It is then sold a s  ordinary car fuel for 
70 to 80p per litre.”
According to the Organised Crime Task Force, the IRA’s  fuel-laundering plants — often concealed 
in bam s along the border — produce up to five million litres of illegal fuel each year, making an 
annual profit of at least £3 million.
About a third of all cigarettes in Northern Ireland are also smuggled, much of this proportion by the 
IRA, according to Customs. The cigarettes are typically brought in by the container-load from zero 
or low-tax countries such a s  Thailand, China and Turkey. A 40ft container can hold ten million 
cigarettes worth £1.5 million.
The IRA is still heavily involved in smuggling sheep and livestock across the border so that farmers 
can take advantage of VAT differences in the Republic, which allows them to claim a rebate for 
lambs.
In recent months the IRA has embarked on a  new activity: the illegal dumping of household waste 
from the Republic, where residents now have to pay “bin taxes’. Police have identified at least five 
illegal dumping sites in Northern Ireland, with w aste ranging from 5,000 to 25,000 tonnes with a 
value of up to £5,000 per 20-tonne lorryload.
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IP CRIME
“W herever there Is a penny to be made, these boys will be turning their hands to it," said one 
security official.
Seizures of pirate DVDs, CDs and computer gam es and software are  at record levels but the 
quantity of goods recovered is believed to be dwarfed by how much escap es detection.
The paramilitaries have long been involved in this trade and the IRA’s  links with America gave it 
access to new releases. Today much of the illegal product in the province is burnt on to DVDs 
locally after m aster copies are imported or downloaded.
Last weekend counterfeit goods worth £200,000, including DVDs, videos, CDs, fireworks and 
electrical items, were seized in Jonesborough in the heart of South Armagh.
The IRA’s  counterfeiting operations extend to fake football strips, designer clothes, power tools and, 
in a recent discovery, a well-known brand of washing powder.
In the past it has been involved in the smuggling and sale of fake-branded disposable razors,
toothpaste and other toiletries sold door to door. In one notorious example, a fake perfume seized
at a market in Northern Ireland contained urine a s  a stabiliser.
CONSULTANCY
Special Branch believes that the IRA received up to $6 million (£3.1 million) for helping to train 
Marxist rebels in Colombia, where three alleged IRA members are wanted after vanishing on bail 
last December.
The payment was allegedly negotiated by a former IRA “chief of sta ff who has worldwide contacts 
— including in Libya, where republicans are believed to have deposited some of the proceeds from 
their vast criminal empire.
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Other senior republicans have also travelled to cultivate links with the PLO in the Middle East and 
Eta in Spain. In the past IRA men trained alongside ANC guerrillas in South Africa.
Police say that other payments have almost certainly been received from overseas for the IRA’s  
terrorist expertise in intelligence gathering to bomb-making.
According to Special Branch, the IRA is also heavily involved in providing security services for pubs, 
clubs and other venues in Belfast The group does not officially deal in drugs but it is believed to 
have “licensed” the trade of illegal drugs by the dissident groups and independent dealers in Dublin.
MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIME
The IRA’s  finance unit is said to have contributed to Belfast’s  property boom by investing in 
property.
Detectives investigating a suspected IRA money-laundering network in the Republic believe that it 
controls a huge business portfolio including pubs, restaurants, night clubs, office blocks, taxi firms, 
filling stations and nursing homes. Often the IRA invests a s  a silent partner in legitimate businesses.
The authorities also believe that the terrorist group has been looking at property opportunities 
overseas, particularly in fast-growing markets outside the European Union such a s  Bulgaria, Turkey 
and Libya.
“You just can’t quantify it,” said one official. “The money is put through so many channels that it’s  
impossible to know. Nobody knows how much property they have, but it’s a lot."
Other financial crimes include insurance and compensation frauds, VAT frauds, and the diversion of 
government and EU grants.
In W est Belfast, the IRA even helps ordinary Roman Catholics to forge mortgage applications, 
offering bogus references and salary statem ents in return for a  share of the loan.
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Appendix 10 -  Excerpt from BFI’s policy booklet
What should make me suspicious?
There are no defined “indicators* and your suspicions wiil likely depend on the context of a 
transaction. Nevertheless, you should be suspicious where any request for services, a 
transaction or a series of transactions is unusual either for the customer or for the Group. 
For instance (on a Group wide basis):
o Large case deposits at a branch or post office; 
o Large or numerous cheque deposits for personal customers; 
o Large or regular international transactions for personal customers; 
o High value or regular early settlement instructions for investment transactions;
o High value retail customers where the source of their wealth is unknown;
o Mortgage customers where the source of repayment is unusual or for low loan to 
value loans the employment details provided by the customer do not ring true; 
o Unusual counterparties or settlement instructions in Treasury business; 
o Customers who are reluctant or hesitant about providing information about 
themselves and/or their business which will enable us to complete verification 
procedures;
o Customers who can only be contacted by mobile phone;
o Business customers who are unwilling to meet at their offices or premises;
o Customers seeking to borrow where there is no apparent reason why they should 
require the advance; 
o Customers appears disinterested in service charges or interest rates. ’
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Appendix 11 -  Definition of PEPs, according to BFI’s 
policy booklet
‘A person occupying any of the roles below, as well as the families of such a person and close 
associates:
o Heads of state, government and cabinet ministers;
o Influential functionaries in nationalised industries and government administration;
o Senior judges (high Court, Crown Court, or above);
o Senior party functionaries;
o Senior and/or influential officials, functionaries and military leaders and people with 
similar functions in international and supranational organisations;
o Members of ruling royal families;
o Senior and/or influential representatives of religious organisations (if these 
functions are connected with political, judicial, military or administrative 
responsibilities. ’
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